/2023 INSC 0658/
NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.10412 of 2013 
Yogendra Prasad Singh (Dead) 
through LRs …..Appellants
                                Versus
Ram Bachan Devi & Ors.        …..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Abhay S. Oka, J.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. The   appellants   are   the   legal   representatives   of
the   original   plaintiff.     For   the   sake   of   convenience,
parties are hereinafter referred to with reference to their
status   before   the   Trial   Court.     The   Trial   Court   decreed
the Suit which has been reversed in appeal.
2. The   plaintiff   is   the   son­in­law   of   the   first
defendant.     The   first   defendant   has   four   daughters.
One of the daughters, Sachita Devi has been married to
the plaintiff.  The second defendant is another daughter
of   the   first   defendant   who   is   married   to   one   Komal
Singh.
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3. The   first   defendant   was   heavily   indebted.     He
had borrowed money  from various persons by executing
mortgage deeds, hand notes, etc.   As the first defendant
was   unable   to   pay   debts,   he   decided   to   sell   the   suit
property.     Accordingly,   he   executed   a   registered   Sale
Deed on 04 th
 February 1963 in favour of the plaintiff for
consideration of Rs.10,000/­.   According to  the case of
the   plaintiff,   he   was   placed   in   possession   of   the   suit
property   and   started   cultivating   the   same.     His
contention   was   that   there   was   an   absolute   sale   under
the Sale Deed dated 04 th
  February 1963 (for short, ‘the
Sale Deed’).
4. Even according to the case of the plaintiff, a part
of   the   consideration   was   to   be   paid   by   him   to   the
creditors   of   the   first   defendant.     In   the   plaint,   the
plaintiff   has   described   the   steps   taken   by   him   to   clear
the   loans   repayable   by   the   first   defendant   and   money
paid   by   him   from   time   to   time   to   various   persons   in
that behalf.   His contention is that he paid off the debt
as   mentioned   in   the   Sale   Deed.     The   plaintiff   has
contended   that   the   first   defendant   being   his   father­in­
law, collected the registered Sale Deed from the office of
the   Sub­Registrar   and   has   kept   the   same   in   his
custody.
5. The first defendant executed a registered Deed of
Cancellation   dated   15 th
  June   1967   in   respect   of   the
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cancellation   of   the   Sale   Deed.     The   plaintiff   was
admittedly   not   a   signatory   to   the   said   Deed   of
Cancellation.   Thereafter, the first defendant purported
to   execute   a   Gift   Deed   dated   12 th
  January   1968   (for
short   ‘the   Gift   Deed’)   in   respect   of   the   suit   property   in
favour   of   the   second   defendant.     The   case   of   the
plaintiff   is   that   though   he   was   all   along   in   possession,
on   the   basis   of   the   order   passed   in   proceedings   under
Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 he
was   illegally   dispossessed   from   the   suit   property.
Therefore,   the   plaintiff   filed   a   Suit   for   declaration   of
title.     The   plaintiff   also   claimed   a   declaration   that   the
Gift Deed is forged.  The plaintiff prayed for a decree for
possession of the suit property.
6. The basic contention of the first defendant in his
written   statement   was   that   by   the   Sale   Deed,   absolute
sale   was   not   effected.     It   is   contended   that   out   of   the
consideration of Rs.10,000/­, the plaintiff had agreed to
pay   a   sum   of   Rs.6,875/­   for   redeeming   the   10
mortgages   made   by   the   first   defendant.     The   balance
amount   of   Rs.3,125/­   was   to   be   paid   on   the   exchange
of   equivalents   ( ta   khubzul   badlain ).     The   contention   of
the   first   defendant   is   that   in   fact   the   mortgages   were
redeemed by him and therefore, he was in possession of
the   mortgage   deeds.     His   contention   is   that   as   no
consideration   was   passed   under   the   Sale   Deed,   the
plaintiff   has   not   acquired   any   right,   title   or   interest   in
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the suit property.
