/2023 INSC 0653/
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4725   OF 2023
(Arising out of SLP(C)No.13789/2022)
GOSTHO BEHARI DAS .. APPELLANT(S)
V.
DIPAK KUMAR SANYAL & ORS. .. RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KAROL, J.
Leave granted.
The question this Court must consider, is: –
“Whether   the   suspension   of   the   Petitioner’s   license   to
practice   medicine   is   alien   to   the   nature   and   types   of
punishment  and   penalties  specified  under   the  Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971?”2023 INSC 653

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THE FACTS   
1. The   present   appeal   stands   filed   against   the   judgement
rendered   by   the   High   Court   of   Calcutta,   (Circuit   Bench   at
Jalpaiguri)   in   MAT   No.   67   of   2022,   by   which   it   upheld
various   orders   passed   by   learned   single   Judge   dated   5 th
,
11 th
,   12 th
  and   14 th
  July,   2022   in   contempt   proceedings
bearing   number   WPCRC9   of   2022,   whereby   vide   the   order
dated   11 th
  July,2022   the   Petitioner/Appellant’s   licence   to
practice medicine, was suspended. 
2. Further   with   the   order   dated   14 th
  July   2022,   while
extending the period of suspension till 19 th
 August 2022, the
petitioner   was   asked   to   show   cause   as   to   why   such
suspension be not affected for a period of two years.
3. A   perusal   of   the   record   reveals   that   the   Appellant   had
unauthorizedly   constructed   a   structure   which   was   in
deviation   with   the   plans   sanctioned   by   the   Siliguri
Municipal Corporation. 1
 Respondent No.1(private party) filed
numerous   complaints   against   such   unauthorised
construction,   but   to   no   avail.   Discontented   by   the   non­
1   Hereafter, “SMC ”

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intervention   of   the   Commissioner   of   SMC 2
,   and   the   SMC 3
  ­
appellant herein filed a writ petition  before the High Court.
Vide   order   dated   22 nd
  December   2016   passed   in   W.P   No.
11464  (W)  of  2016,  Respondent  No.  3  was  directed to  have
the   construction   so   made,   inspected   and   submit   a   report
before   the   court.   On   the   next   date   of   hearing,   that   is   19 th
December 2017 it was directed that the representation that
stood   already   filed   before   the   Municipal   Corporation   dated
2 nd
 August 2007, was to be considered and a reasoned order
was to be passed thereon.
4. Pursuant   to   the   above   direction,   an   order   dated   13 th
  June
2018,   directing   the   Respondents   No.   3   to   demolish   the
unauthorised construction, was passed. This order however,
came   to   be   quashed   by   the   High   Court   observing   the
Commissioner SMC, not to be the competent authority and
instead,   only   the   Board   of   Councillors   of   the   SMC,   who
could pass orders for demolition. Subsequently, vide a fresh
order dated 25 th
June 2019 the Board of Councillors of SMC
while   observing   the   construction   to   be   unauthorised,
ordered   its   demolition.   In   furtherance   thereto,   Respondent
2   Hereafter,  Respondents No. 2
3   Hereafter,  Respondents No. 3

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No.   2   passed   an   order   dated   3 rd
  August   2019   directing   the
demolition to be carried out.
5. Aggrieved   by   this   order,   the   petitioner,   (Appellant   herein)
filed   a   Writ   Petition   bearing   No.   349/2019   before   the   High
Court   of   Calcutta   (circuit   bench   at   Jalpaiguri.)   The   same
was   disposed   of   with   the   observation   that   an   appeal   from
the   order   dated   25 th
  June   2019,   lay   before   the   Principal
Secretary,   Urban   Development   and   Municipal   Affairs,
Government   of   West   Bengal.   The   said   authority   passed
orders  on  8 th
January  2020 and   28 th
July  2020  directing  the
SMC   to   take   necessary   steps   to   aid   the   petitioner   in
undertaking   self­   demolition   of   the   unauthorised
construction   and,   in   the   event   of   his   failure   to   do   so,
directed that the SMC itself undertakes such steps to do so.
6. Respondent No. 1 then filed a contempt petition in WPA No.
349   of   2019.   It   is   hereunder   that   the   license   to   practice
medicine, of the Appellant herein, was suspended.
LAW ON THE ISSUE AT HAND 

