/2023 INSC 0606/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELALTE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5107 OF 2022
VINOD KUMAR & ORS.      …Appellant(s)
Versus
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE MAU & ORS.  …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
J.B. PARDIWALA, J.  :
  This   appeal   is   at   the   instance   of   unsuccessful
original   writ   petitioners   and   is   directed   against   the   order
passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature
at Allahabad dated 28 th
 February, 2020 in Writ­C No. 7310
of   2020   by   which   the   High   Court   rejected   the   writ
application filed by the appellants taking  the view that the
District Magistrate is competent to look into the legality and
12023INSC606

validity of the order passed by the Special Land Acquisition
Officer   (for   short,   ‘SLAO’)   under   Section   3G(5)   of   the
National   Highways   Authority   Act,   1956   (for   short   ‘the   Act
1956’).
FACTUAL MATRIX
2. The   Central   Government   issued   a   notification   dated
23.01.2015 in exercise of power under Section 3A(1) of the
Act 1956 proposing  to  acquire few parcels of land situated
in the District Mau for the purpose of four lane widening of
the National Highway No. 29. The said notification included
the   land   bearing   Gat   Nos.   158,   160   and   161   resply   of   the
village Ahirani Bujurg, District Mau (UP). 
3. In   the   aforesaid   context,   a   further   notification   dated
21.01.2016   was   issued   under   Section   3D   of   the   Act   1956
declaring that the land as aforestated would be acquired for
the public purpose.  Upon issuance of such notification, the
land vested in the Central Government.
2

4. The   competent   authority   i.e.   the   Special   Land
Acquisition   Officer   vide   award   dated   28.11.2016   passed
under   Section   3G   of   the   Act   1956   determined   the
compensation   to   be   paid   to   the   landowners   (parties   before
us) for the acquired land. The relevant portion of the award
passed by the competent authority reads thus:­
“By   assuming   the   rate   of   Rs.4,50,00,000.00   as   the
stamp   rate   determined   for   the   transferable   land   as
basis,   compensation   of   the   land   measuring   3.269
hec.   situated   in   village   Ahirani   Buzurg   which   is
being   acquired   comes   out   to   Rs.14,71,05,000.00,
double   amount   of   which   happens   to   be
Rs.29,42,10,000.00   and   compensation   of   the
structure   and   tree   comes   at   Rs.8,01,582.00,   total
double   amount   of   which   comes   out   at
Rs.15,29,06,582.00.   Amount   of   100%   Solatium
amount   on   this   amount   comes   out   to
Rs.30,00,11,582.00.   Additional   Compensation   of
Rs.3,16,66,953.00   is   payable   at   the   rate   of   12%
from   the   last   publication   of   Section   3A   dated   6th
March,   2015.   Thus,   total   compensation   amount
comes   out   to   Rs.63,16,90,117.00   (Rupees   sixty
three   crores   sixteen   lakhs   ninety   thousand   one
hundred   and   seventeen   only),   I   regard   to   which   I
declare   the   Award.   By   recovering   land   acquisition
expenses of Rs.6,31,69,012.00 at the rate of 10% of
the   total   amount   of   compensation   and   100   times   of
registered   value   of   less   land   revenue   which   comes
out   at   Rs.7476.00   from   the   Acquiring   Authority,
same   be   got   deposited   in   the   prescribed   Account
Head.   Accordingly,   Notice   be   sent   to   the   concerned
3

Tehsil   for   proceedings   of   making   entry.   While
making   one   copy   of   the   Award   Order   to   Indian
National   Highway   Authority,   Gorakhpur,   letter   be
sent for making available the entire amount covered
by the Award in question.”
 
5.  On   11.12.2019,   the   respondents   herein   raised   a
dispute   regarding   apportionment   of   the   compensation
between   themselves   and   the   appellants   herein.   With
respect   to   the   three   parcels   of   land,   the   respondents
claimed   half   share   of   compensation   in   Gat   No.   158   and
1/3 rd
  share   of   compensation   in   Gat   Nos.   160   and   161
respectively,   while   the   appellants   herein   claimed   5/8 th
share   in   the   compensation   in   Gat   No.   158   and   13/16 th
share in Gat Nos. 160 and 161 respectively.
6. In accordance with the legislative scheme i.e. Section
3H(3) of the Act 1956, the  competent authority  is required
to   determine   the   shares   of   the   landowners   in   the
compensation.   In   such   circumstances,   the   competent
authority   called   for   a   report   from   the   revenue   authorities.
The   revenue   authorities   vide   its   report   dated   11.04.2019
reported   the   share   of   the   appellants   and   respondents
4

