/2023 INSC 0397/ REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.530 OF  2022       Dinesh Kumar                                                  ….Appellant VERSUS              The State of Haryana                                    ….Respondent        J U D G M E N T SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J. 1. The   appellant,   and   one   Mange   Ram,   were   convicted   in   Sessions Trial   No.   47   of   2000,   for   offences   under   Sections 302/364/392/394/201   read   with   Section   34   of   Indian   Penal   Code (‘IPC’),   by   the   learned   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Jagadhri,   Haryana. They   were   awarded   life   sentence   under   Section   302   IPC,   and   lesser sentence   on   the   remaining   convictions,   vide   order   dated   11.07.2003. The two  then filed separate appeals before  Punjab and Haryana  High Court. During the pendency of his appeal the co­accused Mange Ram passed   away   on   24.10.2004,   and   his   appeal   stood   abated   vide   order dated 11.05.2017.  The appeal of the present appellant was dismissed and  the  conviction  and  sentence  of  the  trial  court  was  upheld  by  the High Court,  vide  its order dated 31.05.2017. His SLP before this Court was given leave on 28.03.2022.                    We   have   heard   at   length,   the   learned   senior   counsel   Mr.   A. Sirajudeen  for   the  appellant   and   Mr.  Dinesh   Chander  Yadav,  learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana. 2. The   case   of   the   prosecution   is   entirely   based   on   circumstantial evidence.   The ‘evidence’ of last seen and the “discoveries” made from the   information   given   by   the   appellant.     The   facts   of   the   case   are   as under:­  3. The   deceased   Gurmail   Singh   was   a   resident   of   village­Dhimo, District, Yamuna Nagar, Haryana.   On the morning of 08.05.2000, he left   his   village   on   his   tractor,   for   the   nearby   village   of   ‘Dadupur’, (which   is   at   a   distance   of   15­20   kilometers).     In   Dadupur   he   was   to meet   his   sister   and   his   brother­in­law.     He   was   with   his   sister   and brother­in­law   between   2.00   P.M.   to   5.30   P.M   on   08.05.2000   and according   to   his   brother­in­law   (PW­1)   he   left   their   house   at   about 5.30 P.M on 08.05.2000.  Gurmail Singh never returned to his village. Meanwhile,   Harbans   Singh,   the   brother   of   the   deceased   (the   two brothers   were   staying   together   with   their   families   in   village   Dhimo), goes   to   village   Dadupur   on   11.05.2000   i.e.   after   3   days,   to   enquire from his sister about the whereabouts of their brother, when he is told that   the   deceased   had   left   their   house   on   08.05.2000   itself   at   about 5.30 P.M.!   Harbans   Singh   then   lodges   the   F.I.R.   at   P.S   Buria,   District Yamuna   Nagar   (Haryana),   at   4.00   p.m   on   11.05.2000.     He   states   in the F.I.R. that Gurmail Singh is his brother, and the two live together as a joint family in village Dhimo.   Then he narrates how his brother left   his   village   in   the   morning   on   08.05.2000   on   his   tractor   to   meet their sister, but has since not returned.   He states that while he was searching for his brother, he met his neighbour Karanjit Singh, at the petrol   pump   of   village   Dadupur,   who   informed   him   that   he   had   seen Gurmail  Singh  on  his  tractor   on  08.05.2000  at around 7.00 pm   with Mange   Ram   and   Dinesh   (the   two   accused),   who   were   residents   of nearby  villages.   He promptly  went to those villages to find out about the whereabout of these two persons, when he was informed that they were missing since 08.05.2000.  He then states in his F.I.R. that these two persons Mange Ram and Dinesh are known to be vagabonds and they have kidnapped his brother in order to rob him of his tractor.   A case   was   then   registered   by   Police   on   11.05.2000   under   Section   364 IPC.   The   body   of   the   deceased   was   recovered   next   day   i.e.   on 12.05.2000,   at   1.30   P.M.   from   a   canal.     The   inquest   was   conducted the   same   day   and   the   body   was   sent   for   post­mortem.     The   post­ mortem   was   conducted   at   about   4:15   P.M.   on   12.05.2000   by   Dr. Sumesh Garg (PW­4) and Dr. Ashok Kumar Sharma at Civil Hospital, Jagadhri.   The body was found to be swollen with the skin peeling off from   many   places.     