/2023 INSC 0639/
1
NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.10556­10558 OF 2010
GURBACHAN SINGH (DEAD)     …APPELLANT(S)
THROUGH LRS    
 
VERSUS
GURCHARAN SINGH (DEAD)         ...RESPONDENT(S)
THROUGH LRS AND ORS.     
J U D G M E N T 
SANJAY KAROL, J. 
Background
1.   The present appeals stand filed against a judgment rendered
by   the   Punjab   and   Haryana   High   Court   in   Civil   Regular
Second   Appeal   number   283   of   1984   dated   18 th
  February,
2010 1
  and   in   RA­RS­42­C   of   2010   and   Civil   Misc.   No.6287­C
of   2010   dated   28 th
  May,   2010   by   which   the   court   in   such
jurisdiction  set  aside  the  concurrent  findings  returned  by  the
Additional District Judge, Jalandhar in Civil Appeal No.248 of
1   Hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Judgment”
12023 INSC 639

2
1981 dated 1 st
  August, 1981 and by  the Sub­Judge 1 st
  Class,
Jullundur ( now Jalandhar ) in Civil Suit No.186 of 1981 dated
24 th
 September, 1981.
2. The   crux   of   these   appeals   lies   in   a   property   dispute   wherein
one of the two brothers namely, Faqir Singh had allegedly sold
off   the   portion   of   property   belonging   to   him   that   his   brother
Gurbachan   Singh   and   he   inherited   from   their   father   namely
Suchet Singh who died intestate in the year 1942. Gurcharan
Singh   (Respondent   herein/plaintiff)   bought   a   piece   of   land
belonging   to   Faqir   Singh   measuring   4   marlas   vide   sale   deed
dated   19 th
  December,   1978 2
  for   a   consideration   of   ₹   6000.
Thereafter, he was put in possession of such land however, it
was   forcibly   taken   by   the   Appellant   Gurbachan   Singh   who
stated   that   since   Faqir   Singh   did   not   have   any   exclusive   title
or   possession   over   the   suit   property,   he   could   not   purport   to
sell the same.
3. The   Respondent   (Gurcharan   Singh)   filed   a   suit   for
possession   over   such   disputed   property   before   the   Sub­
Judge 1 st
  Class, Jullundur  ( now Jalandhar ) , who, having
considered   the   evidence   led,   framed   certain   issues   and
2   Hereinafter referred to as “disputed property”
2

3
returned   findings   in   favour   of   the   Appellant   (Gurbachan
Singh) herein. On 1 st
  appeal, the learned Additional District
Judge upheld the judgement rendered by the court below on
two   grounds   viz.   that   there   is   no   document   on   record   to
prove   that   the   disputed   property   had   been   given   to   Faqir
Singh   in   a   family   partition;   and   that   if   Suchet   Singh   had
indeed   affected   partition   50   or   60   years   ago,   then   there
should   have   been   an   entry   in   the   revenue   record   to   that
effect, however, no such entry is to be found.
Impugned Judgement 
4. The   learned   single   Judge   framed   the   following   questions   of
law   (not   substantial   questions   of   law)   for   his   consideration­
whether   the   findings   recorded   by   both   the   courts   below   by
relying   upon   cogent   evidence   in   the   shape   of   admissions
made   by   witnesses   of   the   Respondents,   can   be   termed   to   be
perverse given the set of circumstances or not? And, whether
a   person,   who   is   concededly   the   owner   on   the   basis   of   valid
the executed sale deed and having become co­sharer by virtue
of   the   same,   is   entitled   to   protect   his   possession,   if   it   is
3

