/2023 INSC 0664/ REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4835 OF 2023 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.2523 of 2022] Yadaiah and Anr. .… Appellants VERSUS State of Telangana and others      … . Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.4836 OF 2023 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.2060 of 2022] WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.4837 OF 2023 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.2350 of 2022] WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.4838 OF 2023 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.2110 of 2022] C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  1  of  972023 INSC 664 WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.4839 OF 2023 [ Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.2185 of 2022] WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.4840 OF 2023 [Arising  out  of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.6714 of 2022] JUDGMENT Surya Kant, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. These   appeals   are   directed   against   the common   judgment   dated   31.12.2021   passed   by   a Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   of   Telengana whereby   the   intra­court   appeal   preferred   by   the State   of   Telengana   and   its   revenue   authorities   has been   allowed,   reversing   the   decision   of   the   learned Single   Judge.   Consequently,   the   resumption   order dated   27.01.2007,   which   forms   the   core   of   the present   disputes   concerning   the   assignment   of non­occupied   land   in   the   1960s   to   landless C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  2  of  97 Scheduled   Caste/Scheduled   Tribe   persons [ Hereinafter,   ‘ Assignees’ ]   for   the   purpose   of cultivation, has been confirmed.  3. Since   these   appeals   arise   out   of   a   long­drawn saga   wherein   multiple   rounds   of   litigation   occurred between the parties before various forums, including this   Court,   it   would   be   appropriate   to   discuss   the same at length before delving into  the issues of law raised   before   us   concerning   res   judicata ,   nature   of assignment   and   violation   of   conditions   of assignment.   It   may   also   be   mentioned   before embarking   into   the   factual   matrix   that   this   Court vide   order   dated   06.09.2022   had   impleaded   the Greyhounds   Commando   Force   through   the Additional   Director   General   of   Police   as   a   Party­ Respondent for effective adjudication since the land in   dispute   has   been   statedly   allotted   and   is   being used for training its forces. A.                  F ACTS      4. The   genesis   of   these   disputes   began   on 28.10.1953   when   the   Revenue   Department   of   the then   undivided   State   of   Andhra   Pradesh   took   a policy   decision   and   communicated   the   sanction C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  3  of  97 granted   for   the   assignment   of   ‘Astabl   Kanchi’ 1   land measuring 200 Acres comprising the revenue estate of Manchirevula village situated in the Ranga Reddy District   to   the   Assignees.   The   relevant   part   of   the said policy decision stated that:– “…… I   am   directed   to   communicate Government   sanction   for   the   assignment of   culturable   area   to   the   extent   of   200 acres   out   of   Astabl   Kanchi   situated   in Manchirral village to the landless Harijans under   special   laoni   Rules   after   regular phodi   work   by   the   land   Record   and Settlement   Department.   The   remaining area   of   the   Kancha   may   be   kept   in   fact and auctioned every year….”   (sic) 5. The   Collector   after   this   communication,   vide letter dated 07.11.1959, finally submitted a report of eligible individuals and directed that ‘phodi’ or sub­ division of the Subject Land be conducted before its assignment.   However,   after   further   inspection   by revenue   authorities,   the   Collector   noted   in   a subsequent   letter   dated   04.06.1960   that   land measuring   142   Acres   39   Guntas   was   fit   for cultivation   instead   of   the   initially   proposed   area   of 200   Acres.   Accordingly,   the   Revenue   Divisional Officer vide his letter dated 16.08.1960, directed the 1  ‘ Kancha’ is the term employed for land which absolutely vests in favour  of the government. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  4  of  97 concerned   Tehsildar   to   initiate   assignment proceedings   for   land   measuring   142   Acres   39 Guntas   in   Survey   No.   393   of   Village   Manchirevula [ Hereinafter,   ‘Subject   Land’ ]   and   directed   that process be initiated for grant of special Laoni 2   Patta to the eligible persons .   6. It   is   to   be   noted   that   before   any   kind   of   patta could   be   granted,   the   State   Government   issued   an order  dated   29.06.1961   [ Hereinafter,   ‘GOM   1122’ ] overriding   all   previous   orders   which   governed assignment  and  alienation.  The  said  order  provided exhaustive guidelines for assignment and alienation of   Government   lands,   the   relevant   part   whereof   as applicable to the Subject Land reads as follows:– “ 5. The Government further direct that no vacant land in the Greater Hyderabad city or   within   a   belt   of   10   miles   around   the city   should   be   assigned   or   otherwise disposed   of   until   Government   have assessed   the   requirements   of   various Department   for   building   accommodation in the city. ” 7. It   was   only   after   GOM   1122   was   brought   into effect, that the State Government issued temprorary pattas   dated   21.10.1961   [ Hereinafter,   ‘Temporary 2   During   the   course   of   hearing,   it   has   been   brought   into   our   attention that term ‘Laoni’ loosely means to ‘bring into cultivation’.  C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  5  of  97 Pattas’ ]   to   each   of   the   selected   A ssignee s.   It   would be appropriate for proper analysis of the controversy to   reproduce   the   contents   of   one   such   Temprory Patta   dated   21.10.1961   granted   to   an   Assignee which is as follows:– “ FORM­G (Under Rule  9  (g) Written permission to occupy land (to be given by the Tahsildar under Loani Rules) Temporary   patta   is   granted   to   Shri Mylarapu   Pedda   Gandaiah   S/o.   Venkaiah, resident   of   Manchirevula   village,   Tahsil Hyderabad   West,   Hyderabad   District,   to occupy the following land and to cultivate the   same,   till   the   phodi   work   is completed. 1. Village Name  : Manchirevula 2. Taluk                             :  Hyderabad West 3. Sy. No.                           : 393 4. Total extent                   : 326.28 5. Extent given under patta: Ac. 7.06 gts. 6. Cess                                : Rs. 7.15 7. Nature of land                 : Kancha 8. Classification                  : Dry Sri   Mylarapu   Pedda   Gandaiah   has   to pay Rs. 7.15 per year from 1961­1962 for the   land   granted   for   occupation   under this permit as assessment. After   the   podhi   is   completed,   the area and assessment are both fixed by the C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  6  of  97 Dept.   of   Land   Records   (Survey   and Settlement). The Pattadar is bound to pay the   assessment   so   fixed,   but   this   change will   take   effect   only   form   the   year following   in   which   such   change   has   been made   as   a   result   of   the   compk1jon   of phodi work by the Dept. of land Record.  (In the case of land granted as not Transferable) The   Grantee   is   not   empowered   ∙to transfer   the   occupancy   without   the sanction   previously   obtained   from   the Collector. This permission to occupy shall not   confer   the   right   to   mine   on   the   land or   collect   minerals   therefrom.   The   right on   the   toddy   trees   will   vest   with   the Government. Sd/­Tehsildar 24.10.1961 Hyderabad West ”  (sic) (Emphasis Applied) There are some other policy decisions also that have   brought   in   restrictions   regarding   transfer   of Subject Land which we would deal in the later  part of   this   judgement.   However,   it   is   pertinent   to   note that   afterwards,   permanent   pattas   were   granted   to the   Assignees   within   a   few   years   of   the   issuance   of Temporary Patta s. The Appellants are now claiming devolution   of   interest   and   ownership   rights   over C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  7  of  97 different   parcels   of   the   Subject   Land   through   the original Assignees.  8. After   the   grant   of   these   pattas,   the   situation remained   dormant   for   almost   three   decades. Meanwhile,   with   the   passage   of   time,   the   city   of Hyderabad,   like   all   other   capital   cities   across   the nation,   flourished  on  account   of  rapid  urbanisation and   swift   economic   development,   making   land   a scarce   and   valuable   resource.   Consequently,   the Subject Land also rose in value. On 14.08.1991, all the Assignees are stated to have executed a general power   of   attorney   [ Hereinafter,   ‘GPA’ ]   in   favour   of one   M.A.   Baksh.   The   GPA   gave   M.A.   Baksh   the following   amongst   other   powers   in   respect   of   the Subject Land:– “ 5.   To   negotiate,   enter   into   agreements for   and/or   let   lease   or   licence   the   said property   or   any   portion   thereof   to   such person(s)   or   body   and   for   such consideration   and   upon   such   terms   and conditions   and   for   such   purpose(s)   as   my said   attorney   may   in   his   absolute discretion deem fit. 6.   To   negotiate   and   agree   to   and/or   to enter   into   agreement,   to sell/develop/lease/   mortgage   the   said property   or   to   sell,   convey,   lease, mortgage,   assign   or   to   otherwise   transfer C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  8  of  97 the   said   property   or   any   portion   thereof to   such   person(s)   or   body   and   for   such consideration   arid   upon   such   terms   and conditions   and   for   such   purpose(s)   as   the said   attorney   may   in   his   absolute discretion   deem   fit   and   to   collect   and receive   the   considerations   thereof   and   to give a valid receipts therefor.  7. To enter into   agreement(s)   to develop the   said   property   by   laying   roads , drainage,   water   connections,   Electricity connection   etc.   and   or   erecting individual/   multistoreyed,   residential/ commercial   buildings   thereon   with   any person(s),   firms,   company/   companies   or society/   societies   upon   such   terms   and conditions as my said attorney may in his absolute discretion deem fit.” (Emphasis Applied) 9. Thereafter,   acting   upon   the   abovementioned GPA, M.A. Baksh sold a part of the Subject Land to private   individuals   between   the   period   of   January 1992   to   October   1992   as   brought   to   our   notice   by the parties through sale deeds placed on record. On perusal   of   these   sale   deeds,   one   crucial   feature which is to be noted is that M.A. Baksh envisaged to divide the Subject Land into smaller plots akin to a residential   colony   as   each   sale   deed   has   been C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  9  of  97 allotted   a   unique   plot   number   along   with   roads earmarked in the site plans attached thereto. 10. It   seems   that   at   the   time   M.A.   Baksh   was carrying   out   the   process   of   the   sale   of   the   Subject Land   as   a   residential   colony,   he   came   across   the provisions   of   Andhra   Pradesh   Assigned   Lands (Prohibition   of   Transfers)   Act   of   1977   [ Hereinafter, ‘1977   Act’ ]   which   prohibited   transfer   of   land assigned   to   landless   poor   by   the   Government. Realizing   the   potential   pitfall   in   carrying   out   the sales,   he   applied   for   clarification   through   a   letter dated 18.09.1992 to the concerned Mandal Revenue Officer   and   enquired   about   the   applicability   of   the 1977 Act. The Mandal Revenue Officer vide a memo dated 23.09.1992, responded to M.A. Baksh’s query saying that:– “ The   petitioner   Sri   M.A.   Baksh,   G.P.A. Holder   of   Mr.   Mylaram   Jangaiah   and others   is   informed   that   as   per   written permission   issued   by   the   Tahsildar, Hyderabad   West   vide   reference No.A6/8524/80   to   occupy   an   extent   of 143­00   acres   out   of   Sy.   No.   393   of Manchirevulu   village   in   form   (G)   under rule   9(g)   of   Laouni   rules,   1950   to   Sri Mylaram   Jangaiah   and   (19)   others, Harijans   of   same   village.   Subsequently   in C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  10  of  97 1965   the   said   land   was   made   Laouni patta.in   the   name   of   the   above   20 persons,  and  subdivided   as  Sy.  No.   393/1 to 393/20 Ac.7­ 06gts.,  each individual. As   per   rule   9(g)   of   the   Laouni   rules   1950 the   written   permission   in   form   (G)   is issued only after confirmation of sale; The sale   of   such   lands   is   not   hit   by   the provision   of   A.P.   Assignment   lands (Prohibition of Transfer) Act 1977.”  (sic) (Emphasis Applied) 11. Notwithstanding   this   clarification   by   the Mandal   Revenue   Officer,   some   of   the   Assignees cancelled   the   GPA   executed   in   favor   of   M.A.   Baksh in   October   1992,   probably   fearing   that   the   state authorities   would   cancel   the   allotment   of   the Subject   Land.   They   also   issued   a   public   notice wherein they declared that any sale entered into by M.A. Baksh on their behalf was not binding.  12. Fast   forward   a   year   and   somewhere   in November   1993,   the   Police   Department   sent   a requisition for land in  Manchirevula village to set up operational headquarters and training centres for its special   forces,   now   known   as   ‘Greyhounds Commando   Force’.   It   was   only   when   the   revenue authorities   analysed   their   records   that   their attention  was  drawn  towards  the  Subject  Land  and C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  11  of  97 the   legal   infirmities   associated   with   it,   starting   the saga of present legal tussle between the parties. 13. After   that   the   office   of   the   Collector,   Ranga Reddy   District   issued   a   show   cause   notice   dated 28.03.1994   [ Hereinafter,   ‘First   SCN’ ]   proposing   to cancel the assignment of Subject Land. The relevant extracts  of  the  First  SCN  containing  the  grounds  of cancellation are to the following effect:– “ The   issue   was   examined   in   details   with reference   in   rule   position   and   other aspect   and   found   that   the   alleged assignment   is   irregular,   illegal   and   liable to   be   cancelled   on   the   basis   of   following grounds: (i) The   Form­G   Certificate   issued   are for   temporary   occupation   and   thereby implementation   in   Falsalpatti   1961­62   is illegal. (ii) The   alleged   assignment   ought   to have   been   processed   under   Assignment Rule, 1958 instead of Laoni Rules, 1950. (iii)   The   alleged   assignment   is   in contravention   of   the   ban   order   of assignment   issued   in   G.O.   Ms.   No.   1222, dated 29.06.1961. (iv)  After issue of Form­G Certificate for temporary   occupation   there   is   no   Sub­ Division   took   place   and   supplementary Sethwar   issued,   therefore   the   alleged assignment   is   not   final   and   temporary C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  12  of  97 occupation   certificates   cannot   be   treated assignment pattas. (v) That the land is unfit for cultivation and   thereby   the   alleged   assignment   is irregular and indicate malafide intention. (vi)               The   alleged   assignees   have   not   put the land for cultivation and kept in fallow and   thereby   they   have   violated   the condition   laid   down   in   Rule   19   of   Laoni Rules, 1950. (vii)   The   alleged   assignees   while   violating the   condition   of   assignment   have executed   a   G.P.A.   in   favour   of   Sri   M.A. Baksh authorizing him to sell the land.    ” (Emphasis Applied) 14. The   Assignees   fearing   consequential dispossession,   approached   the   High   Court   which vide   its   order   dated   03.05.1994,   held   that   the   writ petition was premature and directed them to file an explanation   within   one   week,   but   protected   them from   dispossession   in   light   of   the   pending   show cause proceedings. The Assignees in turn filed their explanation   before   the   Collector   wherein   they submitted   that   assignment   was   valid   as   per   the applicable law and that there was no bar on sale of the Subject Land.  15. Strangely,   instead   of   the   District   Collector, proceedings   were   entrusted   to   the   District   Revenue C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  13  of  97 Officer   who   vide   his   order   dated   15.09.1994   held that   the   First   SCN   was   unsustainable.   