herein.   This   report   was   in   favour   of   the   appellants.   The
relevant portion of the report reads thus:­
“4.   That   on   the   basis   of   copy   of   Khasra   No.   1353,
Gata No. 213 is mentioned which is having present
No. 232/ 51 min. and present No. of Gata No. 213 B
is   232   Min./183   and   present   No.   of   213   is   232
min./ 519. Similarly present No. of Gata No. 233 is
214/   644   acres   and   type   of   land   is   mentioned   as
"Bagh Digar". Apart from it, present No. of Gata No.
208   is   227   /   1.440   acres   in   which   "Bagh   Digar"   is
mentioned, which is correct. 
5.   That   names   of   Mahadav   Shahi,   son   of   Sitaram
Shahi and Bholanath, son of Ganga and Saryu, son
of   Brijrnohan,   Caste   Kandu   are   recorded   in   Khata
No. 46 of  Copy of  Khatauni for the  crop year 1348,
Ahirani   Buzurg,   in   which   Gata   No.   232   acres   is
recorded   and   name   of   Mahadev,   son   of   Sitaram
Shahi and Bholanath, son of Ganga and Saryu, son
of   Brijmohan,   Caste   Kanu   is   recorded   in   respect   of
Gata No. 128 for the crop year 1348. Gata No. 232/
0.284   acres   is   mentioned   in   it   and   names   of
Mahadev, son of Sitaram Shahi and Bholanath, son
of   Brij   Mohan,   Caste   Kandu   are   recorded   in   Khata
No.   92.   Gata   No.   232/0.539   and   Gata   No.
233/0.644 two Gatas admeasuring 1.163 acres are
mentioned in it, which is correct. On the basis of the
crop   year   1348,   which   has   been   mentioned   as
Jamman   12.   On   its   basis,  ½	  equal   share   in   Gata
No.  227  / 1.440, equal share   of  Salum in  Gata No.
232 min./ 0.551, 232/ 0.183, 232/ 0.539 and 233/
1.624 have been determined, which road is situated
on both sides  of  Hashiya Doharighat  to  Gazipur, in
which   Applicant   has   got   1/3 rd
  share   in   Gata   Nos.
5

232   and   233   and   Applicants   have   got  ½	  share   in
Gata   No.   227   /   1.440   acres   and   present   Gata   No.
158,   in   regard   to   which   according   to   the   order
passed by the Additional Civil Judge, Azamgarh on
31.05.1976, Applicants Suresh and others have got
1/8 th
  share   in   Gatas   No.   232,   233   i.e.   in   present
Gata No. 158 measuring 0.583 and 1/16 th
  share in
Gatas No. 160 and 161.” 
 
7. The   respondents   herein   objected   to   the   aforesaid   report.
Both the parties were given opportunity to file their documents.
An   opportunity   of   hearing   was   also   given   to   the   parties   and
thereafter the competent authority i.e. SLAO, Mau proceeded to
determine   the   shares   of   the   various   parties   in   the   land   in
question   vide   order   dated   11.12.2019.   This   order   was   passed
under Section 3H(3) of the Act 1956. The SLAO relied upon the
earlier   judgment   of   the   Civil   Court   dated   31.05.1976.   It   is   the
case   of   the   appellants   that   the   SLAO   has   correctly   determined
the   shares   between   the   parties.     The   relevant   portion   of   the
order passed by the competent authority/SLAO reads thus:­
“Above   parties   have   been   heard   and   evidences
available   in   the   file   have   been   duly   perused.
Khatauni   for   the   crop   year   1348   produced   by   the
Objector   in   his   support   as   evidence   have   been
examined. Present Khatauni for the crop year 1423­
6

1428, C. H. Form­41 and 45 and Form­11, previous
Khatauni   and   order   dated   31.05.1976   passed   by
the     Hon'ble   Court   of   Additional   Civil   Judge,
Azamgarh   have   been   perused.   Hon'ble   Court   of
Additional   Civil   Judge   in   its   very   passed   order   has
mentioned   the   pedigree   of   the   family,   which   has
been mentioned  by Tehsildar, Ghosi while  perusing
all   the   documents.   This   pedigree   and   share
mentioned   in   it   confirms   the   submission   of   the
report.   The   Hon'ble   Civil   Court   has   categorically
spoken   on   the   issue   of   share   in   the   suit   while
framing   issue   No.1   "Whether   the   Plaintiff   is   co­
owner and in the possession over the trees of list Ka
to   the   extent   of   the   1/4 th
  and   list   Kha   1/8 th
  and
1/12 th
  of the list Ga as alleged in the plaint?" While
deciding   the   above   mentioned   issue   as   well   as
others,   Hon'ble   Court   of   Additional   Civil   Judge,
Azamgarh   has   clearly   mentioned   in   its   order   "In
view  of  the  above  pedigree   and  the  documents,  the
share   of   Ganga,   father   of   Bhola   and   Sukdeo   was
1/4 th
 in the grove of plot No. 208 (new number 158).
"Further,   "In   view   of   what   has   been   discussed
above,   I   arrived   at   the   irresistible   conclusion   that
Bhola   had   1;sth   share   in   Plot   No.   208   (Old   227),
1/32 nd
 share into trees of plot No. 213 and 214 (232
and 233 old) and 1/16 th
 share in tree of Doharighat
­   Ghazipur   Road."   In   the   above   judicial   order,
partition   of   trees   with   land   and   shares   finds
mention,   but   balance   of   convenience   is   falling   in
favour of the Respondent Vinod. In my view, all the
people   who   are   present   in   the   joint   tenureship/co­
tenureship their share is to be decided on the basis
of pedigree. Therefore, when the  pedigree  has  been
decided   by   a   competent   Civil   Court   against   which
the Defendants have never appealed, hence judicial
estoppel also in the same. Accordingly, the  claim of
Mr.  suresh  Gupta  is  not  justified.  Even  earlier  also,
7