Rigor   mortis   was   found   to   be   present   in   all   four limbs   of   the   deceased,   but   was   absent   in   the   neck.     The   tongue   and lips   of   the   deceased   was   dark   red   in   colour   and   swollen   and   further there was red coloured froth coming out from the mouth and nostrils. There was a ligature mark of 53 cm x 8 cm around the neck, over the thyroid   and   hyoid   cartilage.     The   base   of   the   ligature   mark   was   hard and   the   margins   of   the   ligature   mark   were   pale   and   parchment   like. The post­mortem report further states that the ligature marks present on the body disclosed an ante­mortem strangulation. The Pericardium was   found   to   be   congested,   with   the   left   chamber   of   the   heart   to   be empty   and   the   right   chamber   of   the   heart   was   found   to   have   little blood.     Ultimately   the   cause   of   death   was   asphyxia   due   to strangulation which was ante­mortem in nature.  The post mortem examination of the body shows that  rigor mortis was present in all the four limbs of the body, but was not there in the neck.     This   was   indicative   of   the   fact   that   rigor   mortis   was   receding from   the   body.     Generally   speaking,   rigor   mortis   sets   in   one   to   two hours   after   the   death,   and   develops   from   head   to   foot   in   about   12 hours.     Rigor   mortis   then   disappears   in   the   same   sequence   i.e.   first from   the head,  then  neck and  then  to  the  lower  part of  the body.    In northern India,   rigor mortis   lasts about 24 to 48 hours in winters and 18   to   36   hours   in   summers.   All   the   same,   there   are   many   variables. The   body   structure,   and   the   health   of   the   deceased,   the   fact   that   it was   kept   in   cold   water   and   away   from   heat   will   all   slow   down   the process of  rigor mortis 1 .  Rigor mortis  disappears late in bodies which are immersed in cold water. 2    In the  case at  hand,  the body  of  the  deceased was  recovered from a canal, and therefore the possibility that   rigor mortis   would still remain in the body cannot be entirely ruled out, but this has nowhere been  explained.  Although  the  exact  time  when  the  deceased died  has not come out but the prosecution case is that he was murdered by the accused (Dinesh Kumar and Mange Ram) on 08.05.2000 itself.  If this is   so,   then   the   rigor   mortis   has   remained   in   the   body   for   about   90 hours, which is unusual. Moreover, the prosecution has not explained this factor, and the defense has definitely not questioned Dr. Sumesh Garg   (PW­4)   on   this   aspect.     But   considering   the   importance   of   this aspect   this   question     should   have   been   put   to   the   prosecution   and particularly to the doctor who had done the post mortem.  If not by the defense   then   this   question   ought   to   have   been   put   to   the   witness   by the Court under the powers vested with the Court under Section 165 1 A textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology by Modi (Chapter 15, Pg. 342) 2 Ibid (Chapter 15, Pg. 342) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short ‘Act’). But we will come to this in a while. 4. Meanwhile   the   co­accused   Mange   Ram   was   arrested   on 12.05.2000   and   the   next   day   i.e.,   13.05.2000,   on   the   information given   by   him   to   the   police   he   was   taken   to   the   place   which   was disclosed   to  be  the  place  where  he   and   Dinesh   Kumar   had   killed   the deceased.   From   this   place,   two   pairs   of   “chappals”   (slippers)   one belonging to the appellant (Dinesh Kumar) and the other, belonging to the   co­accused   Mange   Ram,   were   recovered.   Some   burnt   hair   of   the deceased were also recovered from  this place.   Mange Ram  then took the police party to the canal from where the dead body was dropped. 5. On   14.05.2000   (i.e.,   the   next   day)   Mange   Ram   led   the   police party to the place where the tractor of the deceased was abandoned by him   and   Dinesh   Kumar.     All   the   same,   by   the   time   the   police   party reached   that   place,   the   tractor   had   already   been   discovered   by   the local   Police,   and   was   in   their   custody   at   Rampur   Police   Station, Saharnpur,   Uttar   Pradesh.     The   possession   of   the   tractor   was   taken from the local police, by the Investigating Officer. 6. The   present   appellant   was   arrested   on   14.05.2000,   from ‘Nandgarh’   village.     