REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6810 of 2022     
(@SLP (C) NO.11216 of 2022) 
Bhimashankar Sahakari      
Sakkare Karkhane Niyamita       ..Appellant(s)
Versus
Walchandnagar Industries              
Ltd. (WIL)                               ..Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the
impugned   judgment   and   order   dated
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  1  of  44

23.02.2022   passed   by   the   High   Court   of
Karnataka, at Kalaburagi in Misc. First Appeal
No.201018/2018 by which the High Court has
dismissed   the   said   appeal   and   has   confirmed
the   order   dated   02.04.2018   passed   by   the
learned   III   Additional   District   &   Sessions
Judge,   Vijayapur   (hereinafter   referred   to   as
“trial   Court”)   in   rejecting   the   application   for
condonation   of   delay   caused   in   preferring   the
application under Section 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred
to   as   “Arbitration   Act”)   ,   the   original   applicant
has preferred the present appeal. 
2. The   brief   facts   leading   to   filing   of   the   present
appeal in nut­shell are as under: 
2.1 That, an arbitral award was passed against the
appellant   under   the   provisions   of   the
Arbitration   Act   on   24.08.2016.   As   per   Section
34(3)   of   the   Arbitration   Act,   90   days   are
prescribed   for   preferring   an   application   under
Section   34   of   the   Arbitration   Act   against   the
arbitral   award.   However,   the   said   period   was
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  2  of  44

extendable   by   a   further   period   of   30   days   in
terms of the  proviso  to Section 34(3) of the Act,
2016.   In   the   present   case,   the   period   of   90
days   prescribed   under   Section   34(3)   of   the
Arbitration   Act   expired   on   24.11.2016.   The
appellant   was   entitled   to   a   further   extended
period of 30 days from 23.11.2016 onwards in
terms of the  proviso  to Section 34(3) which was
upto 24.12.2016. 
2.2 The   trial   Courts   were   closed   on   account   of
winter / Christmas vacations from 19.12.2016
to   01.01.2017.   However,   it   so   happened   that
extendable   /   condonable   period   of   30   days   as
contemplated   in   the   proviso   to   Section   34(3)
expired   on   24.12.2016   on   which   day   the   trial
Court   was   closed   on   account   of   winter   /
Christmas   vacation.   The   appellant   herein   filed
the   application   under   Section   34   of   the
Arbitration   Act,   challenging   the   award   passed
by   the   Arbitral   Tribunal.   The   appellant   also
filed   IA   No.1   for   condonation   of   delay.   Both,
Section   34   application   as   well   as   the
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  3  of  44

application   for   condonation   of   delay   were   filed
on   the   reopening   day   i.e.   on   02.01.2017.   As
the   application   under   Section   34   of   the
Arbitration   Act   was   beyond   the   prescribed
period   of   provided   under   Section   34   of   the
Arbitration   Act   as   well   as   beyond   the
condonable period of 30 days, the learned trial
Court   dismissed   the   IA   No.1   and   refused   to
condone the delay by observing that the period
beyond   120   days   is   not   condonable   as   under
the   Arbitration   Act,   maximum   period   provided
for   preferring   an   application   under   Section   34
is   120   days.   At   this   stage   it   is   required   to   be
noted that in the affidavit filed by the appellant
before   the   High   Court,   filed   in   support   of   IA
No.1,   the   appellant   as   such   admitted   that   it
received the copy of the award on 24.08.2016.
However,   according   to   the   appellant,   the   said
award was misplaced and thereafter obtained a
fresh   copy   on   29.12.2016.     The   learned   trial
Court observed that in that view of the matter,
the   period   of   limitation   would   commence   from
24.08.2016   and   120   days   are   to   be   counted
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  4  of  44

from 24.08.2016.   
2.3 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the
order   passed   by   the   learned   trial   Court
refusing   to   condone   the   delay   in   preferring
application under Section 34 of the Arbitration
Act,   the   appellant   herein   preferred   an   appeal
before the High Court. 
2.4 Before   the   High   Court,   Section   4   of   the
Limitation   Act,   1963   and   Section   10   of   the
General   Clauses   Act,   1897   were   pressed   into
service.   By   the   impugned   judgment   and   order
the   High   Court   has   dismissed   the   said   appeal
by   observing   that   the   expression   “prescribed
period” appearing in Section 4 of the Limitation
Act   cannot   be   construed   to   mean   anything
other   than   the   period   of   limitation   and
therefore,   any   period   beyond   the   prescribed
period, during which the Court or Tribunal has
the discretion to allow a person to institute the
proceeding,   cannot   be   taken   to   be   “prescribed
period”. 
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  5  of  44

2.5 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the
impugned   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the
High   Court,   the   original   applicant   has
preferred the present appeal. 
3. Shri   Shyam   Diwan,   learned   Senior   Advocate
has   appeared   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   and
Shri   Dhruv   Mehta,   learned   Senior   Advocate
has   appeared   on   behalf   of   the   contesting
respondent. 
4. Shri   Shyam   Diwan,   learned   Counsel   has
submitted that Section 34(3) of the Arbitration
Act specifies that the limitation period for filing
an   application   for   setting   aside   the   arbitral
award   under   Section   34   is   three   months   from
the date on which the party making application
has   received   the   award.   However,   if   the   Court
is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by
sufficient   cause   from   making   the   application
within   the   said   period   of   three   months,   the
proviso   to the Section specifies   a further period
of 30 days   within which the application under
Section 34 may be filed/entertained. 
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  6  of  44