report   was   sought   from   Tehsil   Ghosi   in   the   present
case   in   regard   to   objection   on   the   determination   of
the   share,   on   which   while   granting   sufficient
opportunity of hearing to both the parties, same was
furnished by Tehsildar Ghosi while  determining the
share. Even by appearing before the Court, both the
parties have expressed the consent in regard to this
fact   that   Suraj,   Ganga,   Baldev   Salik   and
Radhakrishan   were   the   children   of   Shri   Brijmohan,
in which Baldev died without children and thus, all
of   them   shall   have   1/4 th
  share   in   the   property   of
Brijmohan.   Ganga   had   two   children   namely
Bholanath   and   Sukt1dev.   Applicant   Suresh   is   the
heir of Shri Dwarika, son of Parag, who had bought
the   property   from   Bholanath   in   the   auction.
Accordingly,   Bholanath   can   auction   out   that   much
only  of   which he  is  an  owner lawfully.  It   shall  also
be   pertinent   to   mention   this   fact   also   that
consolidation   proceedings   have   already   been
conducted   in   village   Ahirani   Buzurg,   only   after
which, present records CH Form 11, 23, 41 and 45
have been prepared and Khatauni has been formed
on   their   basis.   Applicant   Suresh   Gupta   or   any
member   of   his   family   has   neither   raised   any
objection   in   this   regard   before   the   Court   nor   has
produced any evidence of initiating any proceedings
in the Court, therefore, he is barred by Section 49 of
the Consolidation of Holding Act.
ORDER
Thus, in pursuance of the evidence available on the
file,   present   Khatauni,   report   of   the   then   Tehsildar,
Ghosi and order of Hon'ble Court of Additional Civil
Judge,   share   produced   on   the   file   are   satisfactory
and   correct.   Accordingly,   by   preparing   file   for
8

payment  of  compensation, same  be  produced.  After
doing needful, file be consigned to Record Room. 
Sd/­ illegible 
(Atul Vats)
 Competent Authority/ SLAO 
Mau 
11.12.2019”  
8.  The  respondents,  being  dissatisfied  with   the   order   dated
11.12.2019   passed   by   the   SLAO   referred   to   above,   challenged
the same by filing a petition before the District Magistrate, Mau
invoking   Section   3G(5)   of   the   Act   1956.   It   is   the   case   of   the
appellants herein that the District Magistrate, Mau without any
jurisdiction   and   further   without   giving   any   opportunity   of
hearing   to   the   appellants   proceeded   to   pass   an   order   dated
16.01.2020 granting higher shares in favour of the respondents
towards   compensation.     The   operative   portion   of   the   order
passed by the District Magistrate, Mau reads thus:­
“ORDER
On the basis of the above examination, order dated
11.12.2019   of   the   competent   Officer/Special   Land
Acquisition   Officer,   Mau   is   set   aside.   File   is
remanded   back   to   the   competent   Officer   with   this
direction   that   while   duly   examining   the   records
produced  by the  above  parties, keeping in view  the
ownership   of   the   land   acquired   by   the   ancestors   of
9

the   objectors   in   the   auction   and   according   to   the
separate pedigrees of Khatedar, share of Khatedars
be   determined   and   also   produce   the   proposal   from
Tehsil   for   taking   action   against   the
officials/employees   who   produced   erroneous
report.”
9.  The   appellants   herein,   being   dissatisfied   with   the   order
passed   by   the   District   Magistrate,   Mau   referred   to   above,
challenged   the   same   before   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at
Allahabad   by   filing   Writ­C   No.   7310   of   2020.   The   said   writ
application came to be rejected by a Division Bench of the High
Court vide its order dated 28.02.2020. The order passed by the
High Court reads thus:­
“1.   Heard   Sri   Yadvendra   Pratap   Singh,   learned
counsel   for   petitioners   and   learned   Standing
Counsel for respondents. 
2.   Writ   petition   is   directed   against   order   dated
16.01.2020   passed   by   District   Magistrate,   Mau   in
purported exercise of power under Section 3(G)(5) of
National Highway Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to
as   "Act,   1956")   whereby   he   has   set   aside   order
passed   by   Special   Land   Acquisition   Officer,   Mau
passed on 11.12.2019 and remanded the matter for
redetermination.
3.   Learned   counsel   for   petitioners   submitted   that
determination   was   already   made   but   could   not
10

dispute   that   District   Magistrate   was   competent   to
examine   the   order   passed   by   Special   Land
Acquisition   Officer   and   take   appropriate   decision   in
accordance with law and order impugned in present
writ petition is not without jurisdiction. No otherwise
error could be shown in the impugned order. 
4. Writ petition lacks merit. Dismissed.”
10.  In   such   circumstances   referred   to   above,   the   appellants
came before this Court by filing the special leave petition.   This
Court vide order dated 31.08.2020 issued notice and stayed the
operation   of   the   order   passed   by   the   District   Magistrate,   Mau
dated   16.01.2020.   Later,   leave   was   granted   and   the   appeal
came to be admitted. 
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
11. Mr.   Gaurav   Agrawal,   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for
the   appellants,   vehemently   submitted   that   the   High   Court
committed   a   serious   error   in   passing   the   impugned   order.   He
submitted   that   the   order   which   came   to   be   passed   by   the
competent   authority   dated   11.12.2019   could   be   said   to   be
under Section 3H(3) of the Act 1956. If the respondents had any
grievance   in   regard   to   the   order   passed   by   the   competent
11

authority the remedy available in law to them was to approach
the competent authority so that the competent authority could
have   referred   the   matter   to   the   Civil   Court.   According   to   the
learned   counsel,   such   procedure   is   laid   down   under   Section
3H(4) of the Act 1956.
12. The   learned   counsel   further   submitted   that   the   District
Magistrate, Mau who is an arbitrator  appointed by the Central
Government   does   not   have   any   jurisdiction   to   decide   the
apportionment   of   the   compensation.   He   is   empowered   only   to
decide the quantum of compensation under Section 3G(5) of the
Act 1956 as an arbitrator.
13. The learned counsel submitted  that  challenge before the
District   Magistrate,   Mau   was   to   the   order   dated   11.12.2019
passed   by   the   competent   authority   which   he   could   not   have
entertained.   The order passed by the District Magistrate dated
16.01.2020 could be said to be without jurisdiction.
14. In   the   last,   the   learned   counsel   submitted   that   even
otherwise   the   impugned   order   passed   by   the   District
Magistrate, Mau, could be said to be without jurisdiction as no
12