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7. The   grant,   regulation   and   suspension   of   the   licence   to
practice   medicine   is   governed   by   the   National   Medical
Commission   Act,   2019.     It   facilitates   the   maintenance   of   a
medical   register   for   India   and   enforces   high   ethical
standards   in   regards   of   all   aspects   of   medical   services.     A
statutory   body   namely   the   National   Medical   Commission
looks after the above­mentioned activities.  
8. A   perusal   of   the   provisions   of   this   Act   as   well   as   the   now
repealed, Medical Council Act, 1956 shows that the power to
punish   a   registered   medical   practitioner   for   “misconduct”
rest exclusively with the body envisaged under this Act.  The
Act itself provides for an exhaustive, complete mechanism to
revoke   the   licence   of   a   registered   practitioner   for
professional   misconduct.     The   same   may   be   done   after
holding   an   inquiry   and   complying   with   the   principles   of
audi alterum partem.   
9. The   instant   dispute   involves   the   question   as   to   whether
such   a   punishment   could   be   handed   down   under   the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 4
.  
4   Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Contempt Act’

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10. Contempt of Court is defined in the Act under Section 2(a) :
“2(a).   “Contempt   of   Court”   means   civil   contempt
or criminal contempt;”
11. Civil contempt, with which the present case concerns itself,
is defined under Section 2(b) which reads as follows:
“2(b).   “civil   contempt”   means   wilful   disobedience
o   any   judgment,   decree,   direction,   order,   writ   or
other   process   of   a   court   or   wilful   breach   of   an
undertaking given to a court;”
12. The punishment for contempt of Court is prescribed under
Section 12 of the Contempt Act, which reads as under:
“12.   Punishment   for   contempt   of   court.­   (1)   Save
as   otherwise   expressly   provided   in   this   Act   or   in
any   other   law,   a   contempt   of   court   may   be
punished   with   simple   imprisonment   for   a   term
which   may   extend   to   six   months,   or   with   fine
which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with
both:
Provided   that   the   accused   may   be   discharged   or
the   punishment   awarded   may   be   remitted   or   on
apology being made to the satisfaction of the court.
Explanation.­   An   apology   shall   not   be   rejected
merely   on   the   ground   that   it   is   qualified   or
conditional if the accused makes it  bona fide.
(2)   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   any
other law for the time being in force, no court shall
impose   a   sentence   in   excess   of   that   specified   in
sub­section   (1)   for   any   contempt   either   in   respect
of itself or of a court subordinate to it.
xx  xx  xx”

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13. It may be noted that right from the Privy Council onwards,
judicious   and   sparing   use   of   the   power   of   contempt   has
been   an   accepted   proposition.   In   Parashuram   Detaram
Shamdasani v. Emperor 5
  the Council had observed­
“… this summary power of punishing for contempt
of   court   should   be   used   sparingly   and   only   in
serious cases. It is a power which a Court must of
necessity   possess;   its   usefulness   depends   on   the
wisdom and restraint with which it is exercised…”
14. A Bench of seven judges in  C.S. Karnan, In re 6
,  had, 
referring to various decisions of other jurisdictions, observed 
“ 63.   The authority to punish for contempt of court
has   always   been   exercised   by   the   judiciary   from
times   immemorial   [   In   one   of   the   earliest   legal
pronouncements   dealing   with   the   subject,   Justice
Wilmot   in   R.   v.   Almon,   1765   Wilmot's   Notes   243   :
97   ER   94   explained   the   philosophy   behind   the
power to punish for contempt of court. The passage
now   a   classic   exposition   runs   as   follows   :   (ER   p.
100)“…   and   whenever   men's   allegiance   to   the   laws
is so fundamentally shaken, it is the most fatal and
most   dangerous   obstruction   of   justice,   and,   in   my
opinion,   calls   out   for   a   more   rapid   and   immediate
redress than any other obstruction whatsoever; not
for   the   sake   of   the   Judges,   as   private   individuals,
but   because   they   are   the   channels   by   which   the
King's   justice   is   conveyed   to   the   people.”]   .   The
justification for the existence of that is not to afford
protection   to   individual   Judges   [   “14.   …   the   law   of
contempt   is   not   made   for   the   protection   of   Judges
5   1945 AC 264
6   (2017) 7 SCC 1

