/2023 INSC 0774/
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.254 OF 2010
M. SIVADASAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS   …APPELLANTS
Versus
A. SOUDAMINI (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS.  …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
1. The   appellants   had   filed   a   suit   for   partition   and   mesne
profit   way   back   in   the   year   1988,   before   the   Court   of
Principal   Munsif,   Kozhikode­I,   Kerala,   claiming   ancestral
rights over the property comprising of Items 1 & 2 in Plaint
Schedule   A;   property   admeasuring   33  ½	  cents   and   42
cents   respectively.     The   Trial   Court   dismissed   the   suit   of
the   plaintiffs/appellants   vide   its   Order   and   Judgment
dated   03.02.1993   on   the   ground   that   the   land   along   with
the   house   sought   to   be   partitioned   is   an   agricultural   land
on which the plaintiffs/appellants, cannot claim any right.
This   finding   of   the   Trial   Court   was   upheld   by   the   First
Appellate Court, and finally by the High Court of Kerela by2023INSC774

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the   impugned   Judgment   dated   29.01.2009   in   second
appeal.   In short, the present appellants have lost from all
the Courts below.  
2. The   contesting   parties   before   this   Court   belong   to
“ Thiyyas”   community   of   Kozhikode,   Kerala   who   were
governed  by  Hindu  Mitakshara  law.  The  admitted  position
is that amongst “ Thiyyas ” of Kozhikode, ancestral property
devolves only on the male children; daughters, have a right
of   maintenance   till   the   time   of   their   marriage.   We   are
speaking   here   of   the   rights,   including   possession   as   it
existed   prior   to   the   Hindu   Succession   Act,   1956.   The
plaintiff/appellant   had   filed   a   civil  suit  before   the   court   of
Munsif for partition of the property which has a total area
of 75 ½	 cents.  Built on the land is the ancestral residential
house   of   the   parties.     The   suit   of   partition   was   dismissed
by   the   trial   court   holding   that   Hindu   Women’s   Right   to
Property Act, 1937 was not applicable to agricultural land,
till its amendment in the year 1946 and the succession to
the said property had opened in the year 1942 itself which
precedes the date of amendment.

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3. The   property   originally   belonged   to   Sami   Vaidyar.   On   his
death   in  the   year   1942,  it   devolved  on  his   male  successor
son Sukumaran.  Rights on the property are being claimed
presently   by   the   progenies   or   daughters   of   Sami   Vaidyar
through their mother Choyichi, who was the widow of Sami
Vaidyar.   The claim of the plaintiff was that Choyichi (who
died   in   the   year   1962)   had   a   right,   though   a   limited   right
under   the   Hindu   Mitakshara   law   as   well   as   by   virtue   of
Hindu   Women’s   Right   to   Property   Act,   1937   which
blossomed   into   full­fledged   right   under   Section   14   sub­
section   (1)   of   Hindu   Succession   Act,   1956   which   is
reproduced below:
14.   Property   of   a   female
Hindu   to   be   her   absolute
property .—(1)   Any   property
possessed   by   a   female   Hindu,
whether   acquired   before   or
after the commencement of this
Act, shall be held by her as full
owner   thereof   and   not   as   a
limited owner
4. This   argument   of   the   plaintiff   was   rejected   by   the   Trial
Court and the same was upheld by the First Appellate Court
as   well   as   by   the   Second   Appellate   Court   on   the   reasoning

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that   after   the   death   of   Sami   Vaidyar,   his   son   Sukumaran
succeeded   in   the   property   in   year   1942   itself.     Thereafter,
Sukumaran   and   later   the   children   succeeding   Sukumaran
had   the   right   over   the   property   which   undisputedly
remained   in   their   possession.     Section   14   sub­Section   (1)
had no application in this case.   The essential ingredient of
Section   14   sub­Section   (1)   is   possession   over   the   property.
Admittedly   the   plaintiff   was   never   in   possession   of   the
property.   The possession was always that of the defendant
and   therefore   Section   14   sub­Section   (1)   would   not   be
applicable.     In   Ram   Vishal   (dead)   by   lrs.   and   Ors.   v.
Jagan Nath & Another.  reported in  (2004) 9 SCC 302  the
position   of   possession   being   a   pre­requisite   to   sustain   a
claim   under   sub­section   (1)   of   Section   14   of   the   1956   Act
was confirmed in Para 16 which is quoted below:
‘ 16.   In   our   view,   the   authority
in   Raghubar   Singh   case   [(1998)
6   SCC   314]   can   be   of   no
assistance   to   the   respondent.
As has been held by this Court,
a   pre­existing   right   is   a   sine
qua non for conferment of a full
ownership   under   Section   14   of
the   Hindu   Succession   Act.   The
Hindu   female  must  not  only  be