notice   or   any   opportunity   of   hearing   was   given   to   the
appellants.
15. In   such   circumstances   referred   to   above,   the   learned
counsel   prayed   that   there   being   merit   in   his   appeal,   the   same
may be allowed and the order passed by the District Magistrate,
Mau   dated   16.01.2020   be   quashed   and   set   aside   and   the   writ
application   filed   by   the   appellants   before   the   High   Court   be
allowed.
SUMISSIONS   ON   BEHALF   OF   THE   RESPONDENT   NO.   1   –
DISTRICT MAGISGRATE,  MAU   AND  THE RESPONDENT  NO.
2  ­        COMPETENT AUTHORITY/SPECIAL   LAND  ACQUISITION
OFFICER, MAU 
16.  Shri   V.K.   Shukla,   the   learned   senior   counsel   appearing
for   the   District   Magistrate,   Mau   (respondent   No.   1)   and
Competent   Authority/Special   Land   Acquisition   Officer,   Mau
(respondent   No.   2),   very   fairly   submitted   that   the   High   Court
committed an error in rejecting the writ application filed by the
appellants   herein.   Shri   Shukla   submitted   that   the   District
Magistrate, Mau could not have entertained any petition filed at
the   instance  of   the  respondents   seeking  to   challenge   the  order
13

passed   by   the   competent   authority   dated   11.12.2019   under
Section   3H(3)   of   the   Act   1956.   In   such   circumstances   referred
to   above,   Shri   Shukla   submitted   that   appropriate   relief   be
granted in favour of the appellants.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NOS. 4, 6 AND
16 
17. Shri   Arvind   Kumar   Shukla,   the   learned   counsel
appearing for the respondent Nos. 4, 6 and 16, submitted that
no error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have
been   committed   by   the   High   Court   in   passing   the   impugned
order.  He submitted  that  the  dispute, in  substance, is  not  one
of   apportionment   but   is   in   respect   of   the   share   in   the   subject
land.  In such  circumstances, the  District  Magistrate, Mau  had
the   jurisdiction   and   competence   to   look   into   the   order   passed
by   the   competent   authority   by   relying   upon   the   order   dated
31.05.1976   passed   by   the   Principal   Civil   Judge,   Azamgarh   in
Civil   Suit   No.   63   of   1970.     In   such   circumstances   referred   to
above, the learned counsel prayed that there being no merit in
the present appeal, the same may be dismissed.
14

ANALYSIS
18. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the
parties   and   having   gone   through   the   materials   on   record,   the
only   question   that   falls   for   our   consideration   is   whether   the
High Court committed any error in passing the impugned order.
19. Before   adverting   to   the   rival   submissions   canvassed   on
either side, we must look into few relevant provisions of the Act
1956.  
20. Section 3A reads thus:­
“ 3A. Power to acquire land, etc. —(1) Where the
Central   Government   is   satisfied   that   for   a   public
purpose   any   land   is   required   for   the   building,
maintenance,   management   or   operation   of   a
national   highway   or   part   thereof,   it   may,   by
notification   in   the   Official   Gazette,   declare   its
intention to acquire such land. 
(2)   Every   notification   under   sub­section   (1)   shall
give a brief description of the land.
 
(3)   The   competent   authority   shall   cause   the
substance of the notification to be published in two
local   newspapers,   one   of   which   will   be   in   a
vernacular language.”
15

21. Section 3C provides for hearing of objections. Section 3D
provides for declaration of acquisition.   Section 3E provides for
power   to   take   possession.   Section   3G   is   with   respect   to
determination of amount payable as compensation. Section 3G
reads thus:­
“ 3G.   Determination   of   amount   payable   as
compensation. —(1)   Where   any   land   is   acquired
under   this   Act,   there   shall   be   paid   an   amount
which   shall   be   determined   by   an   order   of   the
competent authority.
(2)   Where   the   right   of   user   or   any   right   in   the
nature   of   an   easement   on,   any   land   is   acquired
under   this   Act,   there   shall   be   paid   an   amount   to
the   owner   and   any   other   person   whose   right   of
enjoyment   in   that   land   has   been   affected   in   any
manner whatsoever by reason of such acquisition
an   amount   calculated   at   ten   per   cent,   of   the
amount determined under sub­section (1), for that
land. 
(3)   Before   proceeding   to   determine   the   amount
under   sub­section   (1)   or   sub­section   (2),   the
competent   authority   shall   give   a   public   notice
published   in   two   local   newspapers,   one   of   which
will   be   in   a   vernacular   language   inviting   claims
from   all   persons   interested   in   the   land   to   be
acquired. 
(   4) Such notice  shall state  the  particulars   of
the   land   and   shall   require   all   persons
16

interested   in   such   land   to   appear   in   person
or   by   an   agent   or   by   a   legal   practitioner
referred   to   in   sub­section   (2)   of   section   3C,
before   the   competent   authority,   at   a   time
and   place   and   to   state   the   nature   of   their
respective interest in such land.
(5)   If   the   amount   determined   by   the   competent
authority   under   sub­section   (1)   or   sub­section   (2)
is   not   acceptable   to   either   of   the   parties,   the
amount   shall,   on   an   application   by   either   of   the
parties,   be   determined   by   the   arbitrator   to   be
appointed by the Central Government. 
(6)   Subject   to   the   provisions   of   this   Act,   the
provisions   of   the   Arbitration   and   Conciliation   Act,
1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to every arbitration
under this Act. 
(7) The competent authority or the arbitrator while
determining   the   amount   under   sub­section   (1)   or
sub­section   (5),   as   the   case   may   be,   shall   take
into consideration— 
(a)     the market value of the land on the date
of   publication   of   the   notification   under
section 3A; 
(b)   the   damage,   if   any,   sustained   by   the
person   interested   at   the   time   of   taking
possession   of   the   land,   by   reason   of   the
severing of such land from other land; 
(c)   the   damage,   if   any,   sustained   by   the
person   interested   at   the   time   of   taking
possession   of   the   land,   by   reason   of   the
acquisition   injuriously   affecting   his   other
immovable property in any manner, or his
earnings; 
17