On   account of   this   development,   the   District   Collector   through an   order   dated   03.01.1995,   exercised   his   suo   motu revisionary   powers   under   Section   166­B   of   the Telangana   Land   Revenue   Act   of   1317   Fasli [ Hereinafter,   ‘1317   Fasli   Act’ ]   and   suspended   the order   dated   15.09.1994   passed   by   the   District Revenue   Officer   pending   further examination/orders. Thereafter, the Collector sent a letter   to   the   Secretary,   Revenue   Department   for ratification of the order dated 03.01.1995, but since no  notice  was  given to  Assignees as required under Section   166­B   of   1317   Fasli   Act,   the   Government declined   the   request   for   ratification   of   the   said order.   Ultimately,   notices   were   issued   to   the Assignees and the Government vide its memo dated 24.01.1996   ratified   the   order   dated   03.01.1995.   It further   directed   that   final   orders   be   passed   after completion of the inquiry.   16. The   Assignees   filed   separate   writ   petitions against   the   Collector’s   order   dated   03.01.1995   as well   as   the   memo   dated   24.01.1996,   both   of   which C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  14  of  97 were   decided   vide   a   common   order   of   the   Learned Single   Judge   dated   01.09.1997   wherein   the   court set aside the orders on the ground that the initiation of   revisional   power   under   Section   166­B   of   1317 Fasli   Act   was   an unreasonable   and   arbitrary attempt to invalidate the assignment after an undue delay   of   more   than   34  years.   It   must   be   noted   that the   intra­court   appeal   against   the   order   dated 01.09.1997 was also dismissed by a Division Bench of   the   High   Court   through   its   order   dated 14.09.1998. 17. The State Government assailed the High Court order   dated   14.09.1998   before   this   Court   and   vide judgement   dated   28.04.2000   reported   as   Govt.   of A.P.   v.   Gudepu   Sailoo 3 ,   the   State’s   appeal   was allowed   to   the   extent   that   the   proceedings conducted before the District Revenue Officer which culminated   into   the   order   dated   15.09.1994,   were held   to   be   unsustainable.   It   was   further   held   that the  proceedings should  have  taken  place  before the Collector, particularly in view of the directions given by   the   High   Court   in   its   order   dated   03.05.1994. 3   Govt. of A.P. v. Gudepu Sailoo  (2000) 4 SCC 625. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  15  of  97 Hence,   the   Collector   was   directed   to   complete   the proceedings   initiated   vide   his   order   dated 03.01.1995 which was later on ratified by the memo dated   24.01.1996.   The   relevant   part   of   the judgement   dated  28.04.2000 of  this   Court  reads  as follows:– “ We   cannot   subscribe   to   the   view expressed   by   the   High   Court   in   so   far   as the   order   passed   by   the   District   Revenue Officer   is   concerned.   Since   a   mandamus was   issued   to   the   Collector,   Rangareddy District,   to   hear   and   dispose   of   the explanation,   which   was   required   to   be submitted   by   the   respondents   in   reply   to the show cause notice issued to them, the District   Revenue   Officer   had   no jurisdiction   to   consider   the   matter   in violation   of   the   direction   of   the   High Court.   As   a   matter   of   fact,   the explanation to the show cause notice had to   be   submitted   before   the   Collector   and the   Collector   alone   had   to   consider   and take   a   final   decision   in   the   matter.   The action   initiated   by   the   Collector   and   the ratification∙of   his   order   by   the   State Government   are   matters   which   should have   been   allowed   to   take   final   shape instead   of   being   challenged   at   the interlocutory   stage   by   the   respondents. That   being   so,   there   is   no   necessity   of going   into   the   merits   of   the   submissions made   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  16  of  97 parties   with   regard   to   the   provisions   of Section   166­B   and   166­C   of   the   Andhra Pradesh   (Telangana   Area)   Land   Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli .  We,   therefore ,   dispose   of   this   appeal finally  with the direction to the Collector to   complete   the   proceedings,   initiated by him   by   his   order   dated   3rd   of   January, 1995   as   ratified   by   the   Government   by its,order   dated   24th   of   January,   1996,   at an early date in accordance with law .” (Emphasis Applied) 18. Consequently,   proceedings   pursuant   to   the First   SCN   were   initiated   afresh   by   the   Collector   by issuing   notice   dated   17.08.2001   to   the   Assignees, many   among   whom   were   now   represented   by   the Apellants,   informing   that   the   proceedings   would   be taken up by the Joint Collector in exercise of powers delegated   by   the   Collector.   The   Apellants   furnished fresh   explanation(s)   on   27.08.2001   and consequently the office of the Joint Collector passed a   resumption   order   dated   22.12.2001   in   favour   of the State noticing that:– “ In   view   of   the   circumstances   explained above   and   since   the   assignment   itself   is irregular   and   the   assignees   sold   the   land in   conttavention   of   the   conditions   of assignment   and   also   the   assigned   land has   become   urbanized   and   no   longer C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  17  of  97 subserves   the   purpose   of   cultivation ,   I find no reason either to upheld the orders of   the   District   Revenue   Officer,   Ranga Reddy   passed   in   Procds.No.   D1/275/94 Dated:15.9.1994   or   to   revert   back   the land   in   Sy.No.393/   1   to   393/20   totally measuring   an   extent   of   Ac.142∙39   of Mancllerevula   village   of   Rajendranagar Mandal   to   the  assignees.   The  land   should be   remained   as   Government   land. Acoordingly   the   case   is   disposed   off   duly setting   aside   the   orders   of   District Revenue   Oflicer,   Ranga   Reddy   District passed   in   proceedings   No.   Dl/275/94 Dated:l5­9­1994.”  ( sic ) (Emphasis Applied) 19. The   Joint   Collector’s   order   dated   22.12.2001 came to be challenged before the High Court, which vide its order  dated 04.04.2002 opined  that in  view of   this   Court’s   judgement   in   Gudepu   Sailoo 4 ,   the Joint Collector had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the First   SCN   and   directed   the   District   Collector   to conduct   the   proceedings   and   pass   appropriate orders   after   notice   to   all   parties.   Resultantly, proceedings   were   conducted   before   the   District Collector   wherein   again   resumption   order   dated 15.03.2003   was   passed   in   favour   of   the   State.   It must   be   noted   that   the   reasoning   provided   in   the 4 ibid.  C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  18  of  97 resumption   orders   dated   22.12.2001   and 15.03.2003 is more or less identical. 20. The   Appellants   laid   a   challenge   to   the resumption   order   dated   15.03.2003   and   vide   its order   dated   21.04.2006,   the   High   Court   set   aside the   same   as   well   the   First   SCN,   primarily   for   the reasons   as   are   summed   up   in   the   following paragraphs of its judgment:– “ 14.   The   principal   ground   on   which   the assignments   soμght   to   be   cancelled   by invoking the review powers under section 166­B   of   the   Act   is   execution   of   GPA   by the assignees in favour of the predecessor in interest. As on this day, the GPA holder is   not   alive   and   even   if   any   power   of attorney   exists,   it   ceases   with   his   death. Therefore,   no   cause   survives   for   the District Revenue Officer to take  suo motu review. The other question is whether the assignments   made   in   favour   of   the petitioners and their predecessor interest is contrary to the Rules then in existence. That issue is into requircd to be examined after a lapse of nearly 40 years. The Laoni patta   certificates   came   to   be   issued   in accordance   with   the   provisions   of   Laoni, Rules,   1950.   Merely   because   those   rules came to be amended by substituting some other rules cannot be a ground to exercise suo mo to review by the District Revenue C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  19  of  97 Officer   or   the   District   Collector   under Sec. 166­B of the Act. 15. In view of the above discussion, I find that   the   show   cause   notice   issued   by   the District   Revenue   Officer,   R.R.   District   is not legal dnd proper. When once the show cause   notice   is   set   aside,   the   basis   for passing   the   order   impugned   in   the   writ∙ petitions by the Joint Collector canriot be said   to   be   well   founded.   Before   parting the case, I deem it appropriate to observe that   If   there   Is   any   contravention   of   the conditions   imposed   in   the   assignment order, the Government is always at liberty to   cancel   the   same   In   accordance   with the provisions of law. ”  (sic) (Emphasis Applied) 21. Taking   note   of   the   above­reproduced   liberty granted   by   the   High   Court,   the   Deputy   Collector­ cum­Mandal   Revenue   Officer   issued   a   fresh   show cause   notice   dated   11.12.2006   [ Hereinafter, ‘Second SCN’ ] wherein the factum of the sale deeds entered by M.A. Baksh in the capacity of GPA holder of   the   Assignees   was   duly   noticed   and   it   was asserted   that   the   Subject   Land   was   liable   to   be resumed   under   the   1977   Act.   The   relevant   part   of the Second SCN is as follows :– “ The   Sale   transaction   above   shown   are impermissible   and   void   as   same   are   in C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  20  of  97 contravention   of   the   provision   of   sub­ section   (2)   of   section­3   of   the   Andhra Pradesh   assigned   land   (Prohibition   of Transfer)   Act,   1977.   As   per   the prohibitions   of   the   said   Act   there   is prohibition   to   sell   the   land   assigned   to you   and   hence   sale   transaction   above referred are invalid. As per the Section 4 of A.P. assigned land   (Prohibition   of   transfer)   Act,   1977, satisfied   that   the   assignees   are contravened   the   provision   of   Sub­sectio (1)   of   section   3   in   respect   of   assigned lands   bearing   Sy.   No.   393/l   to   393/20   of Manchirevula   Village.   Hence   you   are hereby   show   cause   as   to   why   the scheduled   land   should   not   be   resumed into   Govt.   Possession   as   in   such   manner as prescribed by law.”  (sic) Post   the   issuance   of   Second   SCN,   the Appellants   tendered   explanation   and   proceedings took place pursuant thereto.  22. Eventually,   the   Second   SCN   culminated   into the   resumption   order   dated   27.01.2007,   wherein   it was noted that the Assignees had alienated the land to   M.A.   Baksh   through   GPA,   who   in   turn   sold   the land   to   subsequent   purchasers   in   the   form   of smaller plots. These transaction(s) were held to be in contravention   of   Section   3(1),   3(2),   3(3)   and   3(4)   of C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  21  of  97 the 1977 Act and accordingly, the Subject Land was ordered   to   be   resumed   under   Section   4   thereof.   It would   also   be   relevant   to   mention   that   the resumption   order   dated   27.01.2007   also   noticed that   most   of   the   Subject   Land   was   still   fallow   and unsuitable for cultivation as it was covered by large boulders/rocks. 23. The   Appellants   assailed   the   resumption   order dated   27.01.2007   before   the   High   Court   in   a   writ petition which came to be decided in their favour by a   learned   Single   Judge   vide   judgment   dated 05.02.2010   primarily   on   two   grounds   –   firstly   that the   Second   SCN   and   the   resumption   order   dated 27.01.2007   raised   the   identical   issues   in   respect   of Subject   Land   which   stood   already   decided   by   the High  Court  vide  its order   dated  21.04.2006. Hence, proceedings   emanating   from   the   Second   SCN   were barred by the principle of  res judicata  and an abuse of   process   of   law;   secondly   that   the   assignments were governed by the Laoni Rules of 1950 instead by the   subsequent   GOM   1122,   as   possession   stood granted   way   back   in   1940   much   earlier   than   the date GOM 1122 came into force. It is also useful to C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  22  of  97 mention   that   accordingly   to   the   learned   Single Judge,   the   liberty   granted   in   the   previous   High Court   order   dated   21.04.2006   regarding cancellation   of   Subject   Land   was   only   concerned with   `future   contravention’   of   the   assignment conditions. 24.   Being   piqued   on   account   of   the   order   of   the learned   Single   Judge,   the   State   preferred   an   intra­ court   appeal   before   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High Court. The said writ appeal has been allowed in the Respondents’   favour   via   the   impugned   judgement whereby   the   resumption   order   dated   27.01.2007 stands upheld for the following reasons: – a)   The   proceedings   under   the   Second   SCN   were not   hit   by   the   doctrine   of   res   judicata   or constructive   res   judicata ,   as   the   same concerned   the   sale   deeds   executed   by   M.A. Baksh   and   the   consequent   action   under   the 1977   Act,   which   was   not   an   issue   decided   by the High Court vide its order dated 21.04.2006 whereby the First SCN was set aside. b) The   learned   Single   Judge   had   erroneously construed   the   liberty   granted   in   the   order dated   21.04.2006   in   respect   of   fresh C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  23  of  97 cancellation   proceedings   to   be   only   for   future violation   of   assignment   conditions   as   no   such inference   could   be   drawn   from   the   wording   of the   said   order.   It   was   also   held   that   this interpretation   virtually   amounted   to   re­writing the   order   dated   21.04.2006,   especially   in   view of   the   fact   that   the   review   petition   against   the same,   seeking   to   delete   the   relevant   part granting   liberty   was   specifically   dismissed   by the High Court. c) The   Subject   Land   was   not   alienable   either under   the   Laoni   Rules   of   1950   or   under   the revised   land   assignment   rules   of   1958   and hence   it   comes   under   the   definition   of ‘assigned   land’   as   provided   in   the   1977   Act. The   issue   of   applicability   of   regulatory   regime on   the   assigned   land   stood   settled   by   this Court’s   judgement   in   Gudepu   Sailoo 5   whose relevant part in this context reads as follows:– “… .Thus,   under   the   original   Laoni Rules, 1950 as also under the Revised Policy   published   in   1958,   the alienation   of   the   assigned   land   was prohibited.   While   under   the   Laoni Rules,   1950,   the   alienation   or 5 Gudepu Sailoo  (n 3). C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  24  of  97 transfer   without   the   previous sanction   of   the   Collector   was prohibited,   under   the   Revised   Policy, it   was clearly   provided   that   though the assigned lands would be heritable, they would not be transferred… ” d) The   Division   Bench   also   distinguished   the decision   of   a   co­ordinate   bench   of   the   High Court   in   Letter   sent   from   Plot   No.338, Parvant Nagar v. the Collector and District Magistrate 6   wherein   it   was   held   that   land assigned   under   Rule   9   of   Laoni   Rules   of   1950 by way of market value collection would not be hit   by   the   provisions   of   the   1977   Act whereunder   alienation   of   assigned   land   was prohibited.   It   was   specifically   noted   that   the Subject   Land   was   granted   free   of   cost   to   the Assignees   without   any   action   or   payment   of market   value   as   evisaged   under   Form   9(G)   of the Laoni Rules of 1950 which was relied upon by   the   Appellants.   The   Division   Bench, therefore,   upheld   the   condition   mentioned   in 6   Letter sent from Plot No.338, Parvant Nagar v. the Collector and   District Magistrate  2008 SCC OnLine AP 477. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  25  of  97 the   assignment   itself   which   barred   transfer without the consent of the Collector.  e) It   was   noted   that   the   1977   Act   was   in   force when   the   GPA   in   favor   of   M.A.   