4
established that he is in settled possession of a specific area
or not?
5. Referring   to   the   testimonies   of   DW­1,   DW­3   and   DW­4   the
learned judge noted a categorical admission that Suchet Singh
had   partitioned   the   property   during   his   lifetime.   It   was   also
noticed   that   the   abovenamed   witnesses   testified   to   the
Respondents   herein   having   carried   out   construction   on   the
property purchased by him, the implication thereof being that
after   the   execution   of   the   sale   deed,   possession   also   rested
with   him.   In   view   of   the   said   facts   the   judge   held   that   the
judgements   of   the   courts   below   were   result   of   “complete
misreading   of   the   evidence”   and   that   the   Appellant   was
entitled   to   the   possession   of   the   specific   portion   sold   to   him,
thereby   setting   aside   the   concurrent   findings   of   the   courts
below.
The Instant Appeals
6. The   judgement   rendered   in   the   regular   2 nd
  appeal   has   been
impugned   before   us   on   the   ground   that   the   High   Court   has
transgressed   the   scope   of   second   appeal;   that   the   purchaser
of a co­share does not have a right to possession [this ground
4

5
is urged on the basis of 3 judgement rendered by this court in
Jai   Singh   v.   Gurmej   Singh 3
,   Ramdas   v.   Sitabai   4
and   Shyam
Sunder v. Ram Kumar 5
] and, that the High Court had erred in
its   appreciation   of   evidence,   particularly   on   the   aspects   of
possession, the disputed property being an integral part of the
Appellant   herein’s  house  and   that   of   the  Respondents   herein
having raised construction on the disputed property.
Our View
7. The parameters of an appeal under Section 100, CPC passing
muster   are   well   established.   The   section   itself   dictates   that
such   an   appeal   shall   only   be   maintainable   when   the   case
involves   a   substantial   question   of   law   or   that   the   appellate
decree   has   been   passed   ex   parte.     the   latter,   obviously   is   not
the   case.   This   court   has,   in   a   multitude   of   decisions,
expounded on what  may  be termed as  a substantial question
of   law   to   satisfy   the   requirements   of   section   100.   In   Nazir
Mohamed v. J. Kamala 6
( 2­ Judge Bench), it was observed:­
3  (2009) 15 SCC 747 
4  (2009) SCC 444
5  (2001) 8 SCC 24
6   (2020) 19 SCC 57
5

6
“27.   In   HeroVinoth   v.   Seshammal   [HeroVinoth   v.   S
eshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545] , this Court referred
to   and   relied   upon   Chunilal   V.   Mehta   and   Sons
Ltd.   [Chunilal   V.   Mehta   &   Sons   Ltd.   v.   Century
Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314] and other
judgments   and   summarised   the   tests   to   find   out
whether  a given set of questions of law were mere
questions   of   law   or   substantial   questions   of   law.
The   relevant   paragraphs   of   the   judgment   of   this
Court   in   Hero   Vinoth   [Hero   Vinoth   v.   Seshammal,
(2006)   5  SCC   545]   are   set  out  hereinbelow  :  (SCC
p. 554, para 21)
“21.   The   phrase   “substantial   question   of   law”,   as
occurring   in   the   amended   Section   100   CPC   is   not
defined   in   the   Code.   The   word   substantial,   as
qualifying   “question   of   law”,   means—   of   having
substance,   essential,   real,   of   sound   worth,
important   or   considerable.   It   is   to   be   understood
as  something  in   contradistinction   with—technical,
of   no   substance   or   consequence,   or   academic
merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has
chosen   not   to   qualify   the   scope   of   “substantial
question of law” by suffixing the words “of general
importance”   as   has   been   done   in   many   other
provisions   such   as   Section   109   of   the   Code   or
Article   133(1)(a)   of   the   Constitution.   The
substantial   question   of   law   on   which   a   second
appeal   shall   be   heard   need   not   necessarily   be   a
substantial  question  of  law of general  importance.
In   Guran   Ditta   v.   Ram   Ditta   [Guran   Ditta   v.   Ram
Ditta,   1928   SCC   OnLine   PC   31   :   (1927­28)   55   IA
235   :   AIR   1928   PC   172]   the   phrase   “substantial
question   of   law”   as   it   was   employed   in   the   last
clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since
omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for
consideration   and   their   Lordships   held   that   it   did
not   mean   a   substantial   question   of   general
importance   but   a   substantial   question   of   law
which   was   involved   in   the   case.   In   Chunilal
case   [Chunilal   V.   Mehta   &   Sons   Ltd.   v.   Century
Spg.   &   Mfg.   Co.   Ltd.,   AIR   1962   SC   1314]   the
Constitution   Bench   expressed   agreement   with   the
following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras
6