(d)     if,   in   consequences   of   the   acquisition   of
the   land,   the   person   interested   is
compelled   to   change   his   residence   or
place   of   business,   the   reasonable
expenses,   if   any,   incidental   to   such
change.” (Emphasis supplied)
22. Section   3H   is   with   respect   to   deposit   and   payment   of
amount.   What   is   relevant   for   our   purpose   is   sub­clause   (4)   of
Section 3H. Sub­clause (4) reads thus:­
“ 3H. Deposit and payment of amount .—
(4) If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the
amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom
the same or any part thereof is payable, the competent
authority shall refer the dispute to  the  decision of the
principal   civil   court   of   original   jurisdiction   within   the
limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated.”
23. The scheme of the Act 1956 and the statutory provisions
referred   to   above   makes   it   very   clear   that   once   any   land   is
acquired   under   the   Act   1956,   the   competent   authority   is
obliged to pay an amount by  way of compensation.   There is a
procedure   which   has   been   prescribed   under   Section   3G   of   the
Act   1956.   Sub­clause   (5)   of   Section   3G   makes   it   abundantly
clear that if the amount determined by the competent authority
18

under   sub­section   (1)   or   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   3G   is   not
acceptable   to   either   of   the   parties,   the   amount   will   have   to   be
determined   by   the   arbitrator   who   may   be   appointed   by   the
Central Government on the strength of an application by either
of the parties.  Section 3H provides that the amount determined
towards   compensation   under   Section   3G   will   have   to   be
deposited   by   the   Central   Government   in   accordance   with   the
rules.   It   is   only   after   such   amount   is   deposited   by   the
competent   authority   that   the   possession   of   the   land   can   be
taken. Sub­clause (4) of Section 3H talks about apportionment
of the amount.  The language of sub­clause (4) of Section 3H is
plain   and   simple.   It   provides   that   if   any   disputes   arises   as   to
the   apportionment   of   the   amount   or   any   part   thereof,   the
competent   authority   is   obliged   to   refer   the   dispute   to   the
decision   of   the   Principal   Civil   Court   of   original   jurisdiction
within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated. 
24. In   the   case   on   hand,   the   High   Court   seems   to   have
completely   misread   the   provisions   of   the   Act   1956.   It   fell   into
error   as   it   failed   to   apply   the   well   settled   principle   of   law   that
19

for   construing   a   legal   provision,   the   first   and   foremost   rule   of
construction is the literal construction.   All that the Court has
to see at the very outset is what does the provision state.  If the
provision is unambiguous and from the provision the legislative
intent is clear, the Court need not  call into aid the other  rules
of   construction   of   statute.   The   other   rules   of   construction   are
called into aid only when the legislative intent is not clear.
25.  It   may   be   mentioned   in   the   aforesaid   context   that   the
first   and   foremost   principle   of   interpretation   of   a   statute   in
every   system   of   interpretation   is   the   literal   rule   of
interpretation.   The   other   rules   of   interpretation,   for   example,
the   mischief   rule/   purposive   construction,   etc.   can   only   be
resorted to when the plain words of a statute are ambiguous or
lead to no intelligible results or if read literally would nullify the
very   object   of   the   statute.   Where   the   words   of   a   statute   are
absolutely   clear   and   unambiguous,   recourse   cannot   be   had   to
the   principles   of   interpretation   other   than   the   literal   rule.   The
language   employed   in   a   statute   is   the   determinative   factor   of
the legislative intent. The legislature is presumed to have made
20

no mistakes. The presumption is that it intended to say what it
has   said.   Assuming   there   is   a   defect   or   an   omission   in   the
words used by the legislature, the Court cannot correct or make
up the deficiency. 
26. There   is   a   fine   distinction   between   determining   the
amount   to   be   paid   towards   compensation   and   the
apportionment of the amount. The legislature has thought fit to
confer   powers   upon   the   Principal   Civil   Court   of   original
jurisdiction   to   determine   the   dispute   arising   as   to   the
apportionment   of   the   amount.   There   is   a   reason,   why   the
legislature has thought fit to confer such power to the Principal
Civil   Court   of   original   jurisdiction   within   the   limits   of   whose
jurisdiction   is   land   is   situated.     We   shall   try   to   explain
hereinafter. 
27.  The   question   of   apportionment   of   compensation   is   not
free   from   difficulties.   In   apportioning   the   compensation,   the
Court   has   to   give   to   each   claimant   the   value   of   the   interest
which   he   has   lost   by   compulsory   acquisition.   So   stated,   the
proposition  may  appear  simple,  but  in  its  practical  application
21

