PATNA HIGH COURT

                                          Sasamusa Sugar Works Ltd

                                                         Vs

                                                  State of Bihar

                                      Misc. Judl. Case No. 115 of 1954

                                        (Ramaswami and Ahmad, JJ.)

                                                   04.08.1954

                                                  JUDGMENT

Ahmad, J.

1. The petitioner in this case is a limited concern Sasamusa Sugar Works Ltd. It has got a rule
issued from this Court against the opposite parties calling upon them to show cause as to why a
writ in the nature of mandamus or prohibition or certiorari, or, in the alternative, direction should
not be issued forbearing them from giving effect to the orders passed by the Labor Commissioner
on 21-2-1953 and 29-4-1953, and restraining them from taking any proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act 1950 and also for quashing two orders one passed
by the Government under Section 20 of the aforesaid Act and communicated to the Sub-
divisional Officer, Gopalganj, on 20-2-1954, and the other passed by the Certificate Officer,
Gopalganj, whereby he has started a certificate case No.331 of 1953-54 for the recovery of
Rs.23.790/1/3 against the Directors of Sasamusa Sugar Works Ltd.

2. The dispute giving rise to the present application is in substance the outcome of some
difference between the parties over the interpretation of an award dated 26-9-1950, given under
the Industrial Disputes Act (Act 14 of 1947) by the Industrial Tribunal of which the Hon'ble Mr.
Justice B.P. Sinha (as he then was) was the sole member.

3. It appears that in the early part of the year 1950 some dispute arose between the employers and
workmen of the petitioner company Sasamusa Sugar Works Ltd. For the adjudication of that
dispute the Government under Section 7, Industrial Disputes Act by an order dated 6-2-1950,
constituted an Industrial Tribunal with Hon'bie Mr. Justice B.P. Sinha (as he then was) as its sole
member, and under Section 10 of the Act referred to that Tribunal a number of points for
adjudication. One of the points referred to it, which has given rise to the present application, was:
"The retaining allowance for the off-season to be paid if any". The award, given by the Tribunal
on 25-9-1950, was published in the Bihar Gazette, Extraordinary, on 5-10-1950. The finding
given therein on the issue of retaining allowance was to the effect that the skilled workmen and
clerks should get at the rate of 50 per cent. of their wages during the off-season and semiskilled
ones at the rate of 25 per cent. thereof. A list was also given in the award classifying therein
broadly the skilled and semi-skilled jobs with a note attached thereto in the following words:

        "It should be noted that the list given above of skilled and semi-skilled jobs is illustrative
        of the nature of the work done, and not exhaustive of the description, that is to say,
        irrespective of the description, or nomenclature given by particular factories to their
        workmen, it is the job, and not the description attaching to it, which will determine the
        question of whether the particular man is or is not entitled to retaining allowance."

Against the award, an appeal was taken to the Labor Appellate Tribunal of India under Section 7,
Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act 1950. The main controversy in appeal between the
parties on the point of retaining allowance was as to who among the workmen was to be
considered as skilled and semi-skilled Labor and as such entitled to get retaining allowance. The
Appellate Tribunal on hearing the parties gave its decision on 7-3-1951 which was published in
the Bihar Gazette, Extraordinary, dated 26-3-1951. Therein it held: "We think that we should
maintain the list given in the award".

4. It appears from the counter-affidavit sworn by opposite party No.4, the Secretary of the
Sasamusa Sugar Workers' Union, that while the matter was already pending before the Appellate
Tribunal, a conciliation proceeding for the settlement of the difference over the award had also
started on 3-3-1951 and it was decided therein that the Commissioner of Labor would issue
clarification of the award, if necessary, after the order of the Appellate Tribunal had been given
and in the meantime the parties were advised to discuss the matter between themselves and to
come to a settlement as far as practicable. Unfortunately, the decision of the Appellate Tribunal
did not smooth down their difference and, therefore, in accordance with the agreement arrived at
in the conciliation proceeding held on 3-3-1951, the parties by an agreement dated 23-1-1952,
which forms Annexure-2 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of opposite party No.4, agreed
that the Labor Officer, Muzaffarpur, would hold an investigation into the nature of duties of
different workmen and make his recommendation to the Labor Commissioner by the end of
January, 1952, and on the receipt of his report the management would be asked to pay workmen
in the light of that report. The Labor Officer, Muzaffarpur, accordingly enquired into the matter
and submitted his report to the Labor Commissioner, and on the basis of that report a letter dated
4-4-1952, was sent to the petitioner from the Deputy Commissioner of Labor communicating
therein that

        "The Labor Commissioner has accepted the said report and has directed that the
        management should pay the retaining allowance as recommended by the Labor Officer.
        The Labor Commissioner has further directed that such payment should be made within a
        week from the date of the receipt of this letter".

Unfortunately, none of the parties was satisfied with the report submitted by the Labor Officer
and, therefore, a protest petition was filed by both of them. On those protest petitions the Labor
Commissioner by his letter dated 19-5-1952, directed the parties to place all materials before the
Assistant Labor Commissioner, Muzaffarpur, and to satisfy him that retaining allowance had
been paid to all the categories of workmen in accordance with the terms of the award of the
Tribunal and to abide by his directions in the matter. In pursuance of this direction the Assistant
Labor Commissioner held an enquiry into the matter and on enquiry directed the payment of
retaining allowance to some categories of the workmen about whom there was difference of
opinion between the parties in the light of the decision given in the award. It is claimed by the
petitioner that the instructions given to it by the Assistant Labor Commissioner on the close of
his enquiry were fully carried out by it and thus the conciliation proceeding initiated between the
parties over the question of retaining allowance in terms of the award of the Tribunal had
exhausted itself out. It is further alleged that in the meantime the petitioner had given a notice as
well on 14-4-1952, under Section 19(6), Industrial Disputes Act, conveying its decision therein
to terminate the award as a result whereof it is alleged the award under law terminated after two
months from that date.