On   his   disclosure   a   wrist   watch,   ‘Parna’   (turban) and currency notes amounting to Rs. 250/­ allegedly belonging to the deceased were recovered  from   his residence.    He  then  took  the  Police to   the   same   place   as   the   co­accused   Mange   Ram   had   earlier   taken them   to   the   two   places   i.e.,   the   place   where   the   deceased   was   killed and the place where the tractor was abandoned 3 . 7. The evidence of last seen is of Karanjit Singh (PW­10) who is the neighbour of the complainant (PW­11).   PW­10 had seen the deceased along   with   the   two   accused   i.e.,   Dinesh   Kumar   and   Mange   Ram   at about 7:00 P.M. on 08.05.2000. According to the witness the deceased was driving the tractor and the two i.e., the appellant and Mange Ram were sitting on the mudguard of the tractor.   8.  As   we   can   see   the   case   of   the   prosecution   rests   on   two circumstantial   evidences:   (A)   The   disclosure   given   in   the   police custody   and   the   discovery   on   its   basis   and   (B)   The   evidence   of   last seen in the form of PW­10. In a case of circumstantial evidence, motive too  is of  significance.   As far  as  motive is concerned, the  prosecution case   is   that   the   two   accused   killed   the   deceased   only   to   steal   his tractor.  The deceased in this case was a 42­year­old well­built man of 6 feet  2 inches  in  height  (Post  Mortem   report dated  12.05.2000). The prosecution   case   is   that   the   deceased   was   kidnapped   and   murdered by   the   two   accused,   for   his   tractor   which   they   had   robbed   from   the deceased,   after   putting   him   to   death.     Now   this   tractor   the   accused had   in   any   case   abandoned,   and   did   nothing   to   recover   it   till   one   of them   was   caught   on   12.05.2000.   In   short,   the   ‘motive’   is   not   very 3 Meanwhile S.392/394/302 along with S.34 were added in the F.I.R. (dated 11.05.2000) convincing.  The   disclosure   made   by   the   appellant   while   in   police   custody, which   led   to   certain   discoveries,   such   as   the   place   where   the   stolen tractor   was   abandoned,   the   place   where   the   alleged   crime   was committed,   and   the   place   where   the   body   was   thrown   in   the   canal, and   also   the   discovery   of   ‘Parna’,   burnt   hair,   wrist   watch,   and currency notes of Rs.250/­. Section 27 of the Evidence Act reads as under :­ “How   much   of   information   received   from   accused may   be   proved—Provided   that,   when   any   fact   is deposed   to   as   discovered   in   consequence   of information   received   from   a   person   accused   of   any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or   not,   as   relates   distinctly   to   the   fact   thereby discovered, may be proved.” The above provision shows that discovery should be of a distinct fact,   the   fact   which   has   been   discovered   by   disclosure   of   the   one     in police   custody.     All   the   same,   these   facts   were   already   in   the knowledge   of   the   police   in   the   earlier   discovery   made   by   the   co­ accused   Mange   Ram.     The   co­accused   Mange   Ram   was   arrested   on 12.05.2000 and had led to these discoveries on 12 th , 13 th   & 14 th   May. The present appellant was arrested on May 14, 2000, and the alleged discoveries   made   by   him   were   later   in   time.   The   discoveries   which were   made   on   the   pointing   out   of   co­accused   Mange   Ram   cannot   be read   against   the   present   appellant.     If   the   disclosure   has   been   made by the accused to the police while he was in their custody and such a disclosure leads to discovery of a fact then that discovery is liable to be read as evidence against the accused in terms of Section 27 of the Act. All   the   same,   the   distinguishing   feature   of   such   a   discovery   must   be that   such   a  disclosure  must  lead  to  the  discovery  of  a  “distinct  fact”. The   recovery   of   the   stolen   tractor,   the   place   where   the   murder   was committed   and   the   place   where   body   was   thrown   in   the   canal   were facts which were already in the knowledge of the police, since it is the case   of   the   prosecution   that   the   co­accused   Mange   Ram,   who   was arrested   by   the   police   2   days   preceding   the   arrest   of   the   present appellant, had earlier led to the same discoveries on 12 th , 13 th  & 14 th  of May, 2000.   So, this disclosure and discovery made thereafter cannot be read against the present appellant.   