numerous   complicated   problems   arise   in   apportioning   the
compensation awarded.  The difficulty experienced is due to the
nature of a variety of interests, rights and claims to land which
have   to   be   valued   in   terms   of   money.   The   compensation
awarded   for   compulsory   acquisition   is   the   value   of   all   the
interests which are extinguished and that compensation has to
be   distributed   equitably   amongst   persons   having   interest
therein   and   the   Court   must   proceed   to   apportion   the
compensation   so   that   the   aggregate   value   of   all   interests   is
equal   to   the   amount   of   compensation   awarded.   But   in   the
valuation   of   competing   interests,  which   from   its   very   nature  is
dependent   upon   indefinite   factors   and   uncertain   data,
considerable   difficulty   is   encountered.   Indisputably,   in
apportioning   compensation   the   Court   cannot   proceed   upon
hypothetical considerations but must proceed as far as possible
to   make   an   accurate   determination   of   the   value   of   the
respective   interests   which   are   lost.   The   Court   must,   in   each
case, having  regard to the circumstances and the possibility of
a   precise   determination   of   the   value   having   regard   to   the
22

materials   available,   adopt   that   method   of   valuation   which
equitably   distributes   the   compensation   between   the   persons
entitled thereto. [See :  Dossibai Nanabhoy Jeejeebhoy v. P.M.
Bharucha, (1956) 60 Bom LR 1208 ]
28.  Thus,   the   only   general   principle   one   could   state   is   that
apportionment   under   sub­clause   (4)   of   Section   3H   of   the   Act
1956 is not a revaluation but a distribution of the value already
fixed among the several persons interested in the land acquired
in   accordance   with   the   nature   and   quantum   of   the   respective
interests.     In   ascertainment   of   those   interests,   the
determination   of   their   relative   importance   and   the   manner   in
which   they   can   be   said   to   have   contributed   to   the   total   value
fixed   are   questions   to   be   decided   in   the   light   of   the
circumstances   of   each   case   and   the   relevant   provisions   of   law
governing   the   rights   of   the   parties.   The   actual   rule   for
apportionment   has   to   be   formulated   in   each   case   so   as   to
ensure   a   just   and   equitable   distribution   of   the   total   value   or
compensation among the persons interested in the land. 
23

29. In   the   circumstances   referred   to   above,   the   legislature
thought   fit   to   assign   such   function   to   none   other   than   the
Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. 
30. We   are   not   impressed   by   the   submission   canvassed   on
behalf   of   the   respondent   Nos.   4,   6   and   16   that   the   dispute
between the parties is not one of apportionment but the same is
with   regard   to   giving   effect   to   the   order   passed   by   the   Civil
Court in Civil Suit No. 63 of 1970 decided on 31.05.1976. What
is   perhaps   sought   to   be   argued   is   that   the   shares   in   the   land
acquired   should   be   determined   on   the   basis   of   some   order
passed by the Civil Court referred to above. Thus, if the private
respondents   want   to   rely   upon   the   order   passed   by   the   Civil
Court, they can do so before the Court of the Principal Judge of
original jurisdiction. We hold that the District Magistrate, Mau
has  no power  or  jurisdiction  in regard to the apportionment  of
the amount.
31. We fail to understand on what basis the High Court in its
impugned   order   has   observed   that   the   District   Magistrate   is
competent   to   examine   the   order   passed   by   the   Special   Land
24

Acquisition   Officer   and   decide   the   dispute   as   to   the
apportionment of the amount.
32.   In   the   decision   in   Sharda   Devi   v.   State   of   Bihar ,
reported   in   2003   MhLJ   Online   (S.C.)   23   =   AIR   2003   SC   942,
this Court had an occasion to consider the ambit and scope of
Sections 30 and 31 resply of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In
analyzing  and interpreting  these provisions, this Court held as
under:­
“23.   The   two   provisions   contemplating   power   of   the
Collector   to   make   reference   as   contained   in   Section
18   and   Section   30   of   the   Act   need   a   comparative
study.   Under   Section   18   the   subject­matter   of
reference   can   be   a   dispute   as   to   any   one   or   more   of
the following: (i) as to the measurement of the land, (ii)
as to the amount or the quantum of the compensation,
(iii)   as   to   the   persons   to   whom   the   compensation   is
payable,   (iv)   as   to   the   apportionment   of   the
compensation   among   the   persons   interested.
Under   Section 30   the subject matter of dispute can be:
(i) the apportionment of the amount of compensation or
any part thereof, (ii) the persons to whom the amount
of   compensation   or   any   part   thereof   is   payable.
Though   the   expression   employed   in   Section   18   is   'the
amount   of   compensation'   while   the   expression
employed in   Section 30   is 'the amount of compensation
or   any   part   thereof',   this   distinction   in   legislative
drafting is immaterial and insignificant and a dispute
as   to   entitlement   or   apportionment   of   part   of   the
25