7. The   Trial   Court   after   in­depth   consideration   of
the evidence on record, concluded that the plaintiff had
acquired   ownership   in   respect   of   the   suit   property   on
the basis of the Sale Deed.  It was held that the Deed of
Cancellation   dated   15 th
  June   1967   being   a   unilateral
document was not valid.   The Trial Court held that the
remedy  of the  first defendant was  to  invoke  Section 31
of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and seek cancellation of
the   Sale   Deed.     The   Trial   Court   also   held   that   the
second   defendant   did   not   acquire   any   right,   title   or
interest   on   the   basis   of   the   Gift   Deed   executed   by   the
first   defendant.     The   Trial   Court   accepted   the   case
made out by the appellant that the liabilities of the first
defendant were discharged by him.
8. In   the   appeal   against   the   decree   of   the   Trial
Court   preferred   by   the   original   defendants,   the   High
Court interfered with the impugned judgment and held
that   as   consideration   was   not   paid   under   the   Sale
Deed,   the   plaintiff   did   not   acquire   any   right,   title   or
interest in respect of the suit property.  The High Court
did   not   accept   the   plaintiff's   case   that   he   had
discharged the loan liability of the first defendant.   The
Trial   Court   had   accepted   that   the   plaintiff   had   paid   a
cash amount of Rs.3,125/­ to the first defendant at the
time of the exchange of equivalents.  The said case was
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disbelieved   by   the   High   Court.     Therefore,   the   High
Court   proceeded   to   set   aside   the   decree   of   the   Trial
Court and dismissed the Suit.
SUBMISSIONS
9. The   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   legal
representatives   of   the   plaintiff   submitted   that   on   the
execution   of   the   Sale   Deed,   right,   title   and   interest   of
the first defendant in the suit property were passed on
to   the   plaintiff.     He   submitted   that   there   was
substantial evidence on record to show the discharge of
liabilities of the first defendant by the plaintiff.  Inviting
our   attention   to   the   recitals   in   the   Sale   Deed,   he
submitted   that   it   is   clearly   recorded   that   the   title   and
possession   passed   on   to   the   plaintiff.     He   submitted
that   the   first   defendant   being   the   father­in­law   of   the
plaintiff   had   retained   the   Sale   Deed.     Considering   the
relationship   between   the   plaintiff   and   the   first
defendant, it is not unnatural  that the plaintiff did not
object   to   the   custody   of   the   Sale   Deed   by   the   first
defendant.     He   submitted   that   the   findings   of   fact
recorded   by   the   High   Court   regarding   the   payment   of
liabilities   of   the   first   defendant   by   the   plaintiff   are
completely   erroneous.     He   submitted   that   there   is
nothing   abnormal   about   the   possession   by   the   first
defendant of the mortgage deeds.  Though the mortgage
money   was   paid   by   the   plaintiff,   the   mortgage   deeds
were handed over to the first respondent as he was the
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mortgagor.
10. The   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   first   and
second defendants heavily relied upon a decision of this
Court in the case of  Janak Dulari & Anr.  v.  Kapildeo
Rai & Anr. 1
.   He submitted that this Court in the said
decision has taken note that the practice of   ta khubzul
badlain  (of title passing on the exchange of equivalents)
is   prevalent   only   in   Bihar.     He   submitted   that   this
Court   held   that   the   practice   of   ta   khubzul   badlain   in
Bihar   recognizes   that   a   duly   executed   Sale   Deed   will
not operate as a transfer  in praesenti  but postpones the
actual   transfer   of   title   from   the   time   of   execution   and
registration   of   the   deed   to   the   time   of   exchange   of
equivalents.  In such a case, the title on the basis of the
Sale   Deed   will   pass   to   the   purchaser   only   after   the
entire   amount   is   paid   by   the   purchaser.     Inviting   our
attention to the recitals in the Sale Deed, he submitted
that   it   was   a   transaction   to   which   the   practice   of   ta
khubzul  badlain   was  applicable.     He   submitted  that  as
the   title   in   the   Suit   property   never   passed   on   to   the
plaintiff,   the   first   defendant   rightly   executed   a   Deed   of
Cancellation of the Sale Deed.  He submitted that there
is no reason to find fault with the reasoning adopted by
the High Court. 
11. The   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   legal
1   (2011) 6 SCC 555
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representatives   of   the   plaintiff   submitted   that   in   very
difficult times faced by the first defendant, the plaintiff,
his son­in­law, took the risk of taking the suit property,
which was the subject matter of encumbrances.