4.1 It is submitted that the central question in the
present   petition   is   whether   when   the   last   day
of   condonable   period   of   30   days   falls   on   a
holiday   or   during   a   court   vacation,   would   the
benefit   of   Section   10   of   the   General   Clauses
Act, 1897 would be available to the appellant?
4.2 It   is   submitted   that   in   other   words,   can   the
petitioner – appellant file the application on the
next date when the Court reopens, in line with
the   settled   principle   that   the   law   does   not
compel   a   person   to   do   an   impossible   act.   It   is
submitted   that   in   the   present   case   the
petitioner   –  appellant   had   filed   the  application
under   Section   34   on   the   very   day   when   the
Court reopened. 
4.3 It   is   submitted   by   Shri   Shyam   Diwan,   learned
Senior   Counsel   that   not   extending   the   benefit
of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act to the
appellant   in   such   circumstances   leads   to   an
anomalous   situation   wherein   the   benefit   of
statutorily prescribed condonable period is cut
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  7  of  44

short for some persons due to intervention of a
holiday   or   a   court   vacation,   while   being   fully
available to other persons due to the fortuitous
circumstance of no court vacation intervening.
It   is   submitted   that   this   creates   uncertainty
and   unpredictability   in   the   application   of
provision in question. 
4.4 It is submitted that the present case reflects an
anomalous   situation   where   Section   4   of   the
Limitation   Act,   which   only   deals   with   the
period   of   limitation   prescribed   under   the
Limitation   Act,   leaves   a   vacuum   as   far   as
statutory condonable period is concerned. It is
submitted   that   the   judgment   in   the   case   of
Assam   Urban   Water   Supply   and   Sewerage
Board   vs.   Subash   Projects   and   Marketing
Limited   reported   in   (2012)   2   SCC   624   failed
to   take   into   account   that   in   the   case   of   such
statutory condonable periods, Section 10 of the
General   Clauses   Act,   1897,   which   is   much
wider   in   its   import   and   applicability,   and
embodies   the   same   legal   principle,   must
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  8  of  44

necessarily step in to fill the vacuum. 
4.5 It   is   submitted   that   while   passing   the
impugned judgment and order, the High Court
has   heavily   relied   upon   the   decision   of   this
Court   in   the   case   of   Assam   Urban   (Supra)
while holding that the term “prescribed period”
referred   to   in   Section   4   of   the   Limitation   Act,
1963   only   includes   the   limitation   period   and
not the 30­day condonable / grace period. It is
submitted   that   however   the   case   of   Assam
Urban   (Supra)   does   not   notice   or   deal   with
Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. It
only   notices   and   deals   with   Section   4   of   the
Limitation   Act,   1963   and   holds   that   the   term
“prescribed   period”   mentioned   in   Section   4
means  the  period   of  limitation.  It  is submitted
that the judgment in the case of   Assam Urban
(Supra)   fails   to   notice   that   Section   4   of   the
Limitation   Act,   1963   which   deals   with   the
period   of   limitation   prescribed   under   the
Limitation   Act,   1963,   leaves   a   vacuum   as   far
as   the   statutory   condonable   period   is
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  9  of  44

concerned. 
4.6 It is submitted that in failing to notice Section
10   of   the   General   Clauses   Act,   1897,   the
judgment  in  the  case  of   Assam  Urban  (Supra)
disregards   the   principle   embodied   in   the
General Clauses Act which is much wider in its
import   and   applicability   and   must   necessarily
step   in   to   fill   the   vacuum   left   by   Section   4   of
the Limitation Act. 
4.7 It  is  further  submitted  by  Shri  Diwan,  learned
Senior   Counsel   appearing   for   the   appellant
that   although   the   same   general   principle   of
“elementary   justice”   is   embodied   in   both
Sections   of   the   two   Acts,   there   is   a   crucial
distinction   between   the   Limitation   Act,   1963
and the General Clauses Act, 1897. 
4.8 It   is   submitted   that   Section   2(j)   of   the
Limitation   Act   defines   “period   of   limitation”.   It
is   submitted   that   thus,   while   the   term
“prescribed period” has a narrower meaning in
the  context  of Limitation  Act, there is no such
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  10  of  44

restrictive   definition   clause   in   the   General
Clauses   Act.   It   is   submitted   that   in   fact,   the
scheme   of   Section   10   of   the   General   Clauses
Act is clear from a bare perusal of the provision
and   indicates   that   there   are   two   prescribed
periods   in   this   Section   viz.   (1)   the   prescribed
period within which something is directed to be
done, or (2) the prescribed period within which
something is  allowed to be done . 
4.9 It   is   submitted   that   therefore,   reading   of
Section   10   of   the   General   Clauses   Act,   1897
makes   it   clear   that   the   period   in   which
something   is   allowed   to   be   done,   such   as   30
days  condonable   period  provided  by   proviso   to
Section   34(3)   of   the   Arbitration   Act   is   also   a
prescribed   period   within   the   meaning   of   the
General Clauses Act, 1897. 
4.10 It   is   further   submitted   by   Shri   Shyam   Diwan,
learned Senior Counsel appearing  on behalf of
the   appellant   that   the   principle   embodied   in
Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is
an   elementary   piece   of   justice.   It   is   submitted
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  11  of  44

that   the   60 th
  Law   Commission   Report   on   the
General   Clauses   Act   reiterated   the
parliamentary intention behind the Act and the
provision,   which   is   to   deliver   elementary
justice.  
4.11 It   is   submitted   that   in   the   case   of   HUDA   &
Anr.   vs.   Dr.   Babeswar   Kanhar   &   Anr.
reported in   (2005) 1 SCC  191 , this Court has
observed   and   held   that   every   consideration   of
justice   and   expediency   would   require   that   the
accepted principle which underlines Section 10
of   the   General   Clauses   Act,   1897   should   be
applied in cases where it does not otherwise in
terms   apply.   It   is   observed   that   the   principles
underlying are  lex non cogit ad impossibilia  (law
does   not   compel   a   man   to   do   the   impossible)
and   actus   curiae   neminem   gravabit   (the   act   of
court   shall   prejudice   no   man).   It   is   submitted
that   in   the   case   of   Manohar   Joshi   vs.   Nitin
Bhaurao   Patil   and   Ors.   reported   in   (1996)   1
SCC 169 , it is observed and held by this Court
that   the   litigant   has   a   right   to   avail   limitation
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  12  of  44

