CALCUTTA HIGH COURT

                                                Hare Krishna Das

                                                         Vs

                                        Hahnemann Publishing Co Ltd

                                              (P.N. Mookerjee, J.)

                                                    27.11.1964

                                                 JUDGEMENT

P.N. Mookerjee, J.

( 1. ) THIS appeal is by the defendant and it arises out of a suit for ejectment in respect of Room
No.8, ground floor, of Premises No. 129/1, Bowbazar Street. The contractual rent was Rs. 61.87
nP. per month, payable according to the English calendar month. (Para 1)

( 2. ) THE defendant's above tenancy was purported to be terminated by a notice, dated July 26,
1957, expiring with the expiry of the month of August, 1959. THE notice was attempted to be
served by registered post but it came back with an endorsement "left". It was also attempted to be
served in the disputed premises and, according to the return of the person, who attempted this
service, it appears to have been offered to an alleged officer of the defendant and he not having
agreed to sign the receipt, it was served by affixation or hanging in the above premises. This was
done on July27, 1959, and the present suit was brought on September 19, 1959, the allegation in
the plaint being that the defendant, having been a defaulter in the payment of rent for much more
than the requisite four months, was not entitled to any protection under the relevant rent control
law (the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956). THE default alleged was, in particular, with
respect to the period since 1957. The present suit was preceded by another suit for ejectment
against the same tenant on the ground of reasonable requirement. That suit was decreed initially
by the learned trial Judge on December 23, 1957, but, eventually, on appeal, it was dismissed on
May 20, 1959, and, thereafter, as it appears, the above steps were taken for terminating the
defendant's tenancy and institution of the present suit on the ground of default, as alleged
therein. In the present suit, on February 11, 1960, after service of summons and within a month
thereafter, the defendant deposited the defaulted rents in question, namely, from September,
1957, to April, 1959, by a challan, filed on that day. The suit, thereafter, proceeded and it has
eventually, been decreed by the learned trial Judge, who has held in favor of the plaintiff on the
above question of default, on the question of validity and sufficiency of the notice of ejectment
and also on the question of its service. It is against this decree that the present appeal has been
filed by the defendant appellant.

( 3. ) BEFORE us, various points were taken, in support of the appeal, to challenge the decree of
the learned trial Judge. It was contended first that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant
between the parties and, as such, the suit was not established by the evidence in the case that the
present plaintiff had acquired the landlord's interest in the disputed premises and the defendant
has, under the law, become a tenant in respect of the same under the plaintiff. The defence
objection in this respect was, in our opinion, rightly overruled by the learned trial Judge on the
materials on record. It was further contended that, in any event, the defendant was not a defaulter
for the requisite period to disentitle him to the protection of the above rent control law, namely,
the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The admitted possession, however, is that the
rents for the period September, 1957, to April, 1959, were deposited in Court in the present suit
only on February 11, 1960, and the same cannot at all be taken to be a valid deposit under the
law. It was, however, pressed before us that, as, during the said period, the previous ejectment
suit was pending, there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the
defendant was under no obligation to pay or deposit rent. This contention has only to be stated to
be rejected. If a "tenant" wants to avail himself of the protection of the above Act, he is under an
obligation to continue payment or deposit of rent so long as he remains in possession or wants to
remain in possession. Once he makes a default in this respect and the default extends to the
requisite period under the above Act, namely, four months, he becomes absolutely disentitled to
the protection under the Act. The Act obviously seeks to protect ex-tenants, who would discharge
their obligations under the Act, and, indeed, the protection cannot be (extended?) except to ex-
tenants, as persons, whose tenancies have not terminated do not require any protection under the
above Act. The argument, therefore, that because the contractual tenancy had ended and the
previous suit was pending at the time, the defendant had no obligation to deposit rent for availing
himself of the protection of the above Act, cannot be accepted. If he did not deposit the rent but
made the requisite default, he did so at his own risk and his own omission in this respect,
intentional or otherwise, now recoils upon him. ;