compensation   would   also   be   covered   by   Section   18   of
the Act on the principle that the whole includes a part
too.   Thus,   at   the   first   blush,   it   seems   that   Section
30   overlaps   Section   18   in   part;   but   as   will   be   seen
shortly hereinafter, it is not so.
24. Dr.   G.H.   Grant   Vs.   State   of   Bihar   (supra)   is   a
three­Judge   Bench   decision   of   this   Court   wherein   the
scheme of the Act by reference to the power vesting in
the   Collector   to   make   a   reference   came   up   for   the
consideration  of  the  Court.  The   three­Judge   Bench  by
a majority of 2:1 laid down the following principles :
(i) There are two provisions in the Act under which
the   Collector   can   make   a   reference   to   the   Court,
namely,   Section   18   and   Section   30 .   The   powers
under   the   two   sections   are   distinct   and   may   be
invoked   in   contingencies   which   do   not   overlap.   A
person   shown   in   that   part   of   the   award   which
relates   to   apportionment   of   compensation   who   is
present   either   personally   or   through   a
representative   or   on   whom   notice   is   issued
under   Section   12(2) ,   must,   if   he   does   not   accept
the   award,   apply   to   the   Collector   to   refer   the
matter   to   the   Court   under   Section   18   within   the
time prescribed thereunder. But a person who has
not appeared in the acquisition proceedings before
the Collector may, if he is not served with notice of
filing, raise a dispute as to apportionment or as to
the   persons   to   whom   it   is   payable   and   apply   to
the   Court   for   a   reference   under   Section   30 ,   for
determination   of   his   right   to   compensation   which
may have existed before the award, or which may
have   devolved   upon   him   since   the   award.   For   a
reference under   Section 30 , no period of limitation
is prescribed.
(ii) It is not predicated of the exercise of the power
to   make   a   reference   under   Section   30   that   the
26

Collector   has   not   apportioned   the   compensation
money by his award.
(iii)   The   award   made   by   the   Collector
under   Section   11   is   not   the   source   of   the   right   to
compensation. An award is strictly speaking only
an   offer   made   by   the   Government   to   the   person
interested   in   the   land   notified   for   acquisition;   the
person interested is not bound to accept it and the
Government   can   also   withdraw   the   acquisition
u/s 48. It is only when possession of the land has
been   taken   by   the   Government   u/s   16   that   the
right   of   the   owner   of   the   land   is   extinguished.
Therefore   the   appellant's   contention   that   title   to
compensation   is   derived   solely   from   and   on   the
date of the award could not be accepted.
(iv)  The   liability  of  the   Government  u/s  31 to  pay
compensation to the person entitled thereto under
the award does not imply that only the persons to
whom   compensation   is   directed   to   be   paid   under
the   award   may   raise   a   dispute   u/s   30.   The
scheme   of   apportionment   by   the   Collector
under   Section   11   is   conclusive   only   between   the
Collector   and   the   persons   interested   and   not
among   the   persons   interested.   Payment   of
compensation   u/s   31   to   the   persons   declared   in
the   award   to   be   entitled   thereto   discharges   the
State of its liability to pay compensation leaving it
open   to   the   claimant   to   compensation   to   agitate
his   right   in   a   reference   u/s   30   or   by   a   separate
suit.
(v)   Under   the   Bihar   Land   Reforms   Act   the   title   of
the   appellant   to   the   land   noticed   for   acquisition
became vested in the State and therefore the right
to   compensation   for   the   land   acquired   devolved
upon the State. A dispute then arose between the
State   Government   and   the   appellant   "as   to   the
persons   to   whom"   compensation   was   payable.
27

The   State   had   no   right   to   the   compensation
payable   for   the   land   under   a   title   existing   before
the   date   of   the   award   of   the   Collector   and   no
application   could   be   made   by   it   as   a   person
interested within the meaning of   Section 18 . But a
dispute between the appellant and the State as to
their conflicting claims to the compensation money
was clearly a dispute which could be referred u/s
30   of   the   Act   to   the   Court.   There   is   nothing
in   Section   30   which   excludes   a   reference   to   the
Court   of   a   dispute   raised   by   a   person   on   whom
the   title   of   the   owner   of   the   land   has   since   the
award, devolved. 
 
30.  The   scheme  of  the  Act   reveals   that   the  remedy  of
reference u/s 18 is intended to be available only to a
'person interested'. A person present either personally
or   through   representative   or   on   whom   a   notice   is
served   u/s   12(2)   is   obliged,   subject   to   his   specifying
the test as to locus, to apply to the Collector within the
time   prescribed   u/s   18(2)   to   make   a   reference   to   the
Court. The basis of title on which the reference would
be   sought   for   u/s   18   would   obviously   be   a   pre­
existing title by reference to the date of the award. So
is   Section   29 ,   which   speaks   of   'persons   interested'.
Finality to the award spoken of by   Section 12(1)   of the
Act   is   between   the   Collector   on   one   hand   and   the
'persons interested' on the other hand and attaches to
the   issues   relating   to   (i)   the   true   area,   i.e.
measurement of the land, (ii) the value of the land, i.e.
the   quantum  of   compensation,  and   (iii)   apportionment
of   the   compensation   among   the   'persons   interested'.
The 'persons interested' would be bound by the award
without   regard   to   the   fact   whether   they   have
respectively   appeared   before   the   Collector   or   not.   The
finality   to   the   award   spoken   of   by   Section   29   is   as
between   the   'persons   interested'   inter   se   and   is
28

confined   to   the   issue   as   to   the   correctness   of   the
apportionment.   Section   30   is   not   confined   in   its
operation   only   to   'persons   interested'.   It   would,
therefore,   be   available   for   being   invoked   by   the
'persons   interested'   if   they   were   neither   present   nor
represented   in   proceedings   before   the   Collector,   nor
were   served  with notice   u/s   12(2)  of   the  Act  or when
they claim on the basis of a title coming into existence
post   award.   The   definition   of   'person   interested'
speaks of 'an interest in compensation to be made'. An
interest coming into existence post award gives rise to
a   claim   in   compensation   which   has   already   been
determined.   Such   a   person   can   also   have   recourse
to   Section   30 .   In   any   case,   the   dispute   for
which   Section   30   can   be   invoked   shall   remain
confined only (i) as to the apportionment of the amount
of   compensation   or   any   part   thereof,   or   (ii)   as   to   the
persons   to   whom   the   amount   of   compensation
(already   determined)   or   any   part   thereof   is   payable.
The State claiming on the basis of a pre­existing right
would not be a 'person interested', as already pointed
out hereinabove and on account of its right being pre­
existing,   the   State,   in   such   a   case,   would   not   be
entitled   to   invoke   either   Section   18   or   Section
30   seeking   determination   of   its   alleged   pre­existing
right. A right accrued or devolved post award may be
determined   in   a   reference   u/s   30   depending   on
Collector's discretion to show indulgence, without any
bar as to limitation. Alternatively, such a right may be
left   open   by   the   Collector   to   be   adjudicated   upon   in
any   independent   legal   proceedings.   This   view   is   just,
sound and logical as a title post award could not have
been   canvassed   upto   the   date   of   the   award   and
should   also   not   be   left   without   remedy   by   denying
access   to   Section   30 .   Viewed   from   this   angle,   Section
18   and   30   would not overlap and would have fields to
operate independent of each other.
29