7
High   Court   in   Rimmalapudi   Subba   Rao   v.   Noony
Veeraju   [Rimmalapudi   Subba   Rao   v.   Noony
Veeraju,   1951   SCC   OnLine   Mad   100   :   AIR   1951
Mad   969]   :   (Chunilal   case   [Chunilal   V.   Mehta   &
Sons   Ltd.   v.   Century   Spg.   &   Mfg.   Co.   Ltd.,   AIR
1962 SC 1314] , AIR p. 1318, para 5)
‘5.   …   when   a   question   of   law   is   fairly   arguable,
where  there  is  room  for   difference  of  opinion  on  it
or   where   the   Court   thought   it   necessary   to   deal
with   that   question   at   some   length   and   discuss
alternative   views,   then   the   question   would   be   a
substantial   question   of   law.   On   the   other   hand   if
the   question   was   practically   covered   by   the
decision   of   the   highest   court   or   if   the   general
principles   to   be   applied   in   determining   the
question are well settled and the only question was
of applying those principles to  the particular  facts
of  the  case  it  would  not be  a substantial   question
of law.’
28.   To be “substantial”, a question of law must be
debatable, not previously settled by the law of the
land   or   any   binding   precedent,   and   must   have   a
material   bearing   on   the   decision   of   the   case
and/or   the   rights   of   the   parties   before   it,   if
answered either way.”
(Emphasis supplied)
8. However,   the   formulation   or   lack   thereof   of   the   Court   having
framed substantial questions of law is not one of relevance to
the  instant  dispute  and therefore does not  come  to  the aid  of
the   Appellant   herein.   This   case   arises   out   of   a   dispute   in
Punjab and therefore, the rigors of section 100 do not apply. It
has been held by this court that in appeals arising out of the
7

8
state   of   Punjab   or   the   State   of   Haryana,   courts   are   not
required   to   frame   substantial   questions   of   law   as   per   section
100 of CPC.
9. The   Constitution   bench   in   Pankajakshi   (Dead)   through   LRs
v. Chandrika 7
 had held Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann 8
which   held   section   41   of   the   Punjab   Courts   Act,   1918   to   be
repugnant   to   section   100,   CPC   to   be   bad   in   law,   thereby
implying that section 41 of the Punjab Court Act holds as good
law. It was held as under:­ 
“ 25 .       We   are   afraid   that   this   judgment   in        Kulwant
Kaur   case        [Kulwant   Kaur        v.        Gurdial   Singh   Mann,
(2001) 4 SCC 262] does not state the law correctly
on   both   propositions.   First   and   foremost,   when
Section   97(1)   of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure
(Amendment) Act,   1976 speaks of any amendment
made or any provision inserted in the principal Act
by   virtue   of   a   State   Legislature   or   a   High   Court,
the   said   section   refers   only   to   amendments   made
and/or   provisions   inserted   in   the   Code   of   Civil
Procedure   itself   and   not   elsewhere.   This   is   clear
from   the   expression   “principal   Act”   occurring   in
Section  97(1).  What  Section  97(1)  really  does  is  to
state   that   where   a   State   Legislature   makes   an
amendment   in   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   which
amendment will apply only within the four corners
of the State, being made under Schedule VII List III
Entry   13   to   the   Constitution   of   India,   such
amendment   shall   stand   repealed   if   it   is
inconsistent   with   the   provisions   of   the   principal
7   (2016) 6 SCC 157
8   (2001) 4 SCC 262
8