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who may be sensitive to the winds of public opinion.
Judges are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to
thrive   in   a   hardy   climate.”   [Douglas,
J.,   Craig   v.   Harney,   1947   SCC   OnLine   US   SC   79,
para   14   :   91   L   Ed   1546   :   331   US   367   at   p.   376
(1947)]]   but   to   inspire   confidence   in   the   sanctity
and   efficacy   of   the   judiciary   [   “…   The   object   of   the
discipline enforced by the Court in case of contempt
of   court   is   not   to   vindicate   the   dignity   of   the   court
or   the   person   of   the   Judge,   but   to   prevent   undue
interference   with   the   administration   of   justice.”
[Bowen,   L.J.   —   Helmore   v.   Smith   (2),   (1886)   35   Ch
D   449   at   p.   455   (CA)]]   ,   though   they   do   not   and
should   not   flow   from   the   power   to   punish   for
contempt.   They   should   rest   on   more   surer
foundations.   The   foundations   are—the   trust   and
confidence   of   the   people   that   the   judiciary   is
fearless and impartial .”
15.   Krishna   Iyer   J.   speaking   for   himself   and   Bhagwati   J.   in
Baradakanta   Mishra   v.   Registrar   Orissa   High   Court 7
(Constitution Bench), observed­
“65.   …   we   would   like   to   underscore   the   need   to
draw the lines clear enough to create confidence in
the   people   that   this   ancient   and   inherent   power,
intended   to   preserve   the   faith   of   the   public   in
public   justice,   will   not   be   so   used   as   to   provoke
public   hostility   as   overtook   the   Star   Chamber.   A
vague   and   wandering   jurisdiction   with   uncertain
frontiers,   a   sensitive   and   suspect   power   to   punish
vested   in   the   prosecutor,   a   law   which   makes   it   a
crime   to   publish   regardless   of   truth   and   public
good   and   permits   a   process   of   brevi
manu   conviction, may unwittingly trench upon civil
liberties   and   so   the   special   jurisdiction   and
jurisprudence bearing on contempt power must be
delineated   with   deliberation   and   operated   with
serious   circumspection   by   the   higher   judicial
7  ( 1974) 1 SCC 374

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echelons.   So   it   is   that   as   the   palladium   of   our
freedoms, the Supreme Court and the High Courts,
must   vigilantly   protect   free   speech   even   against
judicial   umbrage   —   a   delicate   but   sacred   duty
whose   discharge   demands   tolerance   and
detachment of a high order.”
16. In   W.B.   Administrative   Tribunal   v.   SK.   Monobbor
Hossain 8
,   (two­Judge Bench) has observed that the tenor of
the   dicta   of   this   Court   on   the   topic   (contempt)   is   crystal
clear.     The   Court   has   time   and   again   asserted   that   the
contempt   jurisdiction   enjoyed   by   the   Courts   is   only   for   the
purpose   of   upholding   the   majority   of   the   judicial   system
that   exists.     While   exercising   this   power,   the   Courts   must
not   be   hypersensitive   or   swung   by   emotions   but   must   act
judiciously.   The principle of sparing use stood reiterated in
Prashant Bhushan, In re 9
On the aspect of Punishment under a specified statute
17.   A Bench of seven judges in   Bar Council of Maharashtra
v.   M.V   Dabholkar 10
  had   observed   as   follows,   in   respect   of
the   role   of   Bar   Councils   and   the   powers   of   disciplinary
action vested within them, as under­
8   (2012) 11 SCC 761
9  ( 2021) 3 SCC 160
10   (1975) 2 SCC 702