up to the last day and his only obligation is to
explain   his   inability   to   present   the   suit   /
petition   on   the   last   day   of  limitation   and  each
day thereafter till it is actually presented.  
4.12 It   is   further   submitted   that   if   as   held   in   the
case   of   Assam   Urban   (Supra) ,   the   benefit   of
Section 4 of the Limitation Act is only available
for the period of limitation and is not available
for   the   statutorily   granted   condonable   period.
Section   10   of   the   General   Clauses   Act,   1897
must step in to fill the vacuum. It is submitted
that any  contrary  view would deny  individuals
the full play of the statutory period of 30 days
for condonation of delay. 
4.13 Now,   so  far   as  the  contention   on   behalf  of   the
respondent that present proceeding is “any Act
or   proceeding   to   which   the   Limitation   Act
applies”   is   a   misconceived   argument   is
concerned,   it   is   submitted   that   the
respondents   have   sought   to   rely   on   proviso   to
Section   10   of   the   General   Clauses   Act,   1897.
Relying   upon   Section   43(1)   of   the   Arbitration
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  13  of  44

Act   to   contend   that   the   Limitation   Act   applies
to the present proceedings, it is submitted that
Section   43(1)   of   the   Arbitration   Act   merely
states   that   “the   Limitation   Act,   1963   shall
apply   to   arbitrations   as   it   applies   to
proceedings in Court”. It is submitted that this
cannot   be   interpreted   to   mean   that   the
Limitation   Act,   in   its   entirety   applies   to
proceeding under Section 34 of the Arbitration
Act   and   that   the   present   proceedings   are   an
act   or   proceeding   to   which   the   Limitation   Act
applies. It is submitted that in fact, in matters
of   limitation,   Section   34   of   the   Arbitration   Act
is   a   complete   code.   It   is   submitted   that   the
respondent’s   entire   case,   on   one   hand,   is   that
the   benefit   of   Limitation   Act,   particularly
Section 4 of the Limitation Act, cannot be given
to the condonable period in the instant case. It
is   submitted   that   therefore   on   one   hand,   the
respondent   is   arguing   that   the   benefit   of
Section   4   of   the   Limitation   Act,   as   well   as
Section   5   of   the   Limitation   Act   has   no
application   to   the   condonable   period   under
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  14  of  44

Section   34   of   the   Arbitration   Act,   i.e.   the
Limitation   Act   has   no   application   in   the
present   proceedings,   at   the   same   time,   the
respondent   is   contending   that   the   benefit   of
Section   10   of   the   General   Clauses   Act,   1897
cannot   be   given   to   the   appellant,   as   the
present proceeding falls within the ambit of the
phrase   “any   act   or   proceeding   to   which   the
Indian Limitation Act, 1877, applies”.
4.14 It  is  further  submitted  by  Shri  Diwan,  learned
Senior Counsel that the reliance placed on the
case   of   Sagufa   Ahmed   &   Ors.   vs.   Upper
Assam   Polywood   Products   Private   Limited
and   Others   reported   in   (2021)   2   SCC   317   is
misconceived for the following two reasons:
(1) The reference to Section 10 of the General
Clauses   Act,   1897   in   the   case   of   Sagufa
Ahmed (Supra)  is tangential at best;
(2) The   facts   of   Sagufa   Ahmed   (Supra)   are
clearly   distinguishable   from   the   case   at
hand.   In   that   case,   the   appellants   had
waited   5   months   after   the   discretionary
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  15  of  44

period   had   expired   to  file   an  appeal   against
the   order   of   the   Ld.   NCLT.   In   the   present
case, there was no undue delay  on the part
of   the   Petitioner   ­   appellant   herein.   The
petitioner ­ appellant filed the petition under
Section   34   of   the   very   day   of   the   reopening
of the Ld. Court. 
4.15 It   is   submitted   that   this   Court   in   its   order
dated   08.03.2021   in   suo   moto   Writ   Petition
(Civil)   No.3/2020,   has   put   a   quietus   to   the
artificial   distinction   between   the   ‘limitation
period’   and   ‘grace   period’,   wherein   it   extended
the   benefit   of   exemption   due   to   COVID   19   to
the limitation period as well as the condonable
period. 
4.16 It  is  further  submitted  by  Shri  Diwan,  learned
Senior   Counsel   that   the   aim   and   object   of   the
limitation   period   and   statutory   grace   period   /
condonable   period   provided   in   the   Arbitration
Act   is   to   ensure   that   parties   who   sleep   over
their rights and come to the court belatedly are
not   allowed   to   upset   the   apple   cart.   It   is
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  16  of  44

submitted   that   in   the   present   instance,   the
appellant   has   been   nothing   but   diligent   and
approached the learned trial Court on the very
day   of   reopening.   It   is   submitted   that   Section
10 of  the  General  Clauses  Act, 1897  has been
enacted   to   address   precisely   this   kind   of   a
situation   and   merely   because   the   benefit   of
Section   4   of   the   Limitation   Act,   1963   is
unavailable   in   a   case,   should   not   ipso   facto
exclude the application of the General Clauses
Act, 1897. 
4.17 It   is   submitted   that   the   appellant   is   an
agriculturists’   society,   and   despite   having
suffered   losses   due   to   non­fulfillment   of   their
obligations   by   the   respondent,   the   appellant’s
case   has   never   been   heard   on   merits.   It   is
submitted   that   therefore   non­suiting   the
appellant   in   the   present   instance   and   denying
the   benefit   of   Section   10   of   the   General
Clauses Act, 1897 (with the elementary rule of
justice   captured   in   it)   will   cause   a   grave
miscarriage of justice. 
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  17  of  44