There cannot be a “discovery” of   an   already   discovered   fact!     What   remains   is   the   discovery   of currency   notes,   wrist   watch,   ‘Parna’   and   hair.   The   forensic   report   of hair only says that it belongs to ‘human’.   The currency notes cannot be really identified with the deceased.  What remains is the watch and the ‘Parna’, which has been identified with the deceased.   The second is the evidence of “last seen”.   This is in the form of PW­10 Kartar Singh who is the neighbour of the complainant and who had   seen   the   appellant   along   with   co­accused   Mange   Ram   with   the deceased on 08.05.2000 at about 7.30 PM in the evening.   9. The   admitted   position   is   that   the   body   of   deceased   was discovered   from   the   canal   four   days   later   i.e.   on   12.05.2000   in   the afternoon   and   the   post­mortem   was   conducted   at   about   4.15   PM   on the   same   day   i.e.12.05.2000.   According   to   Post­mortem   report   the death had taken place more than 48 hours prior to the post­mortem, which   would   mean   that   death   took   place   approximately   before   4.00 PM on 10.05.2000.  Although the autopsy reports normally do not give precise   time   of   death,   but   only   indicate   an   approximate   time   or duration,   yet under normal circumstances in the present case, death should have been on May 10, 2000 or May 9, 2000. All the same, the case of the prosecution is that the deceased was killed on May 8, 2000 itself.   If this be so then it was the duty of the prosecution to explain as   to   how   rigor   mortis   remained   present   in   the   body,   even   after   four days  of  the  death.  The  possibility   of  the   rigor  mortis   remaining   in  the body for 90 hours cannot be ruled out completely, but this was never explained   by   the   prosecution.   It   was   the   duty   of   the   prosecution   to explain the unusual circumstances under which  rigor mortis  remained present in the body, even for 90 hours, in the month of May. The   High   Court   has   only   relied   upon   the   evidence   of   PW­4   Dr. Sumesh   Garg   who   had   conducted   the   post­mortem,   who   gave   his opinion that the death occurred more than 48 hours before the time of the post­mortem and therefore the deceased was killed by Mange Ram and present appellant on 08.05.2000 this is what has been said by the High Court: ­ “According to PW­4 Dr. Sumesh Garg, who alongwith Dr.   Ashok   Kumar   Sharma   had   conducted   post­ mortem examination on dead body of Gurmail Singh on   12.05.2000.   The   probable   duration   between injuries and death was within minutes and between death and post­mortem more than 48 hours. Thus, it comes   out   that   Gurmail   Singh   was   murdered   by accused­Mange   Ram   and   Dinesh   Kumar   on 08.05.2000.”  10.         The trial court was conscious of this aspect but then it did not go into this aspect for the reason that no question was put on this by the defense, this is what was said by the trial court: ­   “I   have   gone   through   the   post   mortem   report. Perusal of the same reveals that the rigor mortis was present in all the four limbs due to swelling and not in   normal   course.   It   was   the   duty   of   the   defence   to ask   the   doctor   who   had   conducted   post   mortem   on the dead body, whether the presence of rigor mortis was   suggestive   of   the   fact   that   the   deceased   was killed   within   thirty­six   hours   of   his   post   mortem examination. But no such question was put to doctor. The doctor in his statement had stated that the time between   death   and   post   mortem   examination   was more than forty­eight hours and this statement of the doctor   was   not   challenged   in   his   cross­examination. Therefore, the plea of the ld. defence counsel cannot be accepted.” 11. We   are   afraid   that   by   pointing   out   the   weakness   in   the   cross examination of the defense the presiding judge indirectly admits to the weakness   in   the   trial   itself.     We   say   this   for   the   reasons   that   under Section   165   of   the   Act,   a   trial   judge   has   tremendous   powers   to   “ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties about any fact relevant or irrelevant”.  It is in fact the duty of the   Trial   Judge   to   do   so   if   it   is   felt   that   some   important   and   crucial question was left from being asked from a witness. The purpose of the trial is after all to reach to the truth of the matter.  Section 165 of the Act reads as under:  “165.   