9
Act   as   amended   by   the   Parliamentary   enactment
contained   in   the   1976   Amendment   to   the   Code   of
Civil   Procedure.   This   is   further   made   clear   by   the
reference   in   Section   97(1)   to   a   High   Court.   The
expression “any provision inserted in the principal
Act” by a High Court has reference to Section 122
of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure   by   which   High
Courts   may   make   rules   regulating   their   own
procedure,   and   the   procedure   of   civil   courts
subject to their superintendence, and may by such
rules   annul,   alter,   or   add   to   any   of   the   rules
contained in the First Schedule to the Code of Civil
Procedure.”
10.   Recently,   a   Bench   of   three   learned   Judges   in   Satyender   v.
Saroj 9
  while dealing with a property dispute arising out of the
State of Haryana, held as under:­
“ 16 .   We   may   also   add   here   that   we   are   presently
concerned   with   the   laws   in   the   State   of   Haryana.
All   the   same,   the   laws   as   applicable   in   Punjab   in
the year  1918, were also applicable to the present
territory of Haryana since it was then a part of the
State   of   Punjab.   Later   on,   the   creation   of   the   new
State   of   Haryana,   under   the   provision   given   in
Section   88   of   the   Punjab   Re­organization   Act,
1966, the laws applicable in the erstwhile State of
Punjab continued to be applicable in the new State
of   Haryana.   Furthermore,   State   of   Haryana
formally adopted the laws of the erstwhile State of
Punjab,   under   Section   89   of   the   Punjab   Re­
Organisation   Act,   1966.   Therefore,   in   the   State   of
Haryana   a   court   in   second   appeal   is   not   required
to formulate a substantial question of law, as what
is   applicable   in   Haryana   is   Section   41   of   the
Punjab   Courts   Act,   1918   and   not   Section   100   of
CPC.   Consequently,   it   was   not   necessary   for   the
9   2022 SCC OnLine SC 1026
9

10
High   Court   to   formulate   a   substantial   question   of
law.”
 
11.   In view of the  above  discussion, it is clear  to  this court that
the   judgement   of   the   learned   single   Judge   sitting   in   second
appellate jurisdiction cannot be faulted for not having framed
substantial questions of law under section 100, CPC.
12.  With reference to  Ramdas  (supra) and  Gurmej Singh  (supra)
it is contended that  Faqir  Singh  as a co­owner  sold  a part of
his   share   in   an   undivided   property   and   therefore   the
purchaser   only   acquires   such   share   but   not   the   right   to
possess. It is only after such a joint holding is partitioned and
a   right   of   exclusive   possession   arises.   With   reference   to
Shyam   Sunder (supra)   it   is  submitted   that  a  co­sharer   has   a
right   to   substitute   himself   in   place   of   a   stranger   so   as   to
prevent such a person from entering into family property.
13. The   principles   of   law   cited   herein   may   be   undoubtedly   good
law,   but,   however,   in   the   considered   view   of   this   court,   they
do   not   hold   in   the   case   put   forward   by   the   Appellant.   A
perusal   of   the   witness   statements   of   DW­3   as   duly   recorded
by   the   High   Court,   (the   court   also   relies   on   the   cross­
10

11
examination portions of DW­4 although the same do not form
part  of  the record before this court.) shows  that father  of the
Appellant   had   indeed   partitioned   the   property   during   his
lifetime.   In   such   situation   selling   a   part   of   his   share   in   an
undivided property, is a question that does not arise. Reliance
on   Shyam   Sunder   (supra)   does   not   support   the   case   of   the
Appellant   as   there   is   nothing   on   record   to   reflect   any   effort
having been made by him to substitute himself in place of the
Respondents in buying the 4 marlas of land from Faqir Singh
in   order   to   keep   a   stranger,   namely   Gurcharan   Singh   from
entering into family­owned property. Had the Appellant made
any such effort and the same would be reflected from record,
then it could have been argued that he has a right to exclude
the Respondents.
14. As already noted above, another ground of objection taken by
the Appellant is the fact of the impugned judgement entering
into   a   reappreciation   of   evidence.   While   it   is   true   that
ordinarily, in second appeal, the court must not disturb facts
established   by   the   lower   court   or   the   first   appellate   court.
However, it is also equally well recognised that this rule is not
an absolute one or in other words, it is not a rule set in stone.
11