Making above submissions, it is prayed to
set aside the order   passed by  the  learned trial
Court   as   well   as   the   High   Court   and   to
condone   the   delay   caused   in   preferring
application under Section 34 of the Arbitration
Act and to direct the learned trial Court to hear
the   application   under   Section   34   of   the
Arbitration   Act   on   merits   by   giving   the
appellant   an   opportunity   to   put   forth   its   case
on merits. 
5. Present   appeal   is   vehemently   opposed   by   Shri
Dhruv   Mehta,   learned   Senior   Counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondent. 
5.1 It   is   submitted   that   in   the   present   case   the
appellant   admittedly   received   the   award   on
24.08.2016.   As   per   Section   34   of   the
Arbitration   Act,   “the   prescribed   period”   of   3
months   to   challenge   the   award   expired   on
24.11.2016   and   further   period   of   30   days
under   the   proviso   to   Section   34(3)   of   the
Arbitration   Act   expired   on   24.12.2016.   That,
the  learned trial Court was on winter  vacation
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  18  of  44

between   19.12.2016   to   01.01.2017.   The
appellant   preferred   its   Section   34   of   the
Arbitration   Act   before   the   learned   trial   Court
on   02.01.2017   i.e.   on   the   day   of   reopening,
accompanied   by   an   application   seeking
condonation   of   delay.   It   is   submitted   that   the
learned   trial   Court   after   considering   both,   the
maintainability   and   merits   of   the   appellant’s
application for condonation, has found that the
application was not maintainable and also that
no   sufficient   cause   had   been   shown   by   the
appellant.   It   is   submitted   that   the   High   Court
has   upheld   the   order   of   trial   Court   that   the
petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act
was   not   maintainable   for   being   beyond   the
“prescribed   period”   under   Section   34(3)   of   the
Arbitration   Act.   It   is   submitted   that   therefore
the   following   questions   arise   for   consideration
in the present case. 
(1) Whether   the   benefit   of   Section   4   of   the
Limitation   Act,   1963   is   available   to   a   party
when the “prescribed period” of 3 months for
filing   a   petition   under   Section   34(3)   of   the
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  19  of  44

Arbitration   Act   has   already   expired   and   the
discretionary   period   of   30   days   under   the
proviso   to Section 34(3) falls on a day when
the Court is closed?
(2) Whether   the   benefit   of   Section   10   of   the
General   Clauses   Act,1897   is   separately
available to a party in such circumstances?
5.2 Now,  so far  as the applicability  of  Section  4 of
the   Limitation   Act   is   concerned,   it   is
vehemently   submitted   by   Shri   Dhruv   Mehta,
learned   Senior   Counsel   that   Section   4   of   the
Limitation Act shall not be applicable to the 30
days’   discretionary   condonable   period
contemplated under   proviso   to Section 34(3) of
the Arbitration Act. It is submitted that Section
34(3)   of   the   Arbitration   Act   stipulates   that   an
application   under   Section   34(1)   of   the
Arbitration   Act   challenging   an   arbitral   award
may   not   be   made   after   a   period   of   three
months   from   the   date   on   which   the   party
making   the   application   had   received   the
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  20  of  44

arbitral   award.   The   proviso   to   Section   34(3)
gives limited powers to the Court, on sufficient
cause   being   shown,   to   condone   delay   in   filing
the   application   under   Section   34(1)   only   for   a
maximum   period   of   30   days,   but   not
thereafter.   It   is   submitted   that   in   the   case   of
Union   of   India   v.   Popular   Construction   Co.
reported   in   (2001)   8   SCC   470   (Paras   10,   12,
14   and   16) ,   this   Court   has   observed   that
usage   of   words   “but   not   thereafter”   in   the
proviso   to Section 34(3) amounts to an express
exclusion   within   the   meaning   of   Section   29(2)
of   the   Limitation   Act.   Therefore,   the   Court
would have no discretion to condone the delay
in   excess   of   30   days.   Section   5   of   the
Limitation   Act   was,   therefore,   held   to   be
inapplicable to  Section  34(1) of the Arbitration
Act. 
5.3 It is submitted that Section 4 of the Limitation
Act is only applicable when the last date of the
“prescribed period” falls on a day on which the
Court   is   closed.   It   is   submitted   that   the   term,
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  21  of  44

“prescribed period” is defined in Section 2(j) of
the   Limitation   Act   as   being   the   period   of
limitation   computed   in   accordance   with   the
provisions of the Limitation Act. 
5.4 It   is   submitted   that   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Assam   Urban   (Supra)   (Paras   10   to   14)   has
held   that   “prescribed   period”   under   Section
34(3) of the Arbitration Act is three months. It
is   submitted   that   “further   period”   of   30   days
mentioned in the  proviso  to Section 34(3) of the
Arbitration Act cannot be said to be the “period
of   limitation”   and   therefore,   would   not   be   the
“prescribed period” for the purposes of making
an   application   for   setting   aside   the   arbitral
award.   It   is   submitted   that   thus,   in   the   said
decision, this Court has categorically held that
Section   4   of   the   Limitation   Act   which   applies
only   to   “prescribed   period”   is   not   attracted
when the last date of the “further period” of 30
days   mentioned   in   Section   34(3)   of   the
Limitation   Act   falls   on   a   day   on   which   the
Court is closed. It is submitted that the facts of
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  22  of  44

the case in   Assam Urban (Supra)   are identical
to the facts of the present case. It is submitted
that   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Assam   Urban   (Supra)   has   been   affirmed   by
Three   Judges’   Bench  of   this   Court   in   the   case
of  Sagufa Ahmed (Supra)  (Paras 20 – 22). 
5.5 It   is   further   submitted   by   Shri   Dhruv   Mehta,
learned   Senior   Counsel   that   the   correct
application   of   Section   4   of   the   Limitation   Act
will   result   in   a   petition   being   entertained   as   a
matter of right, without a party having to seek
condonation   of   delay,   since   it   applies   only   to
petitions   that   would   otherwise   be   within   the
“prescribed   period”  but   its  presentation   within
this   period   has   been   prevented   due   to   closure
of the Court. However, on the other hand, this
cannot   apply   to   a   delayed   petition   where,   in
any   event,   the   right   to   present   the   petition   is
subject   sufficient   cause   being   shown   and
condonation of delay being sought. 
5.6 Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the
appellant   that   the   judgment   in   the   case   of
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  23  of  44