Judge’s   power   to   put   questions   or   order production.   –– The Judge may, in order to discover or   to   obtain   proper   proof   of   relevant   facts,   ask   any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness,  or  of   the  parties  about   any  fact  relevant  or irrelevant;   and   may   order   the   production   of   any document   or   thing;   and   neither   the   parties   nor   their agents shall be entitled to make any objection to any such question or order, nor, without  the  leave  of the Court,   to   cross­examine   any   witness   upon   any answer given in reply to any such question: Provided that   the   judgment   must   be   based   upon   facts declared by this Act to be relevant, and duly proved: Provided   also   that   this   section   shall   not   authorize any   Judge   to   compel   any   witness   to   answer   any question,   or   to   produce   any   document   which   such witness   would   be   entitled   to   refuse   to   answer   or produce under sections 121 to 131, both inclusive, if the   question   were   asked   or   the   document   were called  for  by  the  adverse  party;  nor  shall   the   Judge ask any question which it would be improper for any other   person   to   ask   under   section   148   or   149;   nor shall   he   dispense   with   primary   evidence   of   any document,   except   in   the   cases   hereinbefore excepted.” The  powers  of   a  presiding   judge  in   a   criminal  trial   and  his duty   to   get   to   the   truth   of   the   matter   have   been   laid   down   in   a seminal   judgement   of   this   Court   authored   by   Justice   O. Chinnappa Reddy, which is  Ram Chander   v.   State of Haryana 4 . Justice   O.   Chinnappa   Reddy   in   the   said   judgment   refers   to   his earlier   Judgment 5     given   by   him   as   a   Judge   of   the   Andhra Pradesh High Court, where it was said : “Every   criminal   trial   is   a   voyage   of   discovery   in which truth is the quest.  It is the duty of a presiding judge to explore every avenue open to him in order to discover   the   truth   and   to   advance   the   cause   of justice.  For that purpose he is expressly invested by Section 165 of the Evidence Act with the right to put questions   to   witnesses.     Indeed   the   right   given   to   a judge   is   so   wide   that   he   may,   ask   any   question   he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of   the   parties   about   any   fact,   relevant   or   irrelevant. Section   172(2)   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure enables   the   court   to   send   for   the   police­diaries   in   a case and use them to aid it in the trial.  The record of the   proceedings   of   the   Committing   Magistrate   may also be perused by the Sessions Judge to further aid him in the trial.”  The duty  of  the  presiding  judge of a criminal trial is not  to watch the proceedings as a spectator or a recording machine but he   has   to   participate   in   the   trial   “by   evincing   intelligent   active interest by putting questions to witnesses in order to ascertain the truth.”   While  referring  to  a  decision  of  Lord  Denning   in   Jones   v. National   Coal   Board 6   the   learned   Judge   had   said   that   it   is   the duty   of   the   judge   to   ask   questions   to   the   witnesses   when   it 4 1981 AIR 1036 5 Sessions Judge, Nellore v. Intha Ramana Reddy, ILR 1972 AP 683; 1972 Cri LJ 1485 6 (1957) 2 All ER 155: (1957) 2 WLR 760 becomes   necessary   to   clear   up   any   point   that   has   been overlooked or left obscure, then he goes on to say as under:  “We may go further than Lord Denning and say that it is the duty of a judge to discover the truth and for that purpose he may "ask any question, in any form, at  any time, of any witness, or of the  parties, about any   fact,   relevant   or   irrelevant"   (Section 165,   Evidence   Act ).   But   this   he   must   do,   without unduly   trespassing   upon   the   functions   of   the   public prosecutor and the defence counsel, without any hint of partisanship and without appearing to frighten or bully   witnesses.   He   must   take   the   prosecution   and the defence with him. The Court, the prosecution and the   defence   must   work   as   a   team   whose   goal   is justice,   a   team   whose   captain   is   the   judge.   The judge, 'like the conductor of a choir, must, by force of personality,   induce   his   team   to   work   in   harmony; subdue   the   raucous,   encourage   the   timid,   conspire with the young, flatter and (sic the) old'.” In   our   considered   opinion   the   prosecution   has   failed   to   establish important   links   in   this   case,   which   is   so   vital   in   a   case   of circumstantial   evidence.   