Baksh   was executed   by   the   Assignees   as   well   as   when M.A.   Baksh   executed   the   sale   deeds   in   favour of subsequent purchasers for the small plots of land. Futhermore, it was held that subsequent cancellation of the GPA in favor of M.A. Baksh by   some   of   the   Assignees   was   immaterial   as the sale deeds executed by him by then already constituted   violation   of   the   assignment condition. 25. The   aggrieved   Appellants   are   now   before   this Court. B.                  C ONTENTIONS      26. We   have   heard   an   array   of   learned   senior counsels  representing   different  parties   and   perused the   documents   produced   on   record.   Their   written submissions have also been duly considered. 27. Leading   the   arguments   on   behalf   of   the Appellants,   Mr.   Jaideep   Gupta,   learned   senior counsel   made   the   following   contentions­   First,   that the   Single   Judge   Order   was   correct   in   concluding C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  26  of  97 that  the  Second  SCN  was  barred  by  the  doctrine  of res judicata . He argued that the substratum of both the   First   SCN   and   Second   SCN   is   essentially identical,   i.e.   violation   in   respect   of   the   bar   on   the alienability   of   Subject   Land.   Secondly ,   he   argued that   when   unoccupied   land   is   permanently   granted or   assigned   under   Section   54   of   the   1317   Fasli   Act as done  in  the present case, then Section  58 of the said   Act   expressly   provided   that   the   resultant occupancy right shall be ‘deemed to be heritable and transferable’. Even otherwise, he contended that for any   restriction   on   the   transfer   of   Subject   Land under   the   Special   Laoni   Rules   to   be   applicable,   a separate   notification   under   Section   58­A   of   1317 Fasli Act was a necessary prerequisite as mentioned in the rules itself. For ease of analysis, the relevant provisions   of   the   1317   Fasli   Act   are   reproduced below :– “ 54.      Procedure   for   acquiring   unoccupied land    :   (1) When   any   person is desirous of taking unoccupied   land   he   shall   before occupying   the   land   submit   a   petition   to the   Tahsildar   and   obtain   his   permission in writing.  C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  27  of  97 (2)  On  such  petition  being submitted,   the Tahsildar   may,   in   accordance   with   the rules   made   by   the   Government   in   this behalf from time to time, give permission in writing for occupation. 58.   Occupancy   right   is   heritable   and transferable :   An   occupancy   right   to   land shall   be   deemed   to   be   heritable   and transferable. 58­A. Sanction  of Collector for transfer of occupied   land   compulsory   in   certain cases :  (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the   preceding   section   the   Government may   by   Official   Gazette   notify   in   respect of any village or tract of the area to which this   Act   extends   that   the   right   of occupation   of   any   land   under   section   54 given   after   the   date   of   the   notification shall   not   be   transferable   without obtaining   the   previous   sanction   of   the Collector.  (2)   The   Government   may   also   at   its discretion   from   time   to   time   notify   by Official   Gazette,   that   any   part   or   person or class of persons of such village or tract of   the   area   to   which   this   Act   extends   to which   the   provisions   of   sub­section   (1) have   been   made   applicable   shall   be exempt from the said provisions.” C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  28  of  97 Similarly,   we   may   also   refer   to   the   relevant rules   regarding   ‘Special   Laoni’   as   mentioned   in   the Laoni Rules of 1950 which are as follows :– “                      Special Laoni 15.   No   lands   in   the   special   area   notified under   Section   58­Aof   A.P.   (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, shall be assigned except   in   accordance   the   the   following rules:­  (a)   The   object   of   the   special   laoni   is   to make   land   available   in   certain   areas   to such   landless   persons   of   agricultural   and backward   classes as may be notified  from time to time, and who have not sufficient means   to   purchase   land   either   at   the ordinary   laoni   auctions   or   otherwise.   The selection   of  the   most   deserving   applicant should   be   made   by   Tahsildar   after   due publicity   in   the   village   or   at   the   place fixed for the allotment proceedings.  (b)   Special   laoni,   proceedings   may ordinarily   take   place   twice   a   year   in   the months   of   April   and   September,   and   may also   take   place   at   other   times   when   the Tahsildar is visiting the locality. 16.   In   making   selection   for   special   laoni preference   shall   be   given   to   persons   who reside   in   the   village,   but   do   not   possess any   patta   or   shikmi   rights   in  any   land   in the   village   or   elsewhere   or   who   have insufficient land but possess bullocks and agricultural   implements.   Persons   who   are C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  29  of  97 already   cultivating   lands   are   "asamis"   or "bataidars"   shall   be   given   preference   over other labourers. x­x­x­x 19.   The   allottee   of  the   land   shall   prepare the land for cultivation within three years of   being   placed   in   possession   and commerce   cultivation   of   the   land thereafter.   The   pattadar   may   be   rejected by the order of the Collector for breach of any of the above conditions: Provided   that   he   has   been   served   with   a notice   calling   upon   him   to   comply   with the   conditions   which   he   has   violated   and he   fails   to   comply   with   it   within   three months   of   the   date   of   service   thereof.   If lands   has   been   transferred   in contravention,   the   conditions,   the Collector may eject the transferee.” 28. Thirdly,   Mr.   Gupta,   learned   senior   counsel drew   our   attention   to   this   Court’s   judgement   in Gudepu Sailoo 7   which we have already reproduced at   Para   17   above,   to   contend   that   the   impugned decision   errenously   concuded     that   this   Court   had already   decided   the   issue   of   alienability.   He strenuously   argued   that   the   decision   was   not   on merit   as   this   Court   held   that   the   challenge   was premature   and   remanded   the   dispute   back   to   the 7 Gudepu Sailoo  (n 3). C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  30  of  97 District   Collector.   Fourthly,   by   relying   on   the decision of the High Court in   G.V.K.  Rama  Rao vs Bakelite   Hylam   Employees   Co­Op. 8 ,   it   was contended that since the Subject Land was governed by   Laoni   Rules   of   1950,   which   stipulated   no condition   regarding   non­alienability,   the   same would   not   come   under   the   definition   of   ‘assigned land’ as given under the 1977 Act. In other words, it was submitted that the 1977 Act has no application over   the   Subject   Land.   Fifthly,   it   was   urged   that evoking   suo motu   revisionary powers by the revenue authorities   as   done   in   the   present   case   is   illegal   as the   same   must   be   exercised   within   a   reasonable time   or   else   it   would   render   the   exercise   of   such power   arbitrary.   Reliance   in   this   regard   was   placed on   another   decision   of   the   High   Court   in   S. Santhanam v State of A.P. 9 ,   pointing out that the Special Leave Petition against the aforecited decision was   rejected   by   this   court   vide   order   dated 19.08.2011   passed   in   SLP   (C)   No.   16545   of   2006. Finally,   Mr. Gupta submitted that the Subject Land 8   G.V.K. Rama Rao vs Bakelite Hylam Employees Co­Op. 1997 SCC OnLine AP 200, para 18. 9   S. Santhanam v State of A.P.  2006 SCC OnLine AP 145. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  31  of  97 has   been   in   possession   with   the   Assignees   from 1953   as   noted   in   the   High   Court’s   order   dated 21.04.2006   as   well   as   the   documents   which   have been   brought   on   record   and   therefore   even   if   the Temporary Patta s were given in 1961, the applicable law   vis­à­vis   the   assignment   should   relate   back   to 1953 itself.  29. Turning up next for the Appellants was learned senior   counsel,   Mr.   Huzefa   Ahmadi   who   while reiterating the arguments made by Mr. Gupta, made the   following   additional   submissions   –   Firstly   that requirements   for   application   of   Section   58­A   of   the 1317 Fasli Act were not met, which are as follows – (a) there must be a notification in the official gazette; (b)   the   said   notification   must   be   in   respect   of   ‘any village   or   tract’   to   which   the   1317   Fasli   Act   was extended  and   (c)  such  land   can  be  transferred  with the   permission   of   the   Collector.   Hence,   it   was contended that for any bar in respect of alienability to   be   applicable   through   any   policy,   the requirements   of   Section   58­A   are   sine   qua   non . Secondly,  he argued that even the policies which are stated   to   have   prohibited   alienation   are   not C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  32  of  97 applicable   independently.   With   reference   to   the Circular   dated   08.11.1954   [ Hereinafter   1954 Circular],   it   was   submitted   that   the   same   was   not retrospectively   applicable   and   in   any   event,   it referred   to   Section   58­A   only   in   respect   of   lands which   were   granted   for   ‘Eksala’   ( one   year ) cultivation or to lands which have been set apart as provided   in   Paragraph   8   of   the   1954   Circular.   It would thus be appropriate to reproduce the relevant contents   of   the   1954   Circular   which   are   to   the following effect :– “… ..The   following   Circulars   regarding   the assignment   and   grant   of   Patta   of unoccupied   Government   Lands   to   the Harijans,   Backward   Classes   and   Landless poor   persons   have   been   issued   from   time to time. x­x­x­x As   the   orders   issued   through   various circulars   were  creating   confusion  in  their proper   implementation,   the   following consolidated   orders   are   hereby   issued after   reconsidering   the   various   orders issued  through the aforesaid circulars. x­x­x­x A. Lands under Cultivation on the Basis of Permission for Eksala Cultivation 1.   In   case   of   occupation   by   the   Harijans, Scheduled   Castes,   Backward   Classes,   of C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  33  of  97 poor landless persons, patta shall, subject to the provisions contained in Section 58­ A   of   the   A.P.   (Telangana   Area)   Land Revenue   Act,   be   granted   free   of   cost   to the extent of one family holding inclusive of   the   land   already   owned   by   occupants and   where   the   land   is   in   excess   thereof, they shall be evicted from the excess area x­x­x­x 8.   Village­wise   statements   of   all Porampoke,   Gut,   Kharjkata,   Gairan   lands excluding   ten   percent,   fit   for   grazing   and lands   excised   from   forest,   shall   be prepared   and   all   such   lands   shall   first   be set   apart   as   are   required   for   public   or Government   purposes   or   on   which,   there arc   Sendhi,   Toddy   or   Gulmohwa   trees   or which   are   required   to   be   to   be   set   apart for   such   purposes   or   on   which   there   is   a Kancha,   the   grass   of   which   is   auctioned every year. The remaining lands including those   from   which   occupants   have   been evicted   under   para   3   shall   under   special Laoni   be   assigned   on   patta   to   the Scheduled   Castes,   Harijans,   Backward Classes and poor landless persons who are bonafide   agriculturists   at   the   rate   of   one family   holding   per   family,   subject   to   the provisions   contained   in   Section   58­A   of the   A.P.   (Telangana   Area)   Land   Revenue Act. As far as possible each family shall be entitled   to   patta   shall   primarily   be assigned   lands   which   were   being cultivated by them…..” C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  34  of  97 In   the   same   breadth,   Mr.   Ahmadi   contended that   all   remaining   policies   regarding   assignments, namely, G.O. dated 25.07.1958 [ Hereinafter, ‘1958 Circular’]   which was subsequently clarified by G.O. dated   26.08.1958   [ Hereinafter,   ‘1958 Clarification’]   would   not   be   attracted,   for   the assignment being of 1953 itself, these policies would have   no   retrospective   effect   and/or   these   circulars themselves excluded the Subject Land. The relevant extracts of the 1958 Circular are as follows :– “ 6.  Terms and conditions of assignment  – (i) The assignment of lands shall be free of market value;  (ii)   Land   assigned   shall   be   heritable   but not alienable;  (iii) Lands assigned shall be brought under cultivation within three years; (iv)   No   land   tax   shall   be   collected   for   the first   three   years   except   for   the   extent,   if any,   which   has   already   been   brought under   cultivation.   Water   rate   shall, however,   be   charged   if   the   lands   are irrigated with Government water; and  (v)   Cultivation   should   be   by   the   assignee or   the   members   of   his   family   or   with hired   labour   under   the   supervision   of himself or a member of his family. x­x­x­x C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  35  of  97 15.      Pending assignments    :­      All assignment proceedings   now   pending   or   arising   here after   shall   be   disposed   of   in   accordance with these rules.” (Emphasis Applied) Similarly,   the   relevant   part   of   the   1958 Clarification is to the following effect:­ “ 7.  Pending cases :­  (a)   lands   to   which   Circular   No.   14,   dated 8th   November,   1954   issued   by   the erstwhile   Hyderabad   Government   and   the other Circulars issued in clarification of it were   applicable   should   be   dealt   with under   those   circulars   but   not   under   the new   rules   of   assignment   Issued   in   G.O. Ms. No. 1406, Rev, Dt. 25 th  July, 1958: Provided   that   the   extent   of   land   to be   assigned   in   all   such   cases   shall   not exceed   the   limits   of   6   acres   of   dry   or   2­ 1/2 acres of wet land inclusive of the land already passed (b)   Cases   in   which   the   right   of   patta   was given   to   the   occupants   according   to Circular No. 14, and other circulars issued in   clarification   of   it   and   cases   in   respect to which there is evidence in Government Records   either   of   application   presented by the encroacher  for grant  of patta or of his   possession   of  the   lands   should   not   be treated   as   pending   cases   but   should   be decided   under   Circular   No.   14   and   other circulars issued in clarification of it.”  C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  36  of  97 (Emphasis Applied) It was, thus, submitted that provisions of 1958 Circular   introducing   the   twin   conditions   in   respect of   alienation   and   cultivation,   would   not   be applicable   to   the   Subject   Land   on   account   of   the 1958   Clarification   which   purportedly   brought   the Subject   Land   within   the   purview   of   the   1954 Circular. 30. Thirdly,   Mr.   Ahmadi   argued   that   Section   4   of the 1977 Act provided for re­assignment of the land in case of contravention of Section 3 of the 1977 Act instead   of   resumption   as   was   ordered   by   the revenue   authorities   in   this   case.   Fourthly,   it   was submitted   that   evocation   of   suo   motu   revisionary powers   through   the   Second   SCN   was   not permissible   as   the   sale   deeds   were   of   1992   while Second   SCN   was   of   2006,   which   would   violate   the temporal   aspects   as   argued   by   Mr.   Gupta,   and, thus, the action was  ex facie  illegal. 31. Learned   senior   counsel,   Mr.   Niranjan   Reddy assisted   by   learned   counsel   Mr.   Krishna   Dev Jagarlamudi   also   appeared   on   behalf   of   the Appellants.   While   lending   his   support   to   the abovementioned   arguments,   he   made   the   following C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  37  of  97 submissions   –   Firstly ,   that   the   issue   of   applicable law over the Subject Land can no longer be opened in   light   of   the   High   Court’s   order   dated   21.04.2006 wherein   it   was   categorically   held   that   the   State could   not   agitate   over   the   applicability   of   correct regulatory   regime   after   a   gap   of   30   years   post assignment.   