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possessed   of   the   property   but
she   must   have   acquired   the
property .   Such   acquisition
must   be   either   by   way   of
inheritance   or   devise,   or   at   a
partition   or   “in   lieu   of
maintenance   or   arrears   of
maintenance”   or   by   gift   or   by
her   own   skill   or   exertion,  or   by
purchase   or   by   prescription…’
[Emphasis Supplied]
5. As   per   the   law   as   it   existed   at   their   relevant   time   the
property which was an agricultural property would devolve
upon   the   male   child   and   daughters   would   get   only   a
limited right to maintenance till, they were married and the
widow   would   be   entitled   to   maintenance   from   the   income
from  the property  till her  death or  remarriage.   As per  the
family Settlement Deed dated 12.03.1938 which was relied
upon   by   both   the   parties,   the   property   in   dispute   was
specifically   allotted   to   Sami   Vaidyar   and   his   only   son
Sukumaran.     Therefore,   the   widow   of   Sami   Vaidyar   i.e.,
Choyichi   will   not   have   any   right   over   the   property.     The
findings   of   all   the   courts   below   were   that   Choyichi   was
never   in   possession   of   the   property   and   therefore   she

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would   not   get   the   right,   as   claimed   by   her   under   Section
14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 
6. We   have   heard   at   length Mr. P.N. Raveendran and Mr.
Sudhivasudevan,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   on
behalf of the appellants and Mr. V. Chitambaresh, learned
senior counsel, for the respondents/defendants.  The effort
of the learned senior counsel for the appellants here was to
persuade   us   to   reappreciate   the   entire   case   on   facts,   on
which   three   Courts   have   given   the   same   findings.   The
learned Counsel would argue that the determination of the
land in question as an agricultural land has been wrongly
done   by   all   the   three   Courts.     The   argument   which   has
been put forward by the learned senior counsel before us is
on   the   reasoning   that   merely   because   the   land   has   a   few
coconut trees, that will not make it an agricultural land, as
in   Kerela,   coconut   trees   are   found   everywhere   even   in   the
urban   residential   properties   and   their   presence   itself   will
not make the land an agricultural land.  
7. The land in question undoubtedly has coconut trees on it,
most of  them  are very  old  but fruit bearing, and  moreover
in   revenue   records,   the   land   is   described   as   “ theaattam”

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i.e.,  “garden”.    This   would   mean   that   the   land   in   question
may   be   put   for   agricultural   use.     Theoretically,   it   is
possible that a land which is recorded as “ theaattam”   may
not   be   actually   put   for   agricultural   use.     All   the   same,   in
the   present   case,   the   overwhelming   evidence   which   has
been   duly   appreciated   by   the   three   Courts   below   clearly
prove   that   the   land   was   indeed   an   agricultural   land.     We
therefore   find   no   reason   to   take   a   different   view   at   this
stage.
8. We   must   state   here   that   this   case   is   here   before   us   in   a
Special   Leave   Petition   filed   under   Article   136   of   the
Constitution of India.  It is true that leave has been granted
in   this   case.     Nevertheless,   the   settled   legal   position
remains   that   even   after   leave   is   granted   and   appeal   is
admitted,   the   appellants   must   show   that   exceptional   and
special circumstances exist to reverse the findings, or grave
injustice will be done if the decision under challenge is not
interfered   with.   We   do   not   find   any   special   circumstances
here   which   may   warrant   our   interference.     [See   Pritam
Singh   v.   State,   AIR (1950) SC 169: (1950) SCR 453,   Hem
Raj   v.   State   of   Ajmer   AIR   (1954)   SC   462:   (1954)   SCR

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1133,   Bengal   Chemical   &   Pharmaceutical   Works   Ltd.
v.  Employees , AIR (1959) SC 633: 1959 Supp (2) SCR 136:
(1959)   1   LLJ   413,   Municipal   Board,   Pratabgarh   and
Anr.   v . Mahendra Singh Chawla and Ors.   (1982) 3 SCC
331: (1983) SCC (L&S) 19,  Taherakhatoon (dead) by LRs
v.  Salambin Mohammad  (1999) 2 SCC 635].
9. There   is   another   aspect   of   the   matter.   Admittedly   the
defendants   have   all   along   been   in   possession   of   the
property. The finding of adverse possession in favour of the
defendants by the Trial Court, was never challenged by the
plaintiffs/appellants before the First Appellate Court.     We
refer here the observations of the High Court which are as
under: 
“ 10…It   is   pertinent   to   note   that
the   findings   of   the   trial   court
that   the   rights,   if   any,   of   the
plaintiffs   have   been   lost   by
adverse   possession   and   ouster
does   not   appear   to   have   been
assailed   before   the   lower
appellate   court.     The   lower
appellate   court   also   did   not
interfere with the said finding…”

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Consequently, even if we keep nature of the land aside for
a while, the present appeal is liable to be dismissed on this
ground alone. 
10. The concurrent findings on facts by the Trial Court and the
First   Appellate   Court   have   been   reaffirmed   in   second
appeal   by   the   High   Court,   yet   by   and   large   the   entire
submissions of the appellants is nothing but a persuasion
before this Court for reappraisal of the case on facts.
11. In   view   of   the   above   discussion,   the   judgment   of   the   Trial
Court   and   First   Appellate   Court,   affirmed   by   the   High
Court   in   second   appeal   on   29.01.2009   is   upheld   and   the
present   appeal   is   hereby   dismissed.   The   order   granting
status quo by this Court dated 06.01.2010 stands vacated.
 No order as to costs.  
…………………………..J.
           [C.T. RAVIKUMAR]
…………………………..J.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA] 
 
       AUGUST 28, 2023. 
       NEW DELHI