Sagufa Ahmed  (Supra)   is not a good law or  is
distinguishable   is   concerned,   it   is   submitted
that as such the decision in the case of  Sagufa
Ahmed  (Supra)   lays down the correct law and
shall   be   applicable   with   full   force   on
interpretation   of   “to   condone   delay   within
further period”. 
5.7 It is submitted that the judgment in the case of
Sagufa   Ahmed   (Supra),   in   the   context   of
Section   421(3)   of   the   Companies   Act,   2013,
which   provides   a   prescribed   period   of   45   days
for   filing   an   appeal,   and   empowers   the
appellate Tribunal to condone the delay within
“further   period”   not   exceeding   45   days.   A
Three­Judges  Bench   of  this  Court  rejected  the
contention   of   the   appellants   therein   that   the
benefit of order of this Court dated 23.03.2020
in   Cognizance   for   Extension   of   Limitation,   In
re, (2020) 19 SCC 10, is extendable to them, by
holding   that   under   the   order   dated
23.03.2020, which was extended was only “the
period   of   limitation”   and   not   the   period   up   to
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  24  of  44

which   delay   can   be   condoned   in   exercise   of
discretion conferred by statute.
5.8 It is submitted that thus, in the case of  Sagufa
Ahmed   (Supra),   this   Court   while   affirming
Assam   Urban   (Supra)   has   held   that   the
expression   “prescribed   period”   appearing   in
Section   4   of   the   Limitation   Act   cannot   be
construed   to   mean   anything   other   than   the
period   of   limitation.   Any   period   beyond   the
“prescribed   period”   during   which   the   Court   or
Tribunal has the discretion to allow a person to
institute the proceedings cannot be taken to be
“prescribed period”. 
5.9 Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the
appellant   that   the   judgment   in   the   case   of
Assam Urban (Supra)  has the effect of denying
the   parties   to   right   to   file   their   application   for
condonation   in   situation   where   the
discretionary   period   expires   during   vacation
and   that   such   interpretation   was   incorrect
inasmuch   as   it   leaves   parties   at   the   mercy   of
“fortuitous   circumstance”,   it   is   submitted   that
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  25  of  44

such   a   submission   is   not   tenable.   It   is
submitted that the Court vacations are notified
well   in   advance   and   would   not   account   to   a
fortuitous   circumstance   as   alleged.   It   is
submitted that on the date of receipt of award,
the party would be well aware of the limitation
period   under   Section   34(3)   of   the   Arbitration
Act and ought to diligently secure its right. It is
submitted   that   in   the   present   case,   having
received   the   award   on   24.08.2016,   the
appellant had a further period of 25 days after
expiry   of   “prescribed   period”   and   before
commencement   of   the   winter   vacation   of   the
trial Court. However, the petitioner ­ appellant
chose   not   to   file   its   petition   during   this   time
and   therefore,   as   to   suffer   for   the   inevitable
consequences. 
5.10 It is further submitted that right under Section
34 of the Arbitration Act is a restricted right to
challenge   an   award   on   extremely   limited
ground.   The   proviso   to   Section   34(3)   of   the
Arbitration   Act   further   excludes   the   general
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  26  of  44

power   of   the   Court   under   Section   5   of   the
Limitation Act and imposes a strict timeline for
presentation of a petition under Section 34. In
such   circumstances,   acceptance   of   appellant’s
argument   will   have   the   effect   of   providing   an
unduly   enlarged   time   period   (beyond   the
statutory   30   day   discretionary   period)   for
delayed   presentation   of   a   petition   under
Section   34,   which   would   be   contrary   to   the
scheme and intent of the Arbitration Act. 
5.11 Now, so far as the applicability of Section 10 of
the General Clauses Act, 1897 as per the case
of   the   appellant  is   concerned,   it  is  vehemently
submitted   that   as   such   the   contention   is
untenable   in   light   of   the   proviso   to   Section   10
of   the   General   Clauses   Act,   1897,   which
specifically   excludes   the   application   of   this
section   to   any   Act   or   proceeding   to   which   the
Indian   Limitation   Act   applies.   It   is   submitted
that reference to 1877 Act will now have to be
read   as   reference   to   Limitation   Act,   1963   in
view   of   section   8   of   the   General   Clauses   Act,
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  27  of  44

1897.   It   is   submitted   that   it   is   no   longer   res
integra  that the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to
arbitrations   and   court   proceedings   arising   out
of   the   arbitrations   in   light   of   Section   41(3)   of
the Arbitration Act. Reliance is placed upon the
decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   State   of
Maharashtra   v.   Borse   Brothers   Engineers
and   Contractors   Pvt.   Ltd.   reported   in   (2021)
6   SCC   460   and   Consolidated   Engineering
Enterprises   vs.   Principal   Secretary,
Irrigation   Department   and   Ors.   reported   in
(2008)   7   SCC   169 .   It   is   submitted   that
therefore   in   light   of   the   application   of   the
Limitation   Act,   1963   applicable   to   the
proceedings under  the Arbitration  Act  (both in
Court   and   in   arbitration),   Section   10   of   the
General   Clauses   Act,   1897   is   specifically
excluded, and therefore, cannot be relied upon
by the appellant. 
5.12 It   is   submitted   that   even   otherwise   this   Court
in   the   Sagufa   Ahmed   (Supra)   has   held   that
the principle forming the basis of Section 10(1)
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  28  of  44