Rigor   mortis   present   in   the   body   after   90 hours   is   unusual,   though   possible   under   certain   circumstances.   It was the duty of the prosecution to explain it. The defense too failed to question   it   and   the   Court   remained   silent.   Let   us   now   revert   to   the evidence of last seen.  12. The  evidence of  last  seen  becomes an  extremely  important  piece of   evidence   in   a   case   of   circumstantial   evidence,   particularly   when there is a close proximity of time between when the accused was last seen with the deceased and the discovery of the body of the deceased, or   in   this   case   the   time   of   the   death   of   the   deceased.   This   does   not mean that in cases where there is a long gap between the time of last seen   and   the   death   of   the   deceased   the   last   seen   evidence   loses   its value. It would not, but then a very heavy burden is placed upon the prosecution to prove that during this period of last seen and discovery of  the  body   of  the  deceased  or   the  time  of  the   death  of  the  deceased, no   other   person   but   the   accused   could   have   had   an   access   to   the deceased. The circumstances of last seen together in the present case by   itself   cannot   form   the   basis   of   guilt   (See:   Anjan   Kumar   Sarma   & Others  v.  State of Assam 7 ). The circumstances of last seen together does not by itself lead to an   irrevocable   conclusion   that   it   is   the   accused   who   had   committed the   crime.   The   prosecution   must   come   out   with   something   more   to establish this connectivity with the accused and the crime committed. Particularly,   in   the   present   case   when   there   is   no   close   proximity between circumstances of last seen together and the approximate time of death, the evidence of last seen becomes weak (See: ­   Malleshappa v.  State of Karnataka 8 ). In   Nizam   &   Anr.   v.   State   of   Rajasthan 9   where   the   time   gap between   the   last   seen   together   and   the   discovery   of   the   body   of   the deceased was  long, it  was held  that  during   this  period the  possibility 7 (2017) 14 SCC 359 -para 19 8 (2007) 13 SCC 399 – para 23 9 (2016) 1 SCC 550 of   some   other   interventions   could   not   be   ruled   out.   Where   time   gap between   the   last   seen   and   time   of   death   is   long   enough,   as   in   the present   case,   then   it   would   be   dangerous   to   come   to   the   conclusion that   the   accused   is   responsible   for   the   murder.   In   such   cases   it   is unsafe   to   base   conviction   on   the   “last   seen   theory”   and   it   would   be safer   to   look   for   corroboration   from   other   circumstance   and   evidence which   have   been   adduced   by   the   prosecution.   The   other circumstances here is the so called discovery, and most of these, as we have  already   discussed,  fail  to   meet  the   requirement   of   Section   27  of the Evidence Act. As  per   the  post­mortem   which  was   conducted   on   12.05.2000  at 4:15   P.M,   the   death   was   48   hours   prior   to   the   post   mortem,   which means   it   was   before   4:00   P.M.   on   10.05.2000.     Even   assuming   that the death has taken place, a day earlier i.e. 09.05.2000, still there is a long gap between the last seen which is at 7:00 pm on 08.05.2000 and the   morning   of   09.05.2000.     In   the   case   of   State   of   Goa   v.   Sanjay Thakran 10 ,     where   in   the   evidence   of   last   seen,   the   recovery   of   dead body   was   only   a   few   hours   before   “last   seen”,   it   was   not   considered reliable.              The   same   was   again   emphasized   by   this   Court   in   Ajit   Singh   v. State   of   Maharashtra 11     where     it   was   emphasized   that   the   time 10 (2007) 3 SCC 755 11 (2011) 14 SCC 401 between   victim   last   seen   alive   and   the   discovery   of   the   body   of   the deceased has to be of close proximity, so that any other person being the author of the crime cannot be ruled out.   In this case,   even if we take the time between the last seen and the approximate time of death as   per   the   post­mortem,   which   would   go   beyond   48   hours   preceding the time of post­mortem and the time of death can be stretched to the morning   of   May   9,   2000,   which   still   begs   an   explanation   from   the prosecution as to the time gap, as the deceased was last seen with the two accused on 08.05.2000 at 7:00 P.M.  