According   to   him,   the   Laoni   Rules   of 1950   were   held   to   be   applicable   over   the   Subject Land.   In   support   of   this,   he   also   referred   to   the Mandal   Revenue   Officer’s   clarification   vide   his memo dated 23.09.1992.   Secondly,   he took pains to go   through   the   entirety   of   sale   deeds     executed   by M.A.   Baksh   to   point   out   that   out   of   the   originally assigned area measuring  142 Acres 39 Guntas, only about   10   Acres   land   was   sold   through   these   sale deeds.   In   other   words,   the   contravention   of provisions  of  1977  Act  was  limited  to  this  area  and an order of resumption could not have been passed in   respect   of   the   entire   Subject   Land.   Lastly,   he submitted that even if the Subject Land is resumed, the   Appellants   are   entitled   to   compensation   as   per the   Seven­Judge   bench   decision   of   the   High   Court in   LAO cum Revenue Divisional Officer, Chevella C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  38  of  97 Division   v   Mekala   Pandu 10 ,   read   with   the   right   to property   duly   protected   under   Article   300A   of   the Constitution. 32. Supplementing   the   Appellants,   Mr.   Ranjit Kumar,   learned   senior   counsel   raised   the   following contentions   –   Firstly,   that   in   the   counter   affidavit filed by the impleaded Respondent, i.e. Greyhounds, a   plea   has   been   taken   that   they   have   taken possession of the Subject Land in 2003 itself. If this was the case, then where was the need to issue the Second   SCN   in   2006   and   to   take   this   contrary stance   by   them.   Secondly,   he   contended   that   in   all the   sale   deeds   entered   by   M.A.   Baksh   as   a   GPA holder,   he   is   mentioned   as   the   vendee   which showcases   that   the   Appellants   were   unaware   or were not actively involved in carrying out sale of the Subject Land. 33. In   the   end,   Mr.   Tripurari   Ray   learned   counsel appearing   on   behalf   of   the   Appellants   raised   a contention  for  the first  time at this stage by  relying on   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Yeshwant   Deorao 10   LAO cum Revenue Divisional Officer, Chevella Division v Mekala Pandu 2004 SCC OnLine AP 217. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  39  of  97 Deshmukh   v  Walchand   Ramchand   Kothari 11 . He contended   that   the   Laoni   Rules   of   1950   created   an artificial   classification   among   two   classes   –   namely those  who  were granted regular  patta  under  Rule 2 to   14   of   these   Rules   through   the   bidding   process which was alienable and the landless or poor people who were granted special patta under Rule 15 to 24 of Laoni Rules of 1950 with a bar on the alienability and   obligation   of   an   Assignee   to   cultivate   the   land. He   contended   that   this   amounted   to   ‘class legislation’   which   discriminated   against   the Assignees   and   violated   their   fundamental   rights under Article 14 of the Constitution. 34. Repelling   the   combined   submissions   made   on behalf   of   the   Appellants,   Mr.   K.K.   Venugopal, learned   senior   counsel   for   the   Respondent­ Greyhounds,   has   raised   the   following   contentions   – Firstly,   that   the   Temporary   Pattas   granted   only   a limited occupancy right to the Assignees in the form of   a   temporary   license   to   occupy   and,   it   was   not   a permanent assignment  per se .  Secondly,  the claim of the Appellants that they were cultivating the land is 11   Yeshwant Deorao Deshmukh v Walchand Ramchand Kothari   1950 SCC 766. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  40  of  97 baseless   as   they   were   never   interested   in   even holding  the possession  over the Subject Land itself. In   this   respect,   he   referred   to   the   Panchnama conducted by the revenue officials in the years 2003 and   2007   wherein   it   was   noted   that   no   cultivation was   going   on   at   the   Subject   Land.   Thirdly,   he contended that under the regular assignment as per Laoni Rules of 1950, an auction mechanism  was in place, and it was only  through this process that an alienable   right   could   be   granted   in   respect   of   the assigned   land.   In   this   regard,   he   relied   upon   Form 9(G)   under   which   the   Subject   Land   was   granted   to Assignees   and   invited   our   attention   to   the   relevant part indicative of the auction mechanism. He further submitted that the grant of Subject Land was under the   Special   Loani,   which   included   the   valid condition of non­alienability.   Fourthly,   he submitted that   the   finding   of   possession   as   well   as   the Appellants’  claim   that  applicable  rules in  respect of assignment   should   be   that   of   1953   is   completely unsustainable. Learned senior counsel has taken us through  the  documents  on   record  to  showcase  that the   assignment   only   happened   on   21.10.1961,   i.e., C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  41  of  97 when   Temporary   Pattas   were   granted.   He   further maintained that all other documents only discussed the   grant   of   sanction   of   the   Subject   Land   and   the procedure   pending   before   any   kind   of   assignment could   take   place.   Fifthly,   he   submitted   that   Mr. Reddy’s   argument   concerning   limited   contravention of  the   1977   Act   is  factually   incorrect   in   light   of   the language employed in the GPA executed in favour of M.A. Baksh, which categorically noted that the said GPA  was in  respect of  the entirety  of  Subject  Land. Finally,  he argued that the Subject Land is resumed for   a   ‘public   purpose’,   i.e.   training   of   the   elite commando   force,   which   has   been   instrumental   in suppressing   the   Naxalite   movement   in   the   region. He   also   submitted  that   the  Assignees   were   hand   in glove   with   the   land   mafia   as   well   as   the   corrupt revenue   officers,   who   had   set   their   sights   on   the Subject Land. 35. Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned senior counsel appearing   on   behalf   of   Respondent   State   of Telangana,   supported   the   contentions   made   by   Mr. Venugopal   and   has   supplemented   the   same   by highlighting  the following  additional  points  –   Firstly C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  42  of  97 that   the   High   Court   order   dated   21.04.2006   only discusses   the   issue   of   raising   the   objection   of irregularity   in   assignment   and   doesn’t   decide   the issue of applicable law per se. To say it differently, it only   bars   the   government   from   resuming   the   land after   thirty   years   on   the   ground   that   the   Subject Land   was   assigned   under   an   incorrect   law,   but   it nowhere   resolves   the   legal   regime   under   which   the conditions   applicable   on   the   assignment   are   to   be governed.     He   supported   the   reasoning   assigned   in the   impugned   judgment   of   the   Division   Bench   that the   doctrine   of   res   judicata   or   constructive   res judicata   does   not   bar   the   Second   SCN   and   the consequent   proceedings.   Secondly ,   he   argued   that the   assignment   of   Subject   Land   was   still   governed by   the   twin   condition   of   non­alienability   as   well   as the obligation of cultivation by the Assignees. 36. Mr.   V.   Giri,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing on behalf of the State of Telangana, has wrapped the arguments   by   reiterating   the   stance   taken   by   both Mr. Venugopal and Mr. Vaidyanathan. Before noting his   submissions,   it   would   be   pertinent   to   note   that Mr.   Giri   has   taken   a   contrary   stance   in   respect   of C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  43  of  97 Mr.   Venugopal’s   submission   that   only   temporary occupancy   right   had   been   created   in   favour   of   the Assignees.   Mr.   Giri   has   fairly   admitted   that   the pattas   issued   in   1961   were   in   furtherance   of   an assignment only. Thereafter, he has argued ­   Firstly that   the   Subject   Land   was   governed   by   the   G.O. dated   25.07.1958   as   well   as   the   GOM   1122,   which barred   alienation   by   the   Assignees   as   noted   above. He   submitted   that   even   otherwise,   the   assignment was in the nature of Special Laoni and was governed by   the   condition   of   bar   on   sale   without   Collector’s permission   as   well   as   cultivation   of   the   land.   Both these   conditions   were   incorporated   in   the Temporary   Pattas   issued   under   Form   9(G),   which also   reproduced   Rule   19   as   applicable   to   Special Laoni. He submitted that even though the applicable law   changed,   the   format   under   which   assignments were   granted   to   landless   individuals   remained   the same, i.e. Form 9(G). In other words, he argued that though the Temporary Pattas granted in the present case   to   the   Assignees   erroneously   mentioned   that the form was issued under Laoni Rules of 1950, the pattas   were   in   fact,   governed   by   the   revised   legal C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  44  of  97 regime.   Secondly,   he   urged   that   the   prohibition   on alienability   as   introduced   by   the   1977   Act   was retroactive in effect, and the same has been upheld in   a   full   bench   decision   of   the   High   Court   in Dharma   Reddy   v   Sub­Collector,   Bodhan 12 . Finally,  building on the arguments of Mr. Venugopal in   respect   of   the   involvement   of   the   alleged   land mafia,   he   referred   to   a   Memorandum   of Understanding   entered   into   between   some   of   the Appellants and a private real estate company for the sale   of   the   Subject   Land   and   also   informed   that   a First Investigation Report has also been filed on this behalf   by   the   revenue   authorities   against   the accused which include some of the Appellants. 37. During  rebuttals,  Dr.  Abhishek  Manu  Singhvi, learned   senior   counsel   on   behalf   of   the   Appellants reiterated the arguments made in respect of Section 58­A   of   the   1317   Fasli   Act.   He   furthermore submitted   that   even   if   there   is   a   restriction   on   the transfer   of   land   independent   of   Section   58­A   of   the 1317   Fasli   Act,   as   contained   in   the   Temporary Pattas  regarding need of permission of the Collector, then   such   restriction   indicates   a   permissive   regime 12   Dharama Reddy v Sub­Collector, Bodhan   1986 SCC OnLine AP 141. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  45  of  97 instead of a prohibitory regime which is a necessary corollary for invoking the provisions of 1977 Act. He vehemently reiterated that the Subject  Land doesn’t come under the ambit of the term ‘assigned land’ as defined under the 1977 Act. C.                 A NALYSIS      38. Before   we   analyse   the   rival   contentions   raised by   the   parties,   it   would   be   appropriate   to   broadly highlight   the   issues   which   arise   for   our consideration :–   a) Whether  the proceedings emanating  out of the Second   SCN   are   barred   by   the   doctrine   of   res judicata  or constructive  res judicata ? b) Whether   the   exercise   of   suo   motu   revisionary powers while issuing the Second SCN is bad in law? c) What   is   the   law   governing   the   assignment   of the   Subject   Land   and   whether   the   same contained any bar in respect of alienation?  d) Whether   the   assignment   of   Subject   Land comes under the purview of 1977 Act?  e) If   question   No.(d)   is   answered   in   positive, would   the   entirety   of   Subject   Land   or   only   a part thereof be considered to have violated the C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  46  of  97 1977 Act in light of the sale deeds executed by M.A. Baksh as the GPA holder? f) Whether   the   Appellants   are   entitled   to   any compensation   on   account   of   the   resumption order dated 27.01.2007? C.1              T HE   A PPLICATION   OF   D OCTRINE   OF           R ES    JUDICATA              39. At   the   outset,   we   would   like   to   highlight   that since   the   Second   SCN   doesn’t   speak   about   the violation   of   assignment   condition   regarding cultivation,   it   would   not   be   expedient   to   adjudicate or comment on the same. Coming back to the issue of   res   judicata   based   upon   the   allegation   of alienability   and   its   legal   consequences,   it   would   be prudent to reproduce the reasoning contained in the impugned judgement which is as follows :–  “ 17.   In   the   considered   opinion   of   this Court,   the   issues   involved   in W.P.Nos.13165   and   23639   of   2003   and the   proceedings   involved   in   the   present writ   petition   are   different.   In W.P.Nos.13165   and   L.3639   of   2003,   the issues   raised   therein   pertained   to   the legality   of   the   assignment   orders   issued in   favour   of   the   respondents/assignees C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  47  of  97 and the execution of the GPA in favour of one   M.A.Baksh   to   transfer   the   lands   and consequent   violation   of   the   assignment orders.   The   proceedings   in   the   aforesaid cases   were   by   way   of   suo   motu   revision under Section 166­B of the Land Revenue Act,   1317F   and   the   High   Court   has answered   that   the   legality   of   the assignment   orders   need   not   be   gone   into after   forty   years   and   the   cause   of   action regarding   the   execution   of   GPA   does   not survive since the GPA holder is∙ not alive. On the contrary, the issue involved in the present   writ   petition   deals   with   the proceedings   issued   by   the   Mandal Revenue   Officer   (W.P.No.3634   of   2007) relates   to   the   execution   of   sale   deeds   by GPA   holder   in   favour   of.   several   persons and   the   action   taken   under   Act   No.9   of 1977.   As   many   as   71   sale   deeds   were executed   in   respect   of   the   assigned lands…..  x­x­x­x 18.   Meaning   thereby   in   respect   of assigned   lands,   sale   deeds   were   executed which   were   impermissible   in   law.   The aforesaid   issue   was   never   the   subject matter   of   earlier   litigation   and   therefore, by   no   stretch   of   imagination,   it   could have   been   held   by   the   learned   Single Judge   that   the   proceedings   dated 27.01.2007 are hit by  res judicata. ” C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  48  of  97 40. The   reasoning   assigned   by   the   Division  Bench of   the   High   Court   is,   thus,   founded   on   the   premise that   the   cause   of   action   in   the   Second   SCN   is different   from   the   First   SCN.   In   response   to   the same,   Appellants   have   extensively   referred   to   the resumption   order   dated   10.05.2003   which   was passed in furtherance of the proceedings conducted in   First   SCN   to   state   that   the   same   actively considered   the   issue   of   the   sale   deeds   executed   by M.A. Baksh as well the contravention of 1977 Act. It was urged that since the First SCN was set aside by the High Court through its order dated 21.04.2006, the   observations   in   the   resumption   order   dated 10.05.2003 would effectively merge with the findings of   the   High   Court   order   dated   21.04.2006   and therefore   the   Second   SCN   alleging   identical violations   should   be   held   to   be   barred   by   the doctrine of  res judicata .  41. However,   we   do   not   find   ourselves   in agreement   with   this   line   of   thought   for   the   precise reason   that   the   High   Court   in   its   order   dated 21.04.2006   had   emphatically   held   that   the   First SCN   was   issued   without   jurisdiction   and   set   the C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  49  of  97 same   aside,   instead   of   dealing   with   resumption order   dated   10.05.2003   on   merits.   In   effect,   the resumption order dated 10.05.2003 was held to be a nullity.   Therefore   in   light   of   the   settled   law   as expounded   by   this   Court   in   A.   Jithendernath   v. Jubilee   Hills   Coop.   House   Building   Society 13 , doctrine   of   res   judicata   would   not   be   applicable   as an order being a nullity never existed in the eyes of the law. 42. Coming   to   the   issue   of   the   finding   in   High Court’s   order   dated   21.04.2006   with   respect   to   the demise of M.A. Baksh making the GPA redundant, it is   may   be   noticed   that   the   same   is   materially different from the violations as alleged in the Second SCN   and   held   in   the   impugned   order.   On   closer scrutiny,   we   may   point   out   that   the   aforesaid observation regarding the GPA executed in favour of M.A.   