37. The   Collector   acts   as   a   representative   of   the
State   whilst   holding   proceedings   under   the   Land
Acquisition   Act .   In   fact,   he   conducts   the   proceedings
on   behalf   of   the   State.   The   award   of   the   Collector   is
not   the   source   of   the   right   to   compensation;   it   is   the
pre­ existing right which is recognized by the Collector
and   guided   by   the   findings   arrived   at   in   determining
the   objections,   if   any,   the   Collector   quantifies   the
amount   of   compensation   to   be   placed   as   an   offer   of
the   appropriate   Government   to   the   owner   recognized
by   the   State.   The   offeree   may   accept   or   decline   the
offer. It he accepts the offer and the Government takes
possession   over   the   land,   the   title   of   the   offeree   is
extinguished   and   vests   absolutely   in   the   Government
free   from   all   encumbrances.   The   power   to   make   an
award   under   Section   11   and   to   make   a   reference
under   Sections   18   or   30   of   the   Act   is   a   statutory
power. The sweep of jurisdiction of Court to determine
the disputes is also statutory and is controlled by the
bounds   created   by   Section   17   or   30   whereunder   the
reference has been made to the Court. The power has
to   be   exercised   to   the   extent   to   which   it   has   been
conferred   by   the   Statute   and   on   availability   of   pre­
existing   conditions   on   the   availability   of   which   and
which alone the power can be exercised.
38. Award   made   by   the   Collector   is   final   and
conclusive   as   between   the   Collector   and   the   'persons
interested',   whether   they   have   appeared   before   the
Collector or not, on two issues : (i) as to true area, i.e.
measurement   of   land   acquired,   (ii)   as   to   value   of   the
land,   i.e.   the   amount   of   compensation,   and   (iii)   as   to
the   apportionment   of   the   compensation   among   the
'persons   interested'   again,   between   the   Collector   and
the   'persons   interested'   and   not   as   amongst   the
'persons interested' inter se. In the event of a reference
30

having   been   sought   for   u/s   18,   the   Collector's   award
on   these   issues;   if   varied   by   Civil   Court,   shall   stand
superseded to that extent. The scheme of the Act does
not   attach   a   similar   finality   to   the   award   of   the
Collector   on   the   issue   as   to   the   person   to   whom
compensation   is   payable;   in   spite   of   the   award   by
Collector   and   even   on   failure   to   seek   reference,   such
issue   has   been   left   available   to   be   adjudicated   upon
by any competent forum.”
 
33. We   are   of   the   view   that   when   it   comes   to   resolving   the
dispute   relating   to   apportionment   of   the   amount   determined
towards   compensation,   it   is   only   the   Principal   Civil   Court   of
original   jurisdiction   which   can   do   so.   Principal   Civil   Court
means the Court of the District Judge.
34. Our final conclusion is as under:­ If any dispute arises as
to   the   apportionment   of   the   amount   or   any   part   thereof   or   to
any   person   to   whom   the   same   or   any   part   thereof   is   payable,
then,   the   competent   authority   shall   refer   the   dispute   to   the
decision   of   the   Principal   Civil   Court   of   original   jurisdiction
within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated. The
competent   authority   possesses   certain   powers   of   the   Civil
Court,   but   in   the   event   of   a   dispute   of   the   above   nature,   the
summary   power,   vesting   in   the   competent   authority   of
31

rendering an opinion in terms of sub­section (3) of Section 3H,
will   not   serve   the   purpose.     The   dispute   being   of   the   nature
triable   by   the   Civil   Court   that   the   law   steps   in   to   provide   for
that to be referred to the decision of the Principal Civil Court of
original   jurisdiction.   The   dispute   regarding   apportionment   of
the   amount   or   any   part   thereof   or   to   any   person   to   whom   the
same   or   any   part   thereof   is   payable,   would   then   have   to   be
decided by that Court. 
35. In such circumstance referred to above, the order passed
by   the   District   Magistrate,   Mau   dated   16.01.2020   is   hereby
quashed   and   set   aside.   The   writ   application   No.   7310   of   2020
stands   allowed.   In   view   of   the   dispute   between   the   parties   as
regards   apportionment   of   the   amount   of   compensation,   the
Special   Land   Acquisition   Officer   shall   now   refer   the   dispute   to
the   Principal   Civil   Court   of   original   jurisdiction   in   accordance
with sub­clause (4) of Section 3H of the Act 1956.
36. The appeal is allowed accordingly.  
37. There shall be no order as to costs.
32

38. Pending   application,   if   any,   stands   disposed   of
accordingly.
………………………………..J.
( B.R. GAVAI )
………………………………..J.
(J.B. PARDIWALA)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 07, 2023
33