The   trial   court   as   well   as   the   High   Court   have   lost   sight   of   the vital aspect of the matter.  Both the Courts have relied on Section 106 of the Act and have held that since the accused was last seen with the deceased and he has not been able to give any reasonable explanation of his presence with the deceased in his statement under Section 313 of   the   Cr.P.C.,   it   has   to   be   read   against   the   accused   and   therefore   it has to be counted as an additional link in the chain of circumstantial evidence.   In   present   case   in   the   findings   of   the   trial   court   and   High Court   this   appears   to   be   the   most   important   aspect   which   weighed with the trial court as well as the High Court in establishing the guilt of the accused.  We are, however, afraid this is a complete misreading of Section 106 of the Act.   Section   101   of   the   Act   places   the   burden   of   proof   on   the prosecution.  It reads as under :­ 101.   Burden   of   proof   ––   Whoever   desires   any Court   to   give   judgment   as   to   any   legal   right   or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts,   must   prove   that   those   facts   exist.   When   a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. Section 106 of the Act creates an exception to Section 101 and  reads as under :­ 106.   Burden   of   proving   fact   especially   within knowledge   ––   When   any   fact   is   especially   within the knowledge  of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.   Section 106 of the Act is an exception to the rule which is Section 101 of   the   Act,   and   it   comes   into   play   only   in   a   limited   sense   where   the evidence is of a nature which is especially within the knowledge of that person and then the burden of proving that fact shifts upon him that person.  The   burden   of   proof   is   always   with   the   prosecution.     It   is   the prosecution   which   has   to   prove   its   case   beyond   a   reasonable   doubt. Section   106   of   the   Act   does   not   alter   that   position.     It   only   places burden   for   disclosure   of   a   fact   on   the   establishment   of   certain circumstances.   We   have   no   reason   to   doubt   the   testimony   of   PW­10 (Karanjit Singh), the sole witness of last seen.  In his statement under Section   313   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   when   the   appellant was   questioned   about   being   in   the   company   of   the   deceased   on 08.05.2000   along   with   co­accused   Mange   Ram,   no   explanation   was given by the appellant about his whereabouts. It is for this reason that it has  been held  that  the  accused  has not  been  able to  discharge his burden under Section 106 of the Act and therefore this has to be read as an additional link in the chain of evidence against the appellant. To our   mind,   however,   Section   106   of   the   Act   would   not   even   come   to play here under the facts and circumstances of the present case. 13. What has to be kept in mind is that Section 106 of the Act, only comes   into   play   when   the   other   facts   have   been   established   by   the prosecution.   In this case when the evidence of last seen itself is on a weak   footing,   considering   the   long   gap   of   time   between   last   seen   by PW­10  and   the   time  of   death   of  the   deceased,  Section   106   of  the   Act would   not   be   applicable   under   the   peculiar   facts   and   the circumstances of the case.   14. As   far   as   the   recovery   is   concerned,   the   recovery   is   again   weak. The so­called alleged place of crime and the recovery of tractor or the place where the tractor was abandoned had already been disclosed by the   co­accused   by   the   time   the   present   appellant   was   arrested. Therefore,   making   a   disclosure   about   the   place   of   occurrence   or   the place where the tractor was abandoned is of no consequence. As far as the   recovery   of   watch,   currency   notes   of   Rs.   250/­,   hair   and   ‘Parna’ from the residence of the appellant are concerned, the currency notes and   hair   have   not   been   identified   with   the   deceased.     In   a   criminal trial,   the   prosecution   has   to   prove   its   case   beyond   reasonable   doubt. This   heavy   burden   has   to   be   discharged   by   the   prosecution.   