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“ 24.   The   scheme   and   the   provisions   of   the   Act
indicate   that   the   constitution   of   State   Bar   Councils
and   Bar   Council   of   India   is   for   one   of   the   principal
purposes   to   see   that   the   standards   of   professional
conduct and etiquette laid down by the Bar Council
of   India   are   observed   and   preserved.   The   Bar
Councils   therefore   entertain   cases   of   misconduct
against   advocates.   The   Bar   Councils   are   to
safeguard   the   rights,   privilege   and   interests   of
advocates. The Bar Council is a body corporate. The
Disciplinary   Committees   are   constituted   by   the   Bar
Council. The Bar Council is not the same body as its
Disciplinary   Committee.   One   of   the   principal
functions  of  the   Bar  Council   in   regard   to   standards
of professional conduct and etiquette of advocates is
to   receive   complaints   against   advocates   and   if   the
Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate
has   been   guilty   of   professional   or   other   misconduct
it shall refer the case for disposal to its Disciplinary
Committee.   A   most   significant   feature   is   that   no
litigant   and   no   member   of   the   public   can
straightaway   commence   disciplinary   proceedings
against an advocate. It is the Bar Council of a State
which initiates the disciplinary proceedings. ”
(emphasis supplied)
18. This  Court  in   Supreme   Court   Bar  Association  v.   Union
of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409  (five­Judge Bench) categorically
held that –
“39.   Suspending   the   licence   to   practice   of   any
professional   like   a   lawyer,   doctor,   chartered
accountant   etc.   when   such   a   professional   is
found guilty of committing contempt of court, for
any   specified   period,   is   not   a   recognized   or

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accepted   punishment   which   a   court   of   record
either   under   the   common   law   or   under   the
statutory   law   can   impose   on   a   contemner   in
addition   to   any   of   the   other   recognized
punishments.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. A reading of sub­section (1) of Section 12 of the Act shows
that   the   punishment   prescribed   therein   is   simple
imprisonment,   not   exceeding   six   months   or   a   fine   not
exceeding   Rs.2,000/­Sub­Section   (2)   reads
“notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   any   other   law   for
the   time   being   in   force”   this   implies   that   save   and   except
the   punishment   provided   in   sub­Section   (1)   no   other
punishment   can   be   prescribed   to   a   person   guilty   of
committing contempt of Court.  
20. In   view   of   the   above,   this   Court   has   no   hesitation   in
holding   that   the   punishment   handed   down   to   the
contemnor   is   entirely   foreign   to   the   Act   and,   therefore,
unsustainable.   The   Court,   in   awarding   such   punishment
showed   complete   disregard   for   the   statutory   text   of   the
Contempt of Courts Act 1971, which is abundantly clear in
respect of the punishment that can be imposed thereunder.

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21. A   medical   practitioner   guilty   of   contempt   of   Court   may
also be so for professional misconduct but the same would
depend on the gravity/nature of the contemptuous conduct
of   the   person   in   question.     They   are,   however,   offences
separate   and   distinct   from   each   other.       The   former   is
regulated   by   the   Contempt   of   Court   Act,   1971   and   the
latter   is   under   the   jurisdiction   of   the   National   Medical
Commission Act, 2019.  
22. The   Division   Bench   in   the   impugned   judgment   did   not
consider   or   discuss   this   issue   nor   was   any   final   decision
taken   by   the   Single   Judge   in   the   subject   contempt
proceedings. 
23. The   question   raised   in   the   instant   appeal   is   answered   in
the above terms. 
24. The   appellant   has   submitted   before   the   High   Court   that
the   requisite   demolition   has   been   carried   out   with   the
exception   of   approximately   250   mm   in   the   rear   portion   of
the concerned building as, removal of the same would have
rendered the building, legally constructed, to be unsafe.  In
respect   of   the  unauthorized   construction   that  remains,  we

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direct   that   an   undertaking   be   furnished   before   the
concerned   High   Court   that   remedial   construction   to
safeguard   the   soundness   of   the   existing   building   and   the
consequent   demolishing   of   the   unauthorized   construction
shall be completed within a reasonable time.  
25. Consequently, the judgment of the Court’s below, i.e., the
Division   Bench   and   the   orders   of   the   Single   Judge,   High
Court   of   Calcutta,   (Circuit   Bench   and   Jalpaiguri)   in   MAT
No.67  of  2022  and  orders  dated  11 th
,  12 th
  and  14 th
  of  July
2022 are set aside.  The licence of the appellant, to practice
medicine is revived.  
26. The   appeal   is   allowed   accordingly.     The   pending
application(s), if any, stands disposed of.  No costs. 
………………………J.
(B.R. GAVAI)
………………………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
Date  : 28 July, 2023;
Place : New Delhi.