Baksh   was   not   a   fundamental   determination but   only   a   collateral   determination.   In   this   context, the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Pawan   Kumar 13   A. Jithendernath v. Jubilee Hills Coop. House Building Society  (2006) 10 SCC 96. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  50  of  97 Gupta   v.   Rochi   Ram   Nag   Deo 14   may   be   usefully cited which observes that :– “ 16. The rule of  res judicata   incorporated in   section   11   of   the   Code   of   Civil Procedure   (CPC)   prohibits   the   Court   from trying   an   issue   which   “has   been   directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between   the   same   parties”,   and   has   been heard and finally decided by that Court.  It is   the   decision   on   an   issue,   and   not   a mere   finding   on   any   Incidental   question to reach such decision, which operates as res judicata ….” (Emphasis Applied) 43. By   now   it’s   a   globally   settled   principle   of common law jurisprudence that only determinations which   are   fundamental   would   result   in   the application   of   the   doctrine   of   res   judicata . 15   Only those   findings,   without   which   the   Court   cannot adjudicate   a   dispute   and   also   form   the   vital   cog   in the reasoning of a definite conclusion on an issue on merits, constitute   res judicata  between the same set of   parties   in   subsequent   proceedings.     However,   in the   process   of   arriving   at   a   final   conclusion,   if   the Court   makes   any   incidental,   supplemental   or   non­ essential observations which are not foundational to 14   Pawan Kumar Gupta   v.   Rochi Ram Nag Deo  (1999) 4 SCC 243. 15   Justice KR Handley,  Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley: The Doctrine of  Res judicata   (3rd   edn, LexisNexis Butterworths, 1996) pages 103­107. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  51  of  97 the   final   determination,   the   same   would   not   tie down the hands of courts in future. 44. The   principle   in   respect   of   fundamental determination   has   been   explicitly   discussed   by   this Court   in   Sajjadanashin   Sayed   Md.   B.E.   Edr.   v. Musa   Dadabhai   Ummer 16   through   the   following paragraph :– “ 16.   Spencer   Bower   and   Turner   on   The Doctrine of  Res judicata   (2nd Edn., 1969, p. 181) refer to the English and Australian experience   and   quote   Dixon,   J.   of   the Australian   High   Court   in   Blair   v.   Curran [(1939) 62 CLR 464, 553 (Aus HC)] CLR at p. 553 to say: “ The   difficulty   in   the   actual application   of   these conceptions   is   to   distinguish the   matters   fundamental   or cardinal   to   the   prior   decision on   judgment,   or   necessarily involved   in   it   as   its   legal justification   or   foundation, from   matters   which,   even though   actually   raised   and decided   as   being   in   the circumstances   of   the   case   the determining   considerations,   yet are   not   in   point   of   law   the 16   Sajjadanashin Sayed Md. B.E. Edr. v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer  (2000) 3  SCC 350. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  52  of  97 essential   foundation   of   a groundwork of the judgment.” The   authors   say   that   in   order   to understand this essential distinction, one has   always   to   inquire   with   unrelenting severity   —   is   the   determination   upon which   it   is   sought   to   find   an   estoppel   so fundamental   to   the   substantive   decision that   the   latter   cannot   stand   without   the former.   Nothing   less   than   this   will   do.   It is suggested by Dixon, J. that even where this   inquiry   is   answered   satisfactorily, there   is   still   another   test   to   pass:   viz. whether   the   determination   is   the “immediate   foundation”   of   the   decision as   opposed   to   merely   “a   proposition collateral or subsidiary only, i.e. not more than part of the reasoning supporting the conclusion”.   It   is   well   settled,   say   the above   authors,   “that   a   mere   step   in reasoning is insufficient. What is required is   no   less   than   the   determination   of   law, or   fact   or   both,   fundamental   to   the substantive decision”. (Emphasis Applied) 45. The   effective   test   to   distinguish   between   a fundamental   or   collateral   determination   is   hinged on   the   inquiry   of   whether   the   concerned determination   was   so   vital   to   the   decision   that without   which   the   decision   itself   cannot   stand independently.   Any   determination,   despite   being C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  53  of  97 deliberate   or   formal,   cannot   give   rise   to   application of   the   doctrine   of   res   judicata   if   they   are   not fundamental   in   nature.   On   a   plain   reading   of   the High Court’s order dated 21.04.2006 in conjugation with the application of the test formulated above, we find   that   the   observation   in   respect   of   GPA   in   the said order  was  indeed  a mere collateral  finding. We say   so   for   the   reason   that   the   order   dated 21.04.2006 primarily dealt with the evocation of  suo motu   revisionary powers under Section 166­B of the 1317 Fasli Act for issuing the First SCN and not the allegations   regarding   violation   of   assignment conditions. In fact, the First SCN was held to be bad in   law   and   without   jurisdiction   because   it   was primarily   issued   on   the   ground   of   irregularity   by stating   that   the   Subject   Land   was   erroneously assigned   under   the   old   rules   and   that   it   sought   to disturb   the   assignment   after   a   period   of   more   than thirty years. This was held to be in contravention to the   settled   law   for   evoking   suo   motu   revisionary powers   under   Section   166­B   of   the   1317   Fasli   Act which is the sole fundamental determination by the High   Court   in   its   order   dated   21.04.2006. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  54  of  97 Resultantly,   the   finding   that   the   GPA   was   rendered redundant   on  account  of  the  demise  of  M.A.  Baksh was   only   collateral   in   nature   and   is   not   hit   by   the doctrine of  res judicata .  46. The   other  aspect   which   needs   our   attention   is whether   the   second   SCN   would   be   barred   by   the extended   doctrine   of   constructive   res   judicata .   The said  doctrine   has   been   formulated   over   the   time  by courts as a part of public policy to prevent abuse of process of courts and to bring finality to the judicial pronouncements.   This   court   in   State   of   UP   v. Nawab   Hussain 17   eloquently   explained   this principle :– “ 3.   The   principle   of   estoppel   per   rem judicatam   is   a   rule   of   evidence.   As   has been   stated   in   Marginson   v.   Blackburn Borough   Council   [(1939)   2   KB   426   at   p. 437]   ,   it   may   be   said   to   be   “the   broader rule   of   evidence   which   prohibits   the reassertion   of   a   cause   of   action”.   This doctrine   is   based   on   two   theories:   (i)   the finality   and   conclusiveness   of   judicial decisions   for   the   final   termination   of disputes   in   the   general   interest   of   the community   as   a   matter   of   public   policy, and (ii) the interest of the individual that he   should   be   protected   from 17   State of UP v. Nawab Hussain  (1977) 2 SCC 806. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  55  of  97 multiplication   of   litigation.   It   therefore serves not only a public but also a private purpose   by   obstructing   the   reopening   of matters   which   have   once   been adjudicated   upon .   It   is   thus   not permissible   to   obtain   a   second   judgment for the same civil relief on the same cause of   action,   for   otherwise   the   spirit   of contentiousness   may   give   rise   to conflicting   judgments   of   equal   authority, lead   to   multiplicity   of   actions   and   bring the   administration   of   justice   into disrepute.   It   is   the   cause   of  action   which gives rise to an action, and that is why it is   necessary   for   the   courts   to   recognise that   a   cause   of   action   which   results   in   a judgment   must   lose   its   identity   and vitality   and   merge   in   the   judgment   when pronounced.   It   cannot   therefore   survive the   judgment,   or   give   rise   to   another cause of action on the same facts. This is what   is  known  as the  general  principle  of res judicata . 4.   But it may be that the same set of facts may   give   rise   to   two   or   more   causes   of action.   If   in   such   a   case   a   person   is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of   action   at   one   time   and   to   reserve   the other   for   subsequent   litigation,   that would   aggravate   the   burden   of   litigation. Courts   have   therefore   treated   such   a course of action as an abuse of its process and   Somervell,   L.J.,   has   answered   it   as C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  56  of  97 follows   in   Greenhalgh   v.   Mallard   [(1947) All ER 255 at p. 257] :  “ I   think   that   on   the authorities   to   which   I   will refer   it   would   be   accurate   to say   that   res   judicata   for   this purpose   is   not   confined   to   the issues   which   the   court   is actually   asked   to   decide,   but that   it   covers   issues   or   facts which   are   so   clearly   part   of the   subject­matter   of   the litigation   and   so   clearly   could have been raised that it would be   an   abuse   of   the   process   of the   court   to   allow   a   new proceeding   to   be   started   in respect of them.” This   is   therefore   another   and   an   equally necessary   and   efficacious   aspect   of   the same   principle,   for   it   helps   in  raising   the bar of   res judicata   by suitably construing the   general   principle   of   subduing   a cantankerous   litigant.   That   is   why   this other   rule   has   some   times   been   referred to   as   constructive   res   judicata   which,   in reality,   is   an   aspect   or   amplification   of the general principle.” (Emphasis Applied) 47. The   doctrine   of   constructive   res   judicata   will not be applicable in the present case for the simple reason   that   the   issues   raised   in   the   Second   SCN C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  57  of  97 were   never   adjudicated   upon   in   the   first   place   as explained   above.   The   plea   that   the   same   should have   been   raised   in   the   earlier   proceedings,   is irrelevant in light of the liberty granted by the High Court   in   its   order   dated   21.04.2006   whereby   the Revenue   authorities   were   expressly   permitted   to initiate fresh proceedings for violation of assignment conditions. The Division Bench of the High Court is therefore   right   in   holding   that   this   liberty   was   not for   ‘future   contraventions   only’   as   perceived   by   the Single   Judge   in   his   order   dated   05.02.2010,   for   it would   render   the   liberty   granted   in   order   dated 21.04.2006 as obsolete. We thus hold that in light of the   liberty   granted   by   the   High   Court   vide   order dated   21.04.2006,   the   Second   SCN   would   neither constitute   an   abuse   of   process   of   court   nor   will attract the doctrine of constructive  res judicata . 48. In   light   of   the   above   discussion   and observations,   we   hold   that   the   proceedings emanating out of the Second SCN are not barred by the doctrine of   res judicata   or the extended doctrine of constructive  res judicata . C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  58  of  97 C.2              T HE   E XERCISE   OF           S UO   M OTU           R EVISIONARY      P OWERS       49. The   Appellants   have   strenuously   contended that   evocating   suo   motu   revisionary   powers   and issuing the Second SCN was bad in law as the same was   initiated   after   more   than   45   years   when   the Subject Land was initially assigned and about more than 15 years after the sale deeds were executed. At this   stage,   we   firstly   refer   to   the   following observations   made   by   this   Court   in Ibrahimpatnam   Taluk   Vyavasaya   Coolie Sangham   v.   K.   Suresh   Reddy 18   in   respect   of exercise of  suo motu  revisionary powers :– “ 9.   ……   Exercise   of      suo   motu      power depended   on   facts   and   circumstances   of each   case.   In   cases   of   fraud,   this   power could   be   exercised   within   a   reasonable time   from   the   date   of   detection   or discovery   of   fraud.   While   exercising   such power,   several   factors   need   to   be   kept   in mind   such   as   effect   on   the   rights   of   the third parties over the immovable property due   to   passage   of   considerable   time, change   of   hands   by   subsequent   bona   fide transfers,   the   orders   attaining   finality under   the   provisions   of   other   Acts   (such 18   Ibrahimpatnam   Taluk   Vyavasaya   Coolie   Sangham   v.   K.   Suresh   Reddy (2003) 7 SCC 667. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  59  of  97 as   the   Land   Ceiling   Act).   Hence,   it appears   that   without   stating   from   what date   the   period   of   limitation   starts   and within what period the   suo motu   power is to   be   exercised,   in   sub­section   (4)   of Section 50­B of the Act, the words “at any time”   are   used   so   that   the   suo   motu power   could   be   exercised   within reasonable   period   from   the   date   of discovery of fraud depending on facts and circumstances of each case in the context of  the   statute  and   nature   of  rights   of  the parties. Use of the words “at any time” in sub­section  (4)  of  Section  50­B  of  the  Act cannot   be   rigidly   read   letter   by   letter.   It must   be   read   and   construed   contextually and   reasonably.   If   one   has   to   simply proceed   on   the   basis   of   the   dictionary meaning   of   the   words   “at   any   time”,   the suo   motu      power   under   sub­section   (4)   of Section 50­B of the Act could be exercised even after decades and then it would lead to   anomalous   position   leading   to uncertainty   and   complications   seriously affecting   the   rights   of   the   parties,   that too,   over   immovable   properties.   Orders attaining   finality   and   certainty   of   the rights   of   the   parties   accrued   in   the   light of   the   orders   passed   must   have   sanctity. Exercise of     suo motu      power “at any time” only   means   that   no   specific   period   such as   days,   months   or   years   are   not   (    sic    ) prescribed   reckoning   from   a   particular date. But that does not mean that “at any C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  60  of  97 time”   should   be   unguided   and   arbitrary. In   this   view,   “at   any   time”   must   be understood   as   within   a   reasonable   time depending on the facts and circumstances of  each   case   in  the  absence   of  prescribed period of limitation. ” (Emphasis Applied) 50. It   is   a   matter   of   record   that   the   Second   SCN pertains   to   alleged   violation   of   assignment conditions   by   transferring   the   ownership   rights through   sale   deeds   executed   in   the   year   1992. However,   the   period   till   2006,   in   our   considered opinion,   could   not   be   counted   because   the   parties were engaged in litigation pursuant to the First SCN and it was only after the liberty was accorded by the High   Court   in   its   order   dated   21.04.2006   that   the Second   SCN   could   be   issued.   We   have   already discussed   in   great   detail   the   reasons   behind   the grant   of   said   liberty   and   the   same   need   not   be reiterated.   In   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   this case and taking note of the chronological events, we are   satisfied   that   the   exercise   of   suo   motu revisionary power while issuing the Second SCN was not   vitiated   on   account   of   inordinate   delay   as claimed by the Appellants.  C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  61  of  97 C.3              T HE  A PPLICABLE  L AW   ON  A SSIGNED  L ANDS    51. Once   we   have   determined   the   validity   of   the Second   SCN   in   affirmative,   the   next   question   that falls   for   our   consideration   is   whether   the   subject land   was   assigned   in   the   year   1953   as   claimed   by the   Appellants   or   in   1961   when   the   Temporary Pattas   were   issued.   However,   before   examining   the said   point,   we   express   our   inability   to   accept   the contention   made   by   Mr.   