of   the   General   Clauses   Act,   1897   also   finds   a
place   in   Section   4   of   the   Limitation   Act.
Therefore, when the benefit of Section 4 of the
Arbitration   Act   is   not   available,   the   appellant
cannot   seek   to   take   recourse   to   Section   10   of
the General Clauses Act, 1897 which embodies
the same principle. 
5.13 It  is   further  submitted  that  just   like  Section  4
of the Limitation Act, Section 10 of the General
Clauses   Act,   1897   also   uses   the   term
“prescribed   period”.   Section   10   of   the   General
Clauses Act, 1897 provides that where any act
is directed to be done on a certain day, or any
proceeding   is   allowed   to   be   done  in   any   Court
or   office   within   prescribed   period,   if   the   Court
or   office   is   closed   on   that   certain   day,   or   the
last   day   of   the   prescribed   period,   it   may   be
done   or   taken   on   the   next   working   day.
Accordingly,   if   Section   10   of   the   General
Clauses   Act,   1897   was   to   be   applicable,   the
term   “prescribed   period”   must   be   given   the
same   meaning   as   that   in   the   Limitation   Act.
Thus,   Section   10   of   the   General   Clauses   Act,
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  29  of  44

1897   will   also   only   then   apply   for   the
prescribed   period   of   three   months   under
Section  34(3)  of  the  Arbitration  Act  and  not  to
the   discretionary   period   of   30   days   under   the
proviso  to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act. 
Making   above   submissions   and   relying
upon   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Assam   Urban   (Supra)   and   Sagufa   Ahmed
(Supra) ,   it   is   prayed   to   dismiss   the   present
appeal. 
6. Having   heard   learned   Counsel   appearing   for
the   respective   parties,   a   short   question   which
is   posed   for   consideration   of   this   Court   is
whether   in   the   facts   and  circumstances  of  the
case,   the   learned   trial   Court   was   justified   in
not   condoning   the   delay   in   preferring   the
application   under   Section   34(3)   of   the
Arbitration Act, which was filed after the expiry
of   120   days   but   filed   on   the   first   day   of
reopening   after   the   winter   /   Christmas
vacation   and   in   a   case   where   the   condonable
period   of   30   days   under   Section   34(3)   of   the
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  30  of  44

Arbitration   Act   had   fallen   during   the   winter   /
Christmas   vacation   ?   The   question   is   with
respect   to   applicability   of   Section   4   of   the
Limitation   and   Section   10   of   the   General
Clauses   Act,   1897   in   the   facts   and
circumstances of the case. 
Therefore,   the   central   question   in   the
present appeal is whether when the last day of
condonable   period   of   30   days   (under   Section
34(3) of the Arbitration Act) falls on holiday  or
during the Court vacation, would the benefit of
Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 be
available? 
7. While   considering   the   aforesaid   issues/
questions,   Section   34   of   the   Arbitration   Act   is
required   to   be   referred   to,   which   reads   as
under:
“ 34. Application   for   setting   aside
arbitral   award.­   (3)   An   application   for
setting   aside   may   not   be   made   after
three   months   have   elapsed   from   the
date   on   which   the   party   making   that
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  31  of  44

application   had   received   the   arbitral
award   or,   if   a   request   had   been   made
under   section   33,   from   the   date   on
which   that   request   had   been   disposed
of by the arbitral Tribunal:
Provided   that   if   the   Court   is
satisfied   that   the   applicant   was
prevented   by   sufficient   cause   from
making   the   application   within   the   said
period  of three months it  may entertain
the   application   within   a   further   period
of thirty days, but not thereafter.”
The   relevant   provisions   of   the   Indian
Limitation   Act   and   the   General   Clauses   Act,
1897 are also  required to  be referred to  which
are as under: 
“ 2.(j)   ‘period   of   limitation’   (which)
means   the   period   of   limitation
prescribed   for   any   suit,   appeal   or
application   by   the   Schedule,   and
‘prescribed period’ means the period of
limitation computed in accordance with
the provisions of this Act;”
“ 4. Expiry   of   prescribed   period
when   court   is   closed.­   Where   the
prescribed   period   for   any   suit,   appeal
or   application   expires   on   a   day   when
the   court   is   closed,   the   suit,   appeal   or
application   may   be   instituted,
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  32  of  44

preferred or made on the day when the
court reopens.
Explanation.­   A   court   shall   be
deemed to be closed on any day within
the   meaning   of   this   section   if   during
any part of its normal working hours it
remains closed on that day.”
“ Section 10 of the General Clauses Act,
1897
10. Computation   of   time.­   (1)   Where,
by   any   47   (Central   Act)   or   Regulation
made   after   the   commencement   of   this
Act,   any   act   or   proceeding   is   directed
or   allowed   to   be   done   or   taken   in   any
Court   or   office   on   a   certain   day   or
within  a  prescribed  period, then,  if  the
Court or office is closed on that day or
the   last   day   of   the   prescribed   period,
the   act   or   proceeding   shall   be
considered   as   done   or   taken   in   due
time   if   it   is   done   or   taken   on   the   next
day   afterwards   on   which   the   Court   or
office is open:
Provided   that   nothing   in   this
section   shall   apply   to   any   act   or
proceeding   to   which   the   Indian
Limitation Act, 1877, 48 applies.
(2) This   section   applies   also   to
all   49   (Central   Acts)   and   Regulations
made  on or after the  fourteenth day of
January, 1887.”
(emphasis supplied)”
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  33  of  44

7.1 Section   34(3)   of   the   Arbitration   Act   and
Sections 2(j) and 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963
fell   for   consideration   before   this   Court   in   the
case   of   Assam   Urban   (Supra) .   Even   the   very
issue   raised   in   the   present   appeal   fell   for
consideration   before   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Assam   Urban   (Supra) .   In   the   aforesaid
decision,   this   Court   interpreted   the   aforesaid
provisions   and   has   specifically   observed   and
held   that   the   benefit   of   exclusion   of   period
during   which   Court   is   closed   is   available   only
when application for setting aside the award is
filed within ‘prescribed period of limitation’ and
it   is   not   available   in   respect   of   period
extendable   by   the   Court   in   exercise   of   its
discretion.   By   holding   so,   this   Court
considered   the   earlier   decisions   in   the   case   of
Popular   Construction   Co.   (Supra)   and   State
of   Maharashtra   vs.   Hindustan   Construction
Co.   Ltd.   reported   in   (2010)   4   SCC   518   and
has observed and held in paragraphs 6 to 9 as
under: 
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  34  of  44