It becomes   even   more   difficult   in   a   case   of   circumstantial   evidence.     In the   present   case,   the   nature   of   circumstantial   evidence   is   weak.     In order   to   establish   a   charge   of   guilt   on   the   accused,   the   chain   of evidence must be completed and the chain must point out to one and only   one   conclusion,   which   is   that   it   is   only   the   accused   who   have committed the crime and none else.  We are afraid the prosecution has not been able to discharge this burden. The   factors   which   have   to   be   taken   into   consideration   by   the Court   in   a   case   of   circumstantial   evidence,   are   too   well   settled   to   be stated but nevertheless these factors which are being reproduced from Anjan Kumar Sarma  (supra) are as under :­ (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt  is  to  be  drawn   should  be  fully  established. The circumstances concerned “must” or “should” and not “may be” established; (2)   the   facts   so   established   should   be   consistent only   with   the   hypothesis   of   the   guilt   of   the accused,   that   is   to   say,   they   should   not   be explainable on  any   other   hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3)   the   circumstances   should   be   of   a   conclusive nature and tendency; (4)   they   should   exclude   every   possible   hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not   to   leave   any   reasonable   ground   for   the conclusion   consistent   with   the   innocence   of   the accused   and   must   show   that   in   all   human probability   the   act   must   have   been   done   by   the accused.” 15. In   our   considered  view,   in   the  present   case   the  prosecution   has not been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.  The evidence of  last   seen,   only   leads   upto   a  point   and   no   further.  It  fails  to   link   it further to make a complete chain.  All we have here is the evidence of last seen, which as we have seen looses much of its weight under the circumstances   of   the   case,   due   to   the   long   duration   of   time   between last   seen   and   the   possible   time   of   death.     What   we   can   call   as discovery here under Section 27 of the Act, is the discovery of ‘Parna’ and watch of the deceased.   This evidence in itself is not sufficient to fix guilt on the appellant.  In   a   case   where   there   is   no   direct   eye   witness   to   the   crime,   the prosecution has to build its case on the circumstantial evidence. It is a very   heavy   burden   cast   on   the   prosecution.   The   chain   of circumstances  collected  by   the  prosecution  must  complete  the  chain, which   should   point   to   only   one   conclusion   which   is   that   it   is   the accused who had committed the crime, and none else. Each evidence which  completes the chain  of evidences must stand  on firm  grounds. In   our   considered   opinion,   the   evidence   placed   by   the   prosecution   in this   case   does   not   pass   muster   the   standard   required   in   a   case   of circumstantial evidence. 16. This appeal therefore succeeds.  The orders of the trial court and the   High   Court   dated   11.03.2007   and   31.05.2017,   respectively   are hereby   set   aside.   Appellant   is   in   jail   shall   now   be   released   forthwith unless his presence is required in any other case.   ……..............................J.                   [SUDHANSHU DHULIA]                                                             . …….............................J.                                                  [SANJAY KUMAR] New Delhi, May 04, 2023.   ITEM NO.1501 COURT NO.11 SECTION II-B S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Criminal Appeal No(s). 530/2022 DINESH KUMAR Appellant(s) VERSUS THE STATE OF HARYANA Respondent(s) ( IA No.96201/2022 - PERMISSION TO FILE ADDL.DOCS.FACTS/ANNEXURES) Date : 04-05-2023 This matter was called on for pronouncement of judgment today. For Appellant(s) Mr. A. Sirajudeen, Sr. Adv. (SCLSC) Mr. Naresh Kumar, AOR Mr. Keerthik Vasan, Adv. For Respondent(s) Mr. Dinesh Chander Yadav, A.A.G. Mr. A.S. Rishi, Adv. Mr. Ishwar Chand, Adv. Mr. M.K. Bansal, Adv. Dr. Monika Gusain, AOR Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon’ble Mr.Justice Sanjay Kumar. The appeal is allowed and appellant is released forthwith in terms of the signed reportable judgment, which is placed on the file . Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. (NIRMALA NEGI) (VIDYA NEGI) COURT MASTER (SH) ASSISTANT REGISTRAR