Venugopal,   learned   senior counsel in respect of the nature of occupancy rights granted  to  the  Assignees. On   a  plain  reading  of  the recitals   contained   in   the   relevant   documents, particularly the Temporary Pattas, First and Second SCNs and also the stand taken by Mr. Giri, we have no   reason   to   doubt   that   the   grant   of   Subject   Land was in  the nature of an  assignment and  not  in  any form of limited occupancy right. 52.   Coming   now   to   the   issue   of   the   date   of assignment, we agree entirely with the Respondent’s stance that the actual assignment took place only at the time of issuance of Temporary Pattas and not at any   point   prior   thereto.   On   perusal   of   the documents   brought   on   record,   which   are   merely C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  62  of  97 collection   of   inter­departmental   correspondence before   the   issuance   of   Temporary   Pattas,   we   find that the assignment process was still underway. The Appellant’s   reliance   on   the   document   dated 28.10.1953   is   unfounded   as   the   same   only communicated   the   sanction   by   the   executive   and nothing   else.   In   fact,   the   letter   dated   04.06.1960 brings   out   the   fact   that   the   area   of   the   sanctioned land was to be reduced to 142 Acres and 39 Guntas and   then   only   was   to   be   assigned.   In   this   regard, this   Court   has   repeatedly   held   and   recently reiterated again in  Mahadeo v. Sovan Devi 19  that :– “ 14.        It   is   well   settled   that   inter­ departmental   communications   are   in   the process   of   consideration   for   appropriate decision   and   cannot   be   relied   upon   as   a basis   to   claim   any   right.   This   Court examined the said question in a judgment reported   as   Omkar   Sinha   v.   Sahadat Khan 3 .  Reliance  was  placed  on   Bachhittar Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab 4   to   hold   that merely writing something on the file does not amount to an order. Before something amounts   to   an   order   of   the   State Government,   two   things   are   necessary. First, the order has to be expressed in the name   of   the   Governor   as   required   by clause   (1)   of   Article   166   and   second,   it 19   Mahadeo v. Sovan Devi  2022 SCC OnLine SC 1118. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  63  of  97 has   to   be   communicated.   As   already indicated,   no   formal   order   modifying   the decision   of   the   Revenue   Secretary   was ever   made.   Until   such   an   order   is   drawn up,   the   State   Government   cannot,   in   our opinion,   be   regarded   as   bound   by   what was stated in the file.” Similarly,   the   decision   of   this   Court   in Bachhittar   Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab 20   which   is cited in the above reproduced paragraph notes :– “ 9. The question, therefore, is whether he did   in   fact   make   such   an   order.   Merely writing   something   on   the   file   does   not amount   to   an   order.   Before   something amounts   to   an   order   of   the   State Government   two   things   are   necessary. The   order   has   to   be   expressed   in   the name   of   the   Governor   as   required   by clause (1) of Article 166 and then it has to be   communicated.   As   already   indicated, no formal order modifying the decision of the   Revenue   Secretary   was   ever   made. Until such an order is drawn up the State Government   cannot,   in   our   opinion,   be regarded   as   bound   by   what   was   stated   in the file. As long as the matter rested with him   the   Revenue   Minister   could   well score   out   his   remarks   or   minutes   on   the file and write fresh ones. ” 53. We, therefore, have no reason to doubt that the assignment   took   place   only   on   21.10.1961,   i.e. 20   Bachhittar Singh   v.   State of Punjab  AIR 1963 SC 395. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  64  of  97 when   the   Temprorary   Pattas   were   issued.   We   also wish   to   highlight   that   the   observation   in   the   High Court   order   dated   21.04.2006,   that   the   Assignees were in possession since 1953 is an ex­facie mistake of   fact   in   light   of   the   documents   brought   on   record as none of them supports this stance, including the explanations   submitted   in   response   to   the   SCNs wherein   the   Assignees   themselves   have   stated   that possession was given to them in 1960. However, we hasten   to   add   that   since   the   assignment   would   be governed   by   the   legal   regime   as   applicable   on 21.10.1961,   the   aforementioned   factually   incorrect observation   made   by   the   High   Court   in   respect   of the date of taking possession of the Subject Land by Assignees is inconsequential. 54. Once   it   is   determined   that   the   regulatory regime which was in vogue and held the field as on 21.10.1961 will govern the assignments, then it also stands crystalised that the 1958 Circular as well as GOM   1122   being   in   force   at   that   time,   are   clearly applicable   to   the   Subject   Land.   The   1958 Clarification   which   discounts   the   application   of 1958   Circular   is   not   attracted   in   view   of   proviso   to C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  65  of  97 Rule   7(a)   as   each   of   the   Assignees   in   the   present case   was   granted   around   7  Acres  6   Guntas   of   land for cultivation which is much is more than the limit of   “ 6   acres   of   dry   or   2­1/2   acres   of   wet   land ”   being the   perquisite   for   application   of   the   1958 Clarification.  As a necessary corollary, we hold that there   was   a   conditional   bar   on   alienation   of   the Subject   Land   as   provided   in   the   1958   Circular   and the   GOM   1122.   The   question   whether   the   lands were assigned under ‘regular’ or ‘special laoni’ under the   Laoni   Rules   of   1950   consequently   becomes academic   and   we   do   not   deem   it   necessary   to express our opinion in relation thereto. 55. Finally,   attention   must   be   paid   to   the Appellant’s   argument   concerning   non­compliance with   the   mandatory   requirement   of   notification   as contemplated   under   Section   58­A   of   1317   Fasli   Act for  invoking  any  condition  in respect of alienability. Heavy reliance in this regard has been placed on the following   paragraph   of   Letter   sent   from   Plot No.338 21 ,   stating   inter­alia   that   no   notification 21   Letter sent from Plot No.338  (n 6). C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  66  of  97 under Section 58­A was published for the district in which the Subject Land lies :– “ 45.   Section   58­A   of   the   Telangana   Area Land   Revenue   Act   puts   a   restriction   for transfer   of   occupied   land   notified   in respect   of any   village  or  tract   of  the  area to   which   Act   extends   that   the   right   of occupation   of   any   land   under   Sec.   54 given   after   the   date   of   the   notification shall   not   be   transferable   without obtaining   the   previous   sanction   of   the Collector.   The   Advocate   General representing   the   State   Government admitted that no notification by the State Government   under   Sec.   58­A   was published   prohibiting   transfer   of   the occupied   land   granted   patta   under   Sec. 54.   The   same   has   been   recorded   by   this court in WP No. 144/75 dt. 6­12­1976. x­x­x­x 55.   For   the   aforesaid   reasons,   we   are inclined   to   hold   that   though   the Government framed rules and notified the same cannot  be treated  as notification  as contemplated   under   Sec.   58­A   of   the Telangana   Area   Land   Revenue   Act   where State   Government   has   to   notify   any village   or   tract   of   the   area,   to   which   this Act   extends,   for   obtaining   previous sanction of the Collector. Therefore,  Rule VI   (ii)   of   the   Revised   Assignment   Policy issued   in G.O.Ms.   No.  1406  dt.  25­7­1958 C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  67  of  97 cannot   be   given   effect   to   until   such notification is issued. ” (Emphasis Applied) 56. However,   it   is   pertinent   to   mention   here   that the   decision   in   Letter   sent   from   Plot   No.338 22   in its   later   part   clarifies   the   application   of   compliance with Section 58­A when it says that:­  “ 56.   Even   if   the   rules   are   framed   in exercise   of   rule   making   power   unless notification   is   issued   as   contemplated under   Sec.   58­A   notifying   any   village   or tract   of   the   area   where   sanction   of   the Collector for transfer of land is necessary, rules   cannot   be   enforced.   As   already observed,   the   condition,   if   any   imposed for sale of unoccupied land on payment of market value under Form­G is till the sale is   confirmed   by   the   Collector,   but   not otherwise,   as   Sec.   58­A   itself   envisages sanction   of   right   of   occupation   of   land under   Sec.   54   given   after   the   date   of  the notification,  but the same does not cover the   occupancy   rights   granted   under   Sec. 58   of   the   Telangana   Land   Revenue   Act. Point No. 1 is answered accordingly.” (Emphasis Applied) 57. The   abovementioned   decision   thus   envisages the application of Section 58­A of the 1317 Fasli Act only   in   cases   where   the   assignment   is   within   the ambit   of   Section   54   of   the   1317   Fasli   Act.   In   other 22   Letter sent from Plot No.338  (n 6). C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  68  of  97 words, Assignments such as those under Section 58 of   the   1317   Fasli   Act   are   free   from   the   rigours specified   under   Section   58­A   of   the   1317   Fasli   Act. It   goes   without   saying   that   the   assignment   of   the Subject Land was not under Section 54 of the 1317 Fasli   Act   as   may   be   seen   from   the   contents   of   the 1958   Circular   which   draws   a   clear   distinction between­   (a)   Land   assigned   on   payment   of   market value   after   making   an   application   to   the   Collector and (b) Land Assigned to the Landless poor persons. The former is the case of assignment under Section 54   of   the   1317   Fasli   Act   and   the   latter   is   covered within the ambit of Section 58 of the 1317 Fasli Act. The   instant   case   unambiguously   falls   in   the   latter category,   i.e.   ‘Land   Assigned   to   the   Landless   poor persons’. 58. Additionally, Section 58 of the 1317 Fasli Act is a   deeming   provision   wherein   an   occupancy   right   is presumed   to   be   heritable   as   well   as   transferable, until an indication to the contrary is proved. In this regard, 1958 Circular issued in exercise of the rule­ making   power   vested   under   Section   172   of   1317 Fasli   Act,   read   with   an   independent   statutory   bar C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  69  of  97 created under Section 3 of the 1977 Act, portrays an explicit   legislative   intention   to   curtail   the   legal fiction   created   under   Section   58   of   the   1317   Fasli Act. This is the precise reason because of which the decision   in   Letter   sent   from   Plot   No.338 23 concludes that 1977 Act was applicable in respect of the   land   assigned   to   landless   individuals   and   the same   was   governed   by   the   conditions   of   non­ alienability   as   incorporated   in   the   1958   Circular. The precise part of the decision in  Letter sent from Plot No.338 24   as relied upon by the Division Bench of   the   High   Court   in   the   impugned   decision,   states that :–   “ 60.   We are of the view that provisions of Act No. 9 of 1977 will not be applicable to the   cases   where   assignments   were   made on   collection   of   market   value   or   under Circular   14   except   it   were   granted   to   the landless   poor   persons   free   of   market value.   Point   No.   2   is   answered accordingly.” 59. We have, therefore, no doubt in our mind that the   Subject   Land   was   governed   by   the   provision   of the   1958   Circular   which   included   the   condition   of non­alienability.   We,   however,   clarify   that   since   the 23   Letter sent from Plot No.338  (n 6). 24   Letter sent from Plot No.338  (n 6). C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  70  of  97 Laoni   Rules   of   1950   were   inapplicable   on   the Subject   Land,   the   contention   raised   by   Mr.   Ray regarding violation of Article 14 in respect of ‘regular assignment’ and ‘special laoni assignment’ becomes irrelevant and out of context and the same need not be gone into by us. C.4              T HE   1977   A CT :   E XTEND   OF   A PPLICATION   AND      C ONSEQUENCES    60. The   next   issue   that   arises   for   consideration hovers around the applicability of the 1977 Act and its   consequences   in   the   event   of   violations   of   the assignment   conditions.   In   this   respect,   it   would   be apposite to first note the definition of ‘assigned land’ which is to the following effect:­  “ 2.   Definitions   ­ In   this   Act,   unless   the context otherwise requires,­  (1) “assigned lands” means   lands or house sites   assigned   by   the   Government   to   the landless   or   homeless   poor   persons   under the   rules   for   the   time   being   in   force, subject to condition of non­alienation   and includes   lands   allotted   or   transferred   to landless   or   homeless   poor   persons   under the   relevant   law   for   the   time   being   in force   relating   to   land   ceilings;   and   the word   “assigned”   shall   be   construed accordingly” C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  71  of  97 (Emphasis Applied) We   have   already   concluded   that   the   Subject Land was governed by the law which existed on the date   of   issuance   of   Temporary   Pattas,   i.e. 21.10.1961.   It   has   also   been   held   that   the applicable   law   at   the   relevant   time   included   the 1958   Circular   as   well   as   GOM   1122.   Since   both these   regulatory   measures   incorporated   the condition of non­alienability, there can be no escape but   to   further   hold   that   the   Subject   Land   comes under   the   definition   of   ‘assigned   land’   as   provided under Section 2(1) of the 1977 Act. Resultantly, the provisions   of   the   1977   Act   are   fully   attracted   to regulating the said land. 61. The   other   issue   that   comes   up   for determination   is   whether   the   entirety   of   Subject Land   would   fall   within   the   contravention   of   Section 3 of the 1977 Act which, inter alia, provides that:­  “ Section   3   –   Prohibition   of   transfer   of assigned land  –  (1)   Where,   before   or   after   the commencement   of   this   Act   any   land   has been   assigned   by   the   Government   to   a landless   poor   person   for   purposes   of cultivation   or   as   a   house­site   then, notwithstanding anything to the contrary C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  72  of  97 in   any   other   law   for   the   time   being   in force   or   in   the   deed   of   transfer   or   other document   relating   to   such   land,   it   shall not   be   transferred   and   shall   be   deemed never   to   have   been   transferred;   and accordingly   no   right   or   title   in   such assigned   land   shall   vest   in   any   person acquiring the land by such transfer. (2)   No   landless   poor   person   shall   transfer any   assigned   land,   and   no   person   shall acquire   any   assigned   land,   either   by purchase,   gift,   Lease   (except   in   the   case of   Lease   to   the   Andhra   Pradesh   Green Energy   Corporation   Ltd.,   for   use   as deemed fit and including for usage of non­ agriculture   purpose),   mortgage,   exchange or otherwise. (2A)   No   assignee   shall   transfer   any assigned   house   site,   and   no   person   shall acquire any assigned house site, either by purchase,   gift,   Lease   (except   in   the   case of   Lease   to   the   Andhra   Pradesh   Green Energy   Corporation   Ltd.,   for   use   as deemed fit and including for usage of non­ agriculture   purpose),   mortgage,   exchange or otherwise, till completion of the period of 20 years from the date of assignment. (2B)   Where   the   assigned   House   site   was alienated   by   the   assignee   as   on   the   date of commencement of this Act, such house site   shall   be   regularized   in   favour   of   the alienee as a one­time measure. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  73  of  97 (3) Any   transfer   or   acquisition   made   in contravention   of   the   provision   of   sub­ section   (1)   or   sub­section   (2)   or   sub­ section   (2A)   shall   be   deemed   to   be   null and void. (4) The   Provisions   of   this   section   shall apply   to   any   transaction   of   the   nature referred to in sub­section (2) in execution of   a   decree   or   order   of   a   civil   court   or   of any award or order of any other authority. (5) Nothing in this section shall apply to an  assigned  land   which  was  purchased  by a   landless   poor   person   in   good   faith   and for   valuable   consideration   from   the original assignee or his transferee prior to the commencement of this Act and which is   in   the   possession   of   such   person   for purposes   of  cultivation  or   as   a   house­site on the date of such commencement.” (Emphasis Applied) 62. In   order   to   appreciate   sub­Section   (2)   of Section  3 of the 1977 Act in its correct perspective, the   expression   ‘landless   poor   person’   and   ‘transfer’ also   become   important,   which   are   defined   in   the 1977 Act as follows :– “ Section   2(3)   –   “landless   poor   person” means   a   person   who   owns   an   extent   of land   not   more   than   1.011715   hectares (two   and   half   acres)   of   wet   land   or 2.023430 hectares (five acres) of dry land C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  74  of  97 or   such   other   extent   of   land   as   has   been or may be specified by the Government in this behalf from time to time and who has no other means of livelihood. Explanation:   ­   For   the   purposes   of computing   the   extent   of   land   under   this clause,   0.404686   hectares   (one   acre)   of wet   land   shall   be   equal   to   0.809372 hectares (two acres) of dry land; x­x­x­x Section   2(6)   –   “Transfer”   means   any      sale, gift,   exchange,   mortgage   with   or   without possession    ,   lease   (except   in   the   case   of Lease   to   the   Andhra   Pradesh   Green Energy   Corporation   Ltd.,   for   use   as deemed fit and including for usage of non­ agriculture   purpose)   or   any   other transaction with assigned lands , not being a testamentary disposition and includes a charge   on   such   property   or   a   contract relating   to   assigned   lands   in   respect   of such sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, Lease (except in the case of Lease to the Andhra Pradesh   Green   Energy   Coproration   Ltd., for   use   as   deemed   fit   and   including   for usage of non­agriculture purpose) or other transaction.” (Emphasis Applied) 63. On   a   conjoint   reading   of   these   statutory expressions,   particularly   pertaining   to   the   term ‘transfer’, the question  that  falls on us to answer  is whether   the   GPA   executed   in   favour   of   M.A.   Baksh C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  75  of  97 by   the   Assignees   would   result   in   contravention   of Section   3(2)   of   the   1977   Act.   The   contention   made by   learned   senior   counsel   Mr.   Reddy   that   the contravention could only be limited to the sale deeds executed in respect of about 10 Acres of the Subject Land seems to be built on the decision of this Court in   Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited v. State of Haryana 25   where the practice of GPA sales was deprecated and it was noted that the same did not   constitute   ‘sale’   or   ‘transfer’   as   contemplated under the  Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 64. However, we must note that the term ‘transfer’ as   defined   under   the   1977   Act   is   much   more inclusive   than   the   one   employed   in   the   Transfer   of Property   Act,   1882.   The   definition   under   the   1977 Act   uses   the   phrase   ‘ any   other   transaction’,   which, in   our   considered   opinion,   necessarily   includes   the GPA   executed   as   an   instrument   to   surrender ownership   and   possessory   rights   in   favour   of   M.A. Baksh. The intent of `transfer’ through the said  GPA by   the   Assignees   authorizing   the   attorney   holder   to sell   or   transfer   the   subject   Property   without   any 25   Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited v. State of Haryana   (2012) 1 SCC 656. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  76  of  97 restriction   as   is   evident   from   its   recitals   and   for which   they   admittedly   received   consideration   from M.A. Baksh, is beyond any doubt. This was precisely the   kind   of   practice   deprecated   by   this   Court   in Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited 26 .  We have thus no hesitation in holding that the said GPA falls   within   the   ambit   of   the   term   ‘transfer’, especially   in   view   of   the   objective   of   the   1977   Act, which  was  manifestly  intended  to   save  the   landless poor   persons   from   the   clutches   of   the   rich   and   the resourceful, who deprived them of the precious title assigned   to   them   by   the   Government   for   their occupation and the source of livelihood.  65. Our   observations   are   in   continuity   with   the view   previously   taken   by   this   Court   in   Dharma Naika   v.   Rama   Naika 27   wherein   an   ‘agreement   to sale’ was held to be included within the definition of ‘transfer’   as   provided   under   the     Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978. Its pertinent to   mention   that   the   definition   of   ‘transfer’   in   the 26   ibid. 27   Dharma Naika v. Rama Naika  (2008) 14 SCC 517. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  77  of  97 aforesaid   statute   is   somewhat   similar   to   the   one employed by the 1977 Act. This Court noted that :– “ 12.   A   bare   reading   of   the   definition   of “transfer”   as   defined   in   Section   3(1)(e)   of the   Act   would   show   that   an   “agreement for sale” of any “granted land” is included within   the   meaning   of   “transfer”.   That being the position, the word “transfer” as defined   under   the   Act   is   an   inclusive definition.   That   is   to   say,   it   includes “sale”   as   well   as   “agreement   for   sale”, although an  agreement  for sale under the Transfer   of   Property   Act   is   not   a   transfer and the right, title or interest in the land does   not   pass   until   the   sale   deed   is executed   and   registered.   “Sale”   has   been defined   in   Section   54   of   the   Transfer   of Property   Act   which   means   “transfer   of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part­paid and part­promised”. As   noted   herein   earlier,   an   agreement   to sell   does   not   by   itself   create   any   interest of  the proposed  vendee  in  the immovable property   but   only   creates   an   enforceable right   in   the   parties.   (See   Rambhau Namdeo   Gajre   v.   Narayan   Bapuji   Dhotra [(2004)   8   SCC   614].)   Therefore,   it   is   clear that under the general law, that is, under the   Transfer   of   Property   Act,   an “agreement   for   sale”   is   not   the   same   as “sale” and in the case of an agreement for sale, the title of the property agreed to be sold   still   remains   with   the   vendor   but   in the case of “sale”,   title of the property is C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  78  of  97 vested   with   the   vendee.   Therefore,   an agreement   for   sale   is   an   executory contract   whereas   sale   is   an   executed contract. x­x­x­x 22.   As   noted   hereinearlier,   it   is   true   that in   this   case,   admittedly,   the   parties   had entered   into   an   agreement   for   sale   in respect   of   the   granted   land   before   the commencement   of   the   Act.   It   is   also   an admitted   position   that   the   respondents belong/belonged   to   the   Scheduled   Caste community.   As   already   noted hereinearlier, for the purposes of this Act, “transfer”   has   been   defined   to   include   an “agreement   for   sale”   although   under   the general   law,   an   “agreement   for   sale”   will not   by   itself   transfer   the   granted   land automatically   to   the   appellant   purchaser. From   an   overall   consideration   of   the objects   and   reasons   for   which   this   Act was   introduced   viz.   to   protect   the   right and   interest   of   the   Scheduled   Castes   and Scheduled   Tribes   in   respect   of   the granted  lands and the relevant  provisions of   the   Act,   it   is   pellucid   that   the definition of “transfer” under Section 3(1) (e)   of   the   Act   includes   an   agreement   for sale   also   and   “transfer”   has   been   so defined   to   protect   the   right,   title   and interest   of   the   Scheduled   Castes   and Scheduled   Tribes   so   that   possession   of the  lands   could  be  restored   to  them  even C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  79  of  97 if they had entered into an agreement for sale.” (Emphasis Applied) We,   therefore,   hold   that   the   GPA   executed   in favour of M.A. Baksh in the instant case constitutes a   ‘transfer’   under   the   1977   Act   and   consequently would   also   result   in   violation   of   Section   3   of   the 1977 Act. 66.     This   leads   us   to   further   consider   the   penal consequences in case of the violation of Section 3 of the 1977 Act, as is provided in Section 4 of the 1977 Act.   The   relevant   part   of   the   said   provision,   as amended from time to time, reads as follows :– “ Section   4   –      Consequence   of   breach   of Section 3  –  (1) If in any case, the District Collector or any   other   officer   not   below   the   rank   of   a Mandal   Revenue   Officer,   authorised   by him   in   this   behalf;   is   satisfied   that   the provisions   of  sub­section   (1)   of  section  3, have   been   contravened   in   respect   of   any assigned land, he may, by order­ (a)   take   possession   of   the   assigned land   after   evicting   the   person   in possession   after   such   written   notice   as the   Collector   or   Mandal   Revenue   Officer may   deem   reasonable   and   any   crop   or other produce raised on such land shall be C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  80  of  97 liable   to   forfeiture   and   any   building   or other   construction   erected   or   anything deposited,   thereon   shall   also   be  forfeited, if not  removed  by  him,  after   such  notice, as   the   Collector   or   the   Mandal   Revenue Officer   may   direct   Forfeitures   under   this section shall be adjudged by the Collector or   Mandal   Revenue   Officer   and   any property   forfeited   shall   be   disposed   of   as the   Collector   or   Mandal   Revenue   Officer may direct; and; (b)(i)   reassign the said resumed land, other   than   those   lands/areas   as   may   be notified   by   the   Government   from   time   to time   in   public   interest   and   for   public purpose,  to the  transferee who  purchased the   land   in   good   faith   and   for   valuable consideration   on   or   before   29th   January, 2007,   subject   to   the   condition   that he/she   is   landless   poor   person,   and   is   in occupation   of   the   land   by   using   the   said land for agriculture or as house site, as on the date of taking possession by eviction: Provided   that   the   reassignment   in case of transferee shall be limited to only such   an   extent   that   the   total   holding   of the   reassignee   including   any   other   land held   by   him/her   does   not   exceed   5.00 Acres dry land or 2 ½  Acres wet land: Provided   further   that   where   the transferee   who   has   purchased   the   land and   got   reassignment   of   it,   or   his   legal heir,   transfers   the   reassigned   land,   the C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  81  of  97 land   shall   be   resumed   for   assignment   to the other eligible landless poor: (ii)   restore   the   said   assigned   land, other   than   those   lands/areas   as   may   be notified   by   the   Government   from   time   to time   in   public   interest   and   for   public purpose,   to   the   original   assignee,   subject to the condition that he or she is landless poor   person   as   on  the   date   of  restoration for one time; or (iii)   assign   to   other   eligible   landless poor person: Provided that the restoration of   land   shall   be   limited   to   only   such   an extent   that   the   total   holding   including any   other   land   held   by   him/her   does   not exceed   5.00   Acres   dry   land   or   2  ½   Acres wet land: Provided   further   that   where   the original   assignee   or   his   legal   heir,   after first   restoration   transfers   the   assigned land,   the   land   shall   be   resumed   for assignment   to   the   other   eligible   landless poor: Provided   also   that   if   no   eligible landless  poor  persons  are  available  in  the village/area,   the   resumed   land   will   be utilised for public purpose. Explanation:   For   the   purpose   of   this clause   “Public   Interest”   and   “Public Purpose”   shall   mean   and   include,   the Weaker   Section   Housing,   Public   Utility, Infrastructure Development, promotion of industries   and   Tourism   or   for   any   other public purpose; C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  82  of  97 (c)   In   the   areas   which   may   be   notified by   Government   from   time   to   time,   time, lands   resumed   under   clause   4(a)   above, shall be utilized for public purpose. x­x­x­x (5) For the purposes of this section, where any   assigned   land   is   in   possession   of   a person,   other   than   the   original   assignee or   his   legal   heir,   it   shall   be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that there is a   contravention   of   the   provisions   of   sub­ section (1) of section 3.”    (Emphasis Applied) 67. The   Appellants   have   argued   that   Section   4   of the   1977   Act   as   it   stood   on   the   date   when   the resumption   orders   were   passed,   i.e.   27.01.2007, only stipulated that a breach under Section 3 would result   in   possession   of   the   land   being   taken   over from   the   third   party   to   whom   the   land   was transferred   and   restored   back   to   the   original assignees.   In   other   words,   the   Appellants   contend that the Subject Land should be re­assigned to them as they are the legal heirs of the Assignees. 68. We   have   thoughtfully   considered   the submission. It is important at this to draw attention to   the   provisions   of   The   Andhra   Pradesh   Assigned Lands   (Prohibition   of   Transfers)   (Amendment)   Act, C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  83  of  97 2007   [Hereinafter,   ‘2007   Amendment’]   through which   Section   4(1)(c)   was   introduced.   The   2007 Amendment   Act   in   its   Section   1(3)   expressly   states that :– “ Section   1   ­   Short   title,   extent   and commencement – x­x­x­x (3)           Section   2   shall   be   deemed   to   have come   into   force   with   effect   on   and   from 21st,   January,   1977   and   the   remaining provisions shall   come  into force  from  the date   as   the   Government   may,   by notification, appoint.”    (Emphasis Applied) It is significant to note that Section 4(1)(c) was introduced   through   Section   2   of   the   2007 Amendment   Act.   The   legislature   explicitly   gave   it retrospective   effect   and   even   introduced   an Ordinance   on   similar   lines   prior   to   the   said amendment. The legislative intention can be further illuminated  from   the  relevant  part  of  the  Statement of   Object   and   Reasons   in   the   Bill   which   introduced the   2007   Amendment   and   the   same     reads   as follows:– “ x­x­x­x On   account   of   rapid   urbanization   in certain   areas   i.e.,   Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam,   Ranga   Reddy   Districts C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  84  of  97 etc., most of the assigned lands have been alienated   by   the   original   assignees   and the   lands   were   converted   to   non­ agricultural   use.   It   is   found   not   possible to   reassign   these   lands   after   resumption, either   to   the   original   assignee   or   his/her legal   heir.   It   is   also   practically   not possible   to   assign   these   lands   to   other landless poor persons, since the nature of these   lands   has   been   changed   and   they are not useful for agriculture purpose. Keeping   in   view   of   the   above   said position,   Government   have   decided   to amend   clause   (b)   of   sub­section   (1)   of Section 4 of the said Act empowering the Government to notify certain areas where the Government   can resume the assigned lands and utilize them for public purposes such   as   Weaker   Sections   Housing,   Public Utilities,   Infrastructure   Development   or for any other public purpose in such areas as may be notified by it. The   amendment   also   proposes   that in the areas other than those notified, the land   can   be   restored   once   to   the   original assignee   or   it   can   be   assigned   to   other eligible   persons.   