12
In   Nazir   Mohamed   (supra)   this   Court   has   recognised   three
conditions in which a court in such jurisdiction, may disturb
findings of fact. They are: ­
“   ( i )   the   courts   below   have   ignored   material
evidence   or   acted   on   no   evidence;   ( ii )   the   courts
have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by
applying   the   law   erroneously;   or   ( iii )   the   courts
have   wrongly   cast  the   burden   of   proof.   A   decision
based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases
where  there  is  a total  dearth   of  evidence,  but  also
refers   to   case,   where   the   evidence,   taken   as   a
whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the
finding.”  
 
15.   A   Bench   of   three   learned   Judges,   recently   in
Balasubramanian   and   Anr.   v.   M.   Arockiasamy   (Dead)
Through   LRs. 10
,   had   referred   to,   with   approval   judgement
rendered   in   Ramathal   v.   Maruthathal   &   Ors 11
  (two­Judge
Bench)   wherein   it   was   observed   that   the   restraint   in
interfering   with   questions   of   fact   under   the   jurisdiction   of
second appeal, is not  an absolute  rule. Where the court is of
the view that the conclusions drawn by the court below do not
have   a   basis   in   the   evidence   led   or   it   is   of   the   view   that   the
10   (2021) 12 SCC 529
11   (2018) 18 SCC 303
12

13
appreciation   of   evidence   “suffers   from   material   irregularity”
the court will be justified in interfering with such findings.
16. A   perusal   of   the   impugned   judgement   as   also   the   cross­
examination   portion   of   the   statement   of   DW­3   suggests   that
both   the   courts   below   had   ignored   material   evidence   on   the
aspect   of   property   having   been   divided   by   the   father   of   the
Appellant   herein.   The   Appellant   has   himself   admitted   to
having sold one plot in favour of Atma Singh, claiming himself
to   be   the   exclusive   owner   of   such   property.   A   material
contradiction   then   arises   between   the   statement   and   one
made   earlier   where   he   denies   the   property   ever   having   been
partitioned by his father in favour of himself and his brother.
Nothing   on   record   reflects   the   vires   of   the   transaction   ever
having   been   challenged   therefore   the   earlier   part,   described
above, by nature of it being self­contradictory, stands falsified.
DW­3 has also, on oath testified to  the factum  of  partition of
the   property   by   father   of   the   Appellant,   Suchet   Singh.
Although in the later  part of his testimony he has tried to go
back on his earlier statement and states that it was incorrect
that   the   father   of   the   Appellant   had   effected   partition   within
his   lifetime   however,   a   conjoint   reading   of   the   statement   of
13

14
DW­1   in   regards   to   selling   a   portion   of   his   property   to   Atma
Singh   as   well   as   the   examination   in   chief   portion   of   the
testimony   of   DW   3   suggests   that,   Suchet   Singh   had   indeed
partitioned   the   property.     Hence,   findings   returned   by   the
High Court in the impugned judgment cannot be faulted.
17.   In   view   of   the   above   discussion,   the   appeals   against   the
impugned   judgement   fail.     The   judgement   and   orders   of   the
High   Court,   impugned   are   upheld   and   the   appeals   are
dismissed as lacking on merit.
18.   Interlocutory   applications,   if   any,   shall   stand   disposed   of   in
the above terms. No order as to costs.
…….………………J.
(ABHAY S. OKA)
……..…………..…J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
Dated : 24 th
 July, 2023;
Place : New Delhi.
14