“ 6.   Section   34(3)   of   the   1996   Act   provides
that an application for setting aside an award
may   be   made   within   three   months   of   the
receipt of the arbitral award. The proviso that
follows sub­section (3) of   Section 34   provides
that   on   sufficient   cause   being   shown,   the
court   may   entertain   the   application   for
setting   aside   the   award   after   the   period   of
three   months   and   within   a   further   period   of
30 days but not thereafter. 
7. In  Popular Construction Co. 1
, this Court has
held   that   an   application   for   setting   aside   an
award   filed   beyond   the   period   mentioned   in
Section 34(3)   would not be an application "in
accordance   with   sub­section   (3)   as   required
under   Section   34(1)   of   the   1996   Act"   and
Section  5   of   the  1963  Act  has   no   application
to such application. In para 12 of the Report,
it   was   held   in   Popular   Construction   Co. 1
thus: (SCC pp.474­75)
"12. As far as the language of  Section 34
of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial
words   are   "but   not   thereafter"   used   in
the   proviso   to   sub­section   (3).   In   our
opinion, this phrase would amount to an
express   exclusion   within  the   meaning  of
Section   29(2)   of   the   Limitation   Act,   and
would   therefore   bar   the   application   of
Section 5   of that Act. Parliament did not
need to go further. To hold that the court
could   entertain   an   application   to   set
aside   the   award   beyond   the   extended
period   under   the   proviso,   would   render
the   phrase   "but   not   thereafter"   wholly
otiose.   No   principle   of   interpretation
would justify such a result".
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  35  of  44

8.   Recently,   in   State   of   Maharashtra   v.
Hindustan   Construction   Company   Limited 2
,   a
two­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   speaking
through   one   of   us   (R.M.   Lodha,   J.)
emphasised the mandatory nature of the limit
to   the   extension   of   the   period   provided   in
proviso   to   Section   34(3)   and   held   that   an
application   for   setting   aside   arbitral   award
under   Section   34   of   the   1996   Act   has   to   be
made   within   the   time   prescribed   under   sub­
section   (3)   of   Section   34   i.e.,   within   three
months   and   a   further   period   of   30   days   on
sufficient   cause   being   shown   and   not
thereafter.
9.  Section 43(1)  of the 1996 Act provides that
the  1963  Act  shall   apply   to   arbitrations  as   it
applies to proceedings in court. The 1963 Act
is   thus   applicable   to   the   matters   of
arbitration covered by the 1996 Act save and
except to the extent its applicability has been
excluded   by   virtue   of   the   express   provision
contained in Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act.”
Before   this   Court   there   existed,   similar   facts
like in the present case. In the case before this
Court, the arbitral awards were received by the
appellants   on   26.08.2003.   No   application   for
setting   aside   the   arbitral   award   was   made
before elapse of three months from  the receipt
thereof. Three months from the date of receipt
of   the   award   expired   on   26.11.2003.   The
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  36  of  44

District   Court   had   Christmas   vacation   for   the
period   from   25.12.2003   to   01.01.2004.   On
reopening  of  the  Court  i.e. on  02.01.2004,  the
appellants   made   application   for   setting   aside
the   award   under   Section   34   of   the   Arbitration
Act.   Considering   the   aforesaid   facts   and
thereafter considering Sections 2(j) and 4 of the
Indian   Limitation   Act,   1963,   this   Court
observed   and   held   and   concluded   in
paragraphs 11 to 15 as under: 
“ 11. The question, therefore, that falls for
our   determination   is   ­   whether   the
appellants   are   entitled   to   extension   of   time
under   Section   4   of   the   1963   Act   in   the
above facts?
12.   Section   4   of   the   1963   Act   reads   as
under :­
" 4.   Expiry   of   prescribed   period
when   court   is   closed.­   Where   the
prescribed   period   for   any   suit,
appeal   or   application   expires   on   a
day   when   the   court   is   closed,   the
suit,   appeal   or   application   may   be
instituted, preferred or made on the
day when the court reopens.
Explanation.­   A   court   shall   be
deemed   to   be   closed   on   any   day
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  37  of  44

within   the   meaning   of   this   section
if   during   any   part   of   its   normal
working hours it remains closed on
that day."
The above Section enables a party to
institute a suit, prefer an appeal or make an
application on the day court reopens where
the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or
application   expires   on   the   day   when   the
court is closed. 
13. The crucial words in  Section 4  of the
1963   Act   are   “prescribed   period”.   What   is
the meaning of these words?
14. Section 2(j)  of the 1963 Act defines:
“ 2(j) ‘period of limitation' [which] means the
period   of   limitation   prescribed   for   any   suit,
appeal   or   application   by   the   Schedule,   and
'prescribed   period'   means   the   period   of
limitation computed in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.”
Section   2(j)   of   the   1963   Act   when   read   in
the context of  Section 34(3)  of the 1996 Act,
it   becomes   amply   clear   that   the   prescribed
period for making an application for setting
aside   an   arbitral   award   is   three   months.
The period of 30 days mentioned in proviso
that follows sub­section (3) of   Section 34   of
the 1996 Act is not the “period of limitation”
and,   therefore,   not   the   “prescribed   period”
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  38  of  44