OUR VIEW
12. A sale deed of an immovable property is executed
in   accordance   with   Section   54   of   the   Transfer   of
Property   Act,   1882   (for   short,   ‘the   1882   Act’).     There
cannot  be   any   dispute  that  normally,   on   the  execution
of a registered Sale Deed by the owner of the property,
the title in the property subject matter of the Sale Deed
stands   transferred   to   the   purchaser.     Considering   the
principles   laid   down   in   sub­section   (4)(b)   of   Section   55
of   the   1882   Act,   the   seller   will   have   a   charge   over   the
property   subject   matter   of   the   sale   for   unpaid
consideration and he can enforce the charge by filing a
suit.
13. The entire case of the defendants is based on the
decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Janak   Dulari
Devi 1
.   In   paragraph   20   of   the   said   decision   this   Court
held thus :
“ 20.   We   have   referred   to   several   decisions   of
the Patna High Court in detail to demonstrate
the   existence   of   the   established   practice   of
exchanging   equivalents   ( ta   khubzul   badlain ).
The effect of such transactions in Bihar is
that   even   though   the   duly   executed   and
registered   sale   deed   may   recite   that   the
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sale  consideration  has   been  paid,   title has
been   transferred   and   possession   has   been
delivered   to   the   purchaser,   the   actual
transfer  of title and delivery of possession
is postponed from the time of execution of
the   sale   deed   to   the   time   of   exchange   of
the   registration   receipt   for   the
consideration,   that   is,   ta   khubzul
badlain . ”
(emphasis added)
Paragraph 24 of the decision reads thus : 
“ 24.   We hasten  to add  that the practice of   ta
khubzul   badlain   (of   title   passing   on   exchange
of   equivalents)   is   prevalent   only   in   Bihar.
Normally, the recitals in a sale deed about
transfer   of   title,   receipt   of   consideration
and delivery of possession will be evidence
of   such   acts   and   events;   and   on   the
execution   and   registration   of   the   sale
deed,   the   sale   would   be   complete   even   if
the sale price was not paid, and it will not
be   possible   to   cancel   the   sale   deed
unilaterally.   The   exception   to   this   rule   is
stated   in   Kaliaperumal   [(2009)   4   SCC
193   :   (2009)   2   SCC   (Civ)   101]   .   The
practice   of   ta   khubzul   badlain   in   Bihar
recognises   that   a   duly   executed   sale   deed
will   not   operate   as   a   transfer   in
praesenti   but   postpones   the   actual
transfer   of   title,   from   the   time   of
execution   and   registration   of   the   deed,   to
the   time   of   exchange   of   equivalents ,   that
is,   registration   receipt   and   the   sale
consideration,   if   the   intention   of   the
parties   was   that   title   would   pass   only   on
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payment   of  entire  sale  consideration.   As a
result,   until   and   unless   the   duly   executed
and   registered   sale   deed   comes   into   the
possession of the purchaser, or until the right
to receive the original sale deed is secured by
the   purchaser   by   obtaining   the   registration
receipt,   the   deed   of   sale   remains   merely   an
agreement   to   be   performed   and   will   not   be   a
completed   sale.   But   in   States   where   such   a
practice   is   not   prevalent,   possession   of
registration receipt by the vendor, may not, in
the absence of other clear evidence, lead to an
inference   that   consideration   has   not   been
paid   or   that   title   has   not   passed   to   the
purchaser   as   recited   in   the   duly   executed
deed   of   conveyance.   Where   the   purchaser   is
from   an   outstation,   the   vendor   being
entrusted   with   the   registration   receipt,   to
collect the original sale deed and deliver it to
the purchaser, is common. Be that as it may.”
(emphasis added)
Thus,   this   Court   held   that   normally,   on   the   execution
and   registration   of   a   sale   deed   containing   recitals
regarding   the   payment   of   consideration   and   delivery   of
possession, the sale is complete even if the sale price is
not paid and, therefore, it will not be possible to cancel
the sale deed in its entirety.   However, the exception to
the said rule is the practice of   ta khubzul badlain .   The
use of the expression   ta khubzul badlain   in a sale deed
by   itself  will  not  be  determinative   of   the  true  nature   of
the   transaction.   It   cannot   be   read   in   isolation.   All   the
terms and conditions and recitals in the document will
have   to   be   considered   to   decide   the   real   nature   of   the
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transaction.