However,   if   either   the original   assignee   or   no   eligible   landless poor   are   available   in   the   village,   then   it gets   restored   to   the   Government   for public purpose. As  the   Legislative   Assembly   was   not then in session and it has been decided to give   effect   to   the   above   decision C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  85  of  97 immediately,   the   Andhra   Pradesh Assigned   Lands   (Prohibition   of   Transfers) (Amendment)   Ordinance,   2006   has   been promulgated   by   the   Governor   on   the   5th November, 2006.”    (Emphasis Applied) 69. It deserves to be mentioned that in the Andhra Pradesh   Assigned   Lands   (Prohibition   of   Transfers) (Amendment)   Ordinance,   2006   [Hereinafter,   ‘2006 Ordinance’]  also, a similar provision for resumption for   certain   notified   lands   akin   to   what   has   been provided   in   the   2007   Amendment   Act,   was incorporated.     The   intention   of   the   legislature   in respect of retrospective application of Section 4(1)(c) is   thus   crystal   clear   from   the   very   inception. Furthermore, at the time of rebuttal arguments, the Respondents   have   produced   a   Notification   dated 11.12.2006   whereby   the   village   comprising   the Subject Land has been notified as the area liable for resumption   for   violation   of   Section   3   of   1977   Act. Though   the   notification   was   purportedly   issued   for implementation of the 2006 Ordinance, but the said Ordinance   having   been   substituted   by   the amendment   in   Section   4(1)(c)   of   the   1977   Act   with more   or   less   identical   expressions,   the   Notification, C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  86  of  97 referred   to   above,   caters   the   legal   necessity   of requirement   of  a  Notification   under   the   Act.   Hence, resumption   of   the   Subject   Land   and   re­transfer   of its   ownership   rights   to   the   State,   does   not   suffer from any legal infirmity. 70. It   may   also   be   relevant   to   mention   that   the High Court in   Dharma Reddy 28   has already upheld the retrospective application of Section 4(1)(c) of the 1977   Act.   Pertinently,   this   Court   too   in Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka 29   upheld the constitutional   validity   of   retrospective   appliaction given   to   Karnataka   Scheduled   Castes   and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition  of Transfer  of Certain Lands)   Act   of   1978 ,   which   is   a   statute   whose scheme   is   akin   to   1977   Act .   These   amended provisions are thus deemed to be in force at the time of   violation   of   assignment   conditions   in   the   year 1992.  The only irresistible conclusion would thus be that   the   resumption   order   dated   27.01.2007   does not suffer from any legal infirmity. C.5              C OMPENSATION  F OR  R ESUMPTION    28   Dharma Reddy  (n 12). 29 Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka   (1984) 3 SCC 301. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  87  of  97 71. Finally,   we   consider   the   aspect   of compensation in respect of the Subject Land, which has been pressed into aid by learned senior counsel Mr.   Reddy   by   relying   on   the   decision   of   the   High Court   in   Mekala   Pandu   30   to   contend   that   in   case any assigned land is resumed for public purpose as sought   to  be  done  in  the  instant  case,  then  market value   of   the   said   land   must   be   paid   as compensation.  The   relevant   paragraphs  of   the   cited decision are extensively reproduced as follows:– “ 80.        The   question   that   falls   for consideration   is   whether   the   terms   of grant   or   patta   enabling   the   State   to resume   the   assigned   lands   for   a   public purpose   without   paying   compensation equivalent to the market value of the land to the assignees are valid in law? Whether such   restrictive   conditions   or   covenants suffer from any constitutional infirmity? 81.   The   State   while   directing   no compensation   be   paid   equivalent   to   the market   value   of   the   assigned   lands   never took   into   consideration   and   had   any regard to the length of time the land held by   the   grantee   or   assignee,   the   social objectives   for   which   the   assignment   had been made by the State in discharge of its constitutional   obligation   of   providing public   assistance   to   the   weaker   sections 30   Mekala Pandu  (n 10). C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  88  of  97 of   the   society,   the   improvements   or developments  upon  the  land   made  by  the assignees   on   any   legitimate   expectation of   continuance   of   the   assignment, heritable   nature   of   the   right   under   the grant, etc. 82.   The   question   is   whether   the   ‘no compensation   clause’   imposed   in   the grant   of   assignment,   in   effect,   requires the   assignee   to   relinquish   some constitutional   right?   Whether   the conditions   imposed   at   the   time   of assignment   are   “unconstitutional conditions”? 83.   The   assignees   are   constitutional claimants.   The   constitutional   claim cannot   be   subjected   to   governmental restrictions   or   sanctions   except   pursuant to   the   constitutionally   valid   rule   or   law. There   is   no   legislation   enacted   by   the State compelling it to assign the lands to the   weaker   sections   of   the   society.   The State   obviously   assigned   and   granted pattas   as   a   measure   of   providing   public assistance   to   the   weaker   sections   of   the society.   The   proposition   is   that   as   a general rule the State may grant privilege upon   such   conditions   as   it   sees   fit   to impose; but the power of the State in that regard   is   not   unlimited,   and   one   of   the limitations   that   it   may   not   impose conditions   which   require   the relinquishment   of   constitutional   rights. That   whenever   State   is   required   to   make C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  89  of  97 laws, regulations or policies, it must do so consistently   with   the   directive   principles with   a   view   to   securing   social   and economic   freedom   so   essential   for establishment   of   an   egalitarian   society. The   Directive   Principles   of   State   Policy reflect   the   hopes   and   aspirations   of people of this great country. The fact that they   are   not   enforceable   by   any   Court   in no   manner   reduces   their   importance. They are nevertheless fundamental in the governance   of   the   country   and   the   State is   under   obligation   to   apply   them   in making   laws   and   framing   its   policies particularly   concerning   the   weaker sections of the society. x­x­x­x 92.   ‘ No   compensation’   clause   which virtually   enables   the   State   to   withdraw the   privilege   granted   without   payment   of just compensation is an “unconstitutional condition”   imposed   by   the   State adversely affects the life, liberty, equality and   dignity   guaranteed   by   the Constitution.   The   assignment   of   lands   to the   exploited   and   vulnerable   sections   of the   society   is   neither   a   formality   nor a   gratis .   The   privilege   granted   is   with   a view   to   ensure   and   protect   the   rights   of the   exploited   sections   of   the   people   to live   with   human   dignity   free   from exploitation.   The   privilege   or   largesse once granted acquires the status of vested interest.   The   policy   to   assign   the C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  90  of  97 government   land   by   the   State   was obviously   designed   to   protect   the   socio­ economic status of a vulnerable citizenry; its   deprivation   would   be   universally perceived as a misfortune. x­x­x­x 100.   The   deprivation   of   the   assignee's right   to   payment   of   just   compensation equivalent   to   the   market   value   of   the assigned   land   may amount  to  deprivation of   right   to   livelihood.   The   denial   of constitutional   claim   to   receive   just compensation   after   depriving   the assignee   of   his   land   is   impermissible except   pursuant   to   a   constitutionally valid rule or law . x­x­x­x 110.   In   the   result,   we   hold   that   ‘no compensation’   clause,   restricting   the right   of   the   assignees   to   claim   full compensation   in   respect   of   the   land resumed   equivalent   to   the   market   value of   the   land,   is   unconstitutional.   The   ‘no compensation   clause’   infringes   the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14   and   31­A   of   the   Constitution.   We   are conscious that Article 21 essentially deals with   personal   liberty.   But   in   cases   where deprivation   of   property   would   lead   to deprivation of life or liberty or livelihood, Article   21   springs   into   action   and   any such deprivation without just payment  of compensation amounts to infringement of the   right   guaranteed   thereunder.   The C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  91  of  97 doctrine   of   ‘unconstitutional   conditions’ applies in all its force . 111.   In   the   circumstances,   we   hold   that the assignees of the government lands are entitled   to   payment   of   compensation equivalent to the full market value of the land   and   other   benefits   on   par   with   full owners   of   the   land   even   in   cases   where the assigned lands are taken possession of by the State in accordance with the terms of grant or patta, though such resumption is   for   a   public   purpose.   We   further   hold that   even   in   cases   where   the   State   does not   invoke   the   covenant   of   the   grant   or patta   to   resume   the   land   for   such   public purpose   and   resorts   to   acquisition   of   the land   under   the   provisions   of   the   Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the assignees shall be   entitled   to   compensation   as   owners   of the   land   and   for   all   other   consequential benefits   under  the  provisions  of the  Land Acquisition   Act,   1894.   No   condition incorporated in patta/deed  of  assignment shall   operate   as   a   clog   putting   any restriction on the right of the assignee to claim   full   compensation   as   owner   of   the land . 112.   In such view of ours, the view taken by   this   Court   in   Bondapalli   Sanyasi   (2 supra)   that   whenever   the   land   is   taken possession   of   by   the   State   invoking   the terms   of   the   grant,   the   right   of   an assignee   to   any   compensation   may   have to   be   determined   in   accordance   with   the C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  92  of  97 conditions in patta itself is unsustainable. With   due   respect,   we   are   unable   to   agree with the view taken in this regard. We are also   unable   to   agree   with   the   view   taken that   the   assignee   shall   be   entitled   to compensation   in   terms   of   the   Land Acquisition   Act   not   as   owner   but   as   an interested  person for the interest he held in the property.” (Emphasis Applied) 72. A perusal of the above extracts reveals that the   real   issue   in   those   cases   pertained   to   ‘no compensation’   clauses   in   the   assignment   and not   the   non­payment   of   compensation   for violating conditions regarding non­alienability as involved   in   the   case   in   hand.   That   apart,   the High   Court’s   observation   in   respect   of   a constitutional   right   to   compensation   were disapproved   by   this   Court   while   dismissing   the Civil   Appeals/Special   Leave   Petitions,   including against   the   decision   in   Mekala   Pandu 31   as   is discernible from the following order 32 : – “ 1.   Having   regard   to   the   peculiar   facts and   circumstances   of   the   case.   noted   in 31   Mekala Pandu  (n 10). 32   A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd v Ramesh Singh  and other connected appeals   (Civil Appeal No. 7904­7912 of 2012, 4 August 2014). C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  93  of  97 the   impugned   judgment(s),   we   are satisfied   that   these   are   not   fit   cases   for exercise   of   our   jurisdiction   under   Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 2. Civil Appeals and Special Leave Petition are, accordingly, dismissed. 3. No costs. 4.   Certain   observations   made   in   the impugned   order(s)   about   the   status   of claimants as 'constitutional claimants' are kept open to be considered in appropriate case, if necessary.” (Emphasis Applied) 73. Importantly,   we   must   be   cautious   of   the difference   between   the   terms   ‘acquisition’   and ‘resumption’   in   the   context   of   property   laws.   While both   terms   indicate   deprivation   of   a   right,   there exists   a   significant   distinction   in   their   actual   legal connotation.   Acquisition   denotes   a   positive   act   on behalf   of   the   State   to   deprive   an   individual’s enjoyment   of   a   pre­existing   right   in   a   property   in furtherance   of   its   policy   whereas   resumption denotes  a  punitive   action  by   the  State  to  take  back the   right   or   an   interest   in   a   property   which   was granted   by   it   in   the   first   place.   The   term ‘resumption’   must   not   therefore   be   conflated   with C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  94  of  97 the   term   ‘acquisition’   as   employed   within   the meaning of Article 300­A of the Constitution so as to create   a   right   to   compensation.   Keeping   this   mark distinction   in   view,   it   is   not   necessary   for   us   to determine   whether   an   expropriated   owner   has   an impeachable   constitutional   right   to   compensation under Article 300A of the Constitution in lieu of his acquired property.  74. It   is   also   pertinent   to   note   that   serious allegations   prevail   against   the   Appellants   for   being involved   with   the   land   mafia   to   usurp   the   Subject Land   for   private   interests   which   was   the   precise reason   for   the   Government   to   introduce   legislation in   the   nature   of   the   1977   Act.   Resultantly,   in   the facts   and   circumstances   of   this   case,   we   hold   that the Appellants are not entitled to any compensation under the existing constitutional framework.  D.                 C ONCLUSION      75. In   light   of   the   abovementioned   discussion,   we conclude that the proceedings emanating out of the Second  SCN  were valid; the Subject  Land  was non­ alienable and hence was subject to the provisions of the   1977   Act.   We   further   hold   that   the   Appellants C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  95  of  97 had   transferred   the   Subject   Land   in   contravention to   the   provisions   of   1977   Act   and   therefore,   the resultant   resumption   order   dated   27.01.2007   is valid.   The   Appellants   are   also   not   entitled   to   any compensation   on   account   of   the   requisition   of   the assigned land. 76. We are not oblivious to the fact that the parties have   been   litigating   since   the   year   1994.   During these   decades,   the   Subject   Land   has   acquired enormous   value.   Some   of   the   documents   on   record do   indicate   that   land   mafia   has   already   ousted   the gullible   Assignees   and   now   have   vulture’s   eyes   on the   land.   Additionally,   a   security   agency   of paramount   national   importance   currently   occupies the   Subject   Land   in   public   interest.   We,   therefore, deem   it   appropriate   to   invoke   our   powers   under Article   142   of   the   Constitution   to   do   complete justice to the parties and issue the following further directions/declarations:­  a) The   Subject   Land   in   its   entirety   is   declared   to have   vested   in   the   State   Government.   On further   allotment,   its   ownership   and possessory rights, free from all encumbrances, stand transferred in favour of the Greyhounds; C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  96  of  97 b) No   Civil   Court   or   High   Court   shall   entertain any   claim   whatsoever   on   behalf   of   any Assignee, their legal representative, GPA holder or any other claimant under any Agreement to sell   or   other   instruments,   claiming   direct   or indirect interests in the Subject Land; and c) There   shall   be   a   final   quietus   of   title   and possessory   dispute   over   the   Subject   Land   in favour   of   the   Respondent­State   and/or   the agency   to   whom   the   said   land   has   been allotted.  77. Consequently,   these   appeals   stand   dismissed along   with   any   pending   applications   in   the   above terms. No order as to costs. ……… ..………………… J. (SURYA KANT) ………………………… .. J. (J.K. MAHESHWARI) NEW DELHI DATED: 01.08.2023 C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.               Page  97  of  97