for   the   purposes   of   making   the   application
for   setting   aside   the   arbitral   award.   The
period   of   30   days   beyond   three   months
which   the   court   may   extend   on   sufficient
cause   being   shown   under   the   proviso
appended to sub­section (3) of  Section 34  of
the   1996   Act   being   not   the   “period   of
limitation”   or,   in   other   words,   the
“prescribed   period”,   in   our   opinion,   Section
4   of the 1963 Act is not, at all, attracted to
the facts of the present case.
15. Seen thus, the applications made by the
appellants on 2­1­2004 for setting aside the
arbitral   award   dated   26­8­2003   were   liable
to   be   dismissed   and   have   rightly   been
dismissed   by   the   District   Judge,   Kamrup,
Guwahati, as time­barred.”
Therefore,   as   such   the   question   involved
in   the   present   appeal   is   squarely   answered
against   the   appellant   and   the   said   issue   is   as
such not  res integra. 
8. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the
appellant   that   the   Limitation   Act   shall   not   be
applicable   to   the   proceedings   under   the
Arbitration Act is concerned, the aforesaid has
no   substance.   Section   43(1)   of   the   Arbitration
Act   specifically   provides   that   Limitation   Act,
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  39  of  44

1963 shall apply to arbitrations as it applies to
proceeding in Court. However, as observed and
held by this Court in the case of   Assam Urban
(Supra),   Limitation   Act,   1963   shall   be
applicable to the matters of arbitration covered
by   1996   Act   save   and   except   to   the   extent   its
applicability   has   been   excluded   by   virtue   of
express provision contained in Section 34(3) of
the Arbitration Act. 
8.1 In   the   case   of   Popular   Construction   Co.
(Supra) ,   when   section   5   of   the   Limitation   Act
was   pressed   into   service   to   proceedings   under
Section   34   of   the   Arbitration   Act   for   setting
aside   the   arbitral   award,   this   Court   has
observed   that   the   Arbitration   Act   being   a
special  law   and   provides  a   period  of   limitation
different   from   that   prescribed   under   the
Limitation   Act,   the   period   of   limitation
prescribed   under   the   Arbitration   Act   shall
prevail   and   shall   be   applicable   and   to   that
extent   the   Limitation   Act   shall   be   excluded.
That,   thereafter,   it   is   observed   and   held   that
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  40  of  44

application   challenging   an   award   filed   beyond
period   mentioned   in   Section   34(3)   of   the
Arbitration Act would not be an application “in
accordance   with”   sub­section   (3)   as   required
under Section 34(1) of the Arbitration Act. 
8.2 In   the   case   of   Hindustan   Construction
Company   Ltd.   (Supra) ,   in   fact   this   Court   has
emphasized   the   mandatory   nature   of   limit   to
the   extension   of   period   provided   in   proviso   to
Section 34(3) and has held that an application
for   setting   aside   an   arbitral   award   under
Section   34   of   the   Arbitration   Act   has   to   be
made within time prescribed under sub­section
(3) of Section 34 i.e. within three months and a
further   period   of   30   days   on   sufficient   cause
being shown and not thereafter. 
9. Now, so far as reliance placed upon Section 10
of   the   General   Clauses   Act,   1897   on   behalf   of
the   appellant   is   concerned,   at   the   outset   it   is
required to be noted that such a contention is
untenable   in   light   of   the   proviso   to   Section   10
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  41  of  44

of   the   General   Clauses   Act,   1897,   which
specifically   excludes   the   application   of   Section
10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to any act
or   proceeding   to   which   the   Indian   Limitation
Act,   1877   applies.   Reference   to   1877   Act   will
now have to be read as reference to Limitation
Act,   1963   in   view   of   Section   8   of   the   General
Clauses   Act,   1897.   Therefore,   in   light   of   the
application   of   Limitation   Act,   1963   to   the
proceedings   under   the   Arbitration   Act   and
when   Section   10   of   the   General   Clauses   Act,
1897   specifically   excludes   the   applicability   of
Section   10   to   any   act   or   proceeding   to   which
Indian   Limitation   Act,   1963   applies   and   in
light of the definition of “period of limitation” as
defined   under   Section   2(j)   read   with   Section   4
of the Limitation Act and as observed and held
by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Assam   Urban
(Supra),   benefit   of   exclusion   of   period   during
which   the   Court   is   closed   shall   be   available
when the application for setting aside award is
filed   within   “prescribed   period   of   limitation”
and   shall   not   be   available   in   respect   of   period
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  42  of  44

extendable   by   Court   in   exercise   of   its
discretion. 
10. Now,   so   far   as   the   reliance   placed   upon
the decision of this Court in the case of  Sridevi
Datla vs. Union of India   reported in   (2021) 5
SCC 321  relied upon on behalf of the appellant
is concerned,  at the  outset  it is  required to  be
noted that in the said decision, this Court has
not   noticed   the   decision   in   the   case   of   Assam
Urban   (Supra)   and   there   is   no   discussion   on
distinction between “prescribed period” and the
“discretionary   condonable   period”.   On   the
other   hand,  the   binding   decision   of  this   Court
in the case of   Assam Urban (Supra)   is directly
on point.   
11. In view of the above and for the reasons stated
above,   applying   the   law   laid   down   by   this
Court   in   the   case   of   Assam   Urban   (Supra) ,   it
cannot   be   said   that   the   High   Court   and   the
learned   III   Additional   District   &   Sessions
Judge,   Vijaypur   have   committed   any   error   in
  Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022         Page  43  of  44

refusing   to   condone   the   delay   caused   in
preferring   application   under   Section   34   of   the
Arbitration   and   Conciliation   Act,   1996   which
was   beyond   the   period   prescribed   under
Section   34(3)   of   the   Arbitration   and
Conciliation   Act,   1996.   Under   the
circumstances,   the  present   Appeal  deserves  to
be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. In
the  facts and  circumstances of  the  case,  there
shall be no order as to costs. 
………………………………… J.
      (M. R. SHAH)
………………………………… J.
      (KRISHNA MURARI)
New Delhi, 
April 10, 2023
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