14. We   have,   therefore,   examined   the   recitals   in   the
Sale   Deed   from   the   translated   English   version   of   the
same   produced   by   the   appellants.     The   English
translation shows that –
(a) There   is   a   specific   recital   that   the   first
defendant   has   transferred   the   possession   of   the
suit property to the plaintiff in the capacity of the
owner   and   that   the   plaintiff   will   become   the
owner of the property; 
(b) It  also  mentions  that from  the  date  of  Sale
Deed, the first defendant has no claim or title in
respect of the suit property or regarding its price;
(c) Nothing   was   due   and   payable   by   the
plaintiff   to   the   first   defendant   as   the   first
defendant had received consideration; and 
(d)     The plaintiff who was the son­in­law of the
first   defendant   took   the   suit   property   with
encumbrances   when   the   first   defendant   was   in
trouble due to liabilities. 
 
15. Therefore,   the   use   of   the   words   “khubzul
badlain”, in the facts of the case, cannot be conclusive.
It is true that the Sale Deed refers to various mortgages
executed   by   the   first   defendant   for   getting   money   and
the   recitals   indicate   that   the   plaintiff   had   agreed   to
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discharge   the   said   loan   liabilities.     But,   there   is   a
specific   recital   in   the   Sale   Deed   that   the   title   and
possession   in   the   property   has   been   passed   to   the
plaintiff.     These   recitals   regarding   the   transfer   of   title
and   possession   are   very   crucial   which   cannot   be
brushed aside.
16. On   overall   reading   of   the   Sale   Deed,   it   is
apparent   that   under   the   Sale   Deed,   the   entire   right,
title   and   interest   of   the   first   defendant   in   the   suit
property   has   been   transferred   to   the   plaintiff   by   the
said sale deed.  At the highest, as per sub­section (4)(b)
of   Section   55   of   the   1882   Act,   the   first   defendant   was
entitled   to   have   a   charge   on   the   suit   property   for   the
amount   of   consideration   which   was   not   paid   by   the
plaintiff.     Even   this   provision   may   not   help   the   first
defendant.     The   reason   is   that   the   plaintiff   has   taken
over   the   suit   property   with   liabilities   as   set   out   in   the
Sale   Deed.     The   creditors   of   the   first   defendant   can,
therefore,   proceed   against   the   suit   property.     Once   we
hold   that   the   title   and   ownership   passed   on   to   the
plaintiff on the date of Sale Deed, it is not necessary to
go   into   the   question   whether   the   appellant   has
discharged   liabilities   of   the   loan   especially   when   the
first   or   second   defendants   did   not   file   a   counter­claim
for payment of the consideration payable under the Sale
Deed.
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17.              There is one more aspect of the case. If it was
the   case   of   the   first   defendant   that   there   was   no
transfer of title under the said Sale Deed, there was no
reason   for   him   to   unilaterally   execute   a   document   of
cancellation   of   the   sale   deed.   In   any   case,   such   a
unilateral   cancellation   deed   was   not   binding   on   the
plaintiff   as   he   was   not  a   consenting   party.   The   second
defendant will not get any right by virtue of the gift deed
as   the   first   defendant   had   no   transferable   title.   As   the
ownership   of   the   plaintiff   is   proved,   the   decree   for
possession   must   follow.   There   was   no   counter­claim
made   by   the   first   or   second   defendant   for   claiming
alleged unpaid consideration. 
18. Therefore,   the   appeal   succeeds.     The   impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court of Patna
in First Appeal No.334 of 1988 is quashed and set aside
and   the   decree   passed   by   the   Trial   Court   in   Title   Suit
No.142 of 1977 is restored.
19. The appeal is allowed on the above terms with no
order as to costs.
……..………………..J.
[ABHAY S. OKA]
..……………………..J.
[RAJESH BINDAL]
New Delhi
Dated : July 31, 2023.
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