5. The grievance of the petitioner in this application on this part of the case is that thereafter the
Labor Commissioner without any authority by his letter issued from his office on 21-2-1953,
ordered the petitioner to make payment of retaining allowance to some additional categories of
workmen and subsequently sent a reminder on 29-4-1953, communicating therein

        "The workmen concerned have applied for recovery of the amount due under certificate
        procedure in accordance with Section 20, Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act,
        1950. You are, therefore, advised once again to make payment of the retaining allowance
        due to all workmen in accordance with the abovementioned letter immediately".

The directions given in these two letters were, it is said, challenged by the petitioner and it
categorically denied to accept the eligibility of the new categories of workmen set up by the
Labor Commissioner for payment of retaining allowance and also questioned his authority to
give such direction.

6. On the protest made by the petitioner, it appears, the State Government, according to the
allegation of the petitioner, at the instance of the Labor Commissioner, and according to the
opposite party No.4 on an application filed by the workers on 25-5-1153, sanctioned the
institution of a proceeding under Section 20, Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950,
for the recovery of retaining allowance payable to the additional categories of workmen in
accordance with the finding of the Labor Commissioner and issued a letter on 20-2-1954, to the
Sub-divisional Officer, Gopalganj, directing him to file the necessary certificate of public
demand in the office of the Certificate Officer, Gopalganj, and to make a request that early steps
should be taken to realise the amount from the Directors of the Sasamusa Sugar Works Ltd. In
pursuance of this letter, it appears, the Sub-divisional Officer of Gopalganj, filed the necessary
certificate form in the office of the Certificate Officer, Gopalganj, who, on its receipt, filed it in
his office under Section 4, Public Demands Recovery Act and subsequently started a proceeding
under the Public Demands Recovery Act against the petitioner. That proceeding is still pending
for disposal and in the course of that proceeding notice under Section 7, Public Demands
Recovery Act has been served on the petitioner on 4-3-1954. The case of the petitioner is that the
certificate case started against it on the basis of the order passed by the Government under
Section 20(1), Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, is invalid in law, for no money
either found due by a conciliation officer in a conciliation proceeding or found due on an
interpretation and application by a workman or the Government of a principle given in the award
is recoverable under Section 20(1) of the said Act.
7. On these allegations the present application has been now filed in this Court by the petitioner
for the issue of writs and directions as stated above. It may be noted here that the present
application was sworn on 18-2-1954, and as the petitioner had no knowledge of the proceeding
taken against it under the Public Demands Recovery Act at any time before 4-3-1954, when
notice thereof under Section 7 was served on it, no reference of the proceeding, it is said, could
be made in the original application, and, therefore, on the service of the notice under the Public
Demands Recovery Act, supplementary affidavits were filed in the case by the petitioner praying
therein to quash the order passed by the Certificate Officer whereby he has started a case under
the Public Demands Recovery Act against the petitioner and also to make the Certificate Officer
a party therein.

8. Cause has been shown in the case by the Government Pleader on behalf of the State of Bihar,
the Commissioner of Labor, Bihar, the Collector of Saran, Chapra, and the Certificate Officer,
Gopalganj, and by Mr. Tara Kishore Prasad, on behalf of Mohammad Shamsuddin, Secretary,
Sasamusa Workers' Union.

9. The learned Government Pleader contended that the orders dated 21-2-1953 and 29-4-1953,
were passed by the Labor Commissioner in the course of the conciliation proceeding held on the
basis of the agreement dated 23-1-1952, and, therefore, the Labor Commissioner had the
necessary authority in law to pass the orders on 21-2-1953, and 29-4-1953, and the orders passed
on those dates were valid and legal.

10. His next contention was that the order passed by the Government under Section 20, Industrial
Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, for the recovery of the retaining allowance payable to
the additional categories of workmen was on the basis of the application submitted to it by the
workmen of the Sasamusa Sugar Works Ltd., and the same was valid and legal. He supported the
order firstly on the ground that the money found due by the Labor Commissioner in the
conciliation proceeding could also be directed by the Government to be recovered under Section
20 of the aforesaid Act and secondly that in any case the money which the Government has
under its order directed to be recovered under Section 20 of the Act is the money claimed to be
due by the workers under the award dated 26-9-1950. In this view of the matter he submitted that
the validity of the proceeding started against the petitioner for the realization of the due is not
open to any question.

11. Mr. Tara Kishore Prasad appearing for the Secretary of the Union has, however, in his
argument conceded that the money found due by the Labor Commissioner under his orders dated
21-2-1953, and 29-4-1953, passed by him in the conciliation proceeding started on the basis of
the agreement dated 23-1-1952, cannot in law be recovered under Section 20, Industrial Disputes
(Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. He also did not support the validity of the order passed by the
Labor Commissioner on the basis of the agreement dated 23-1-1952. His only contention was
that the order passed by the Government under Section 20 of the aforesaid Act was not for the
money found due in the conciliation proceeding but for the money claimed to be due by the
workmen under the award of 26-9-1950, and as such the order passed by the Government under
Section 20 is valid and legal and accordingly the proceeding started on the basis of that order
under the Public Demands Recovery Act by the Certificate Officer, Gopalganj, is in accordance
with law.
12. On the contentions raised in this case, the following four points arise for consideration:

1. Whether the orders passed by the Labor Commissioner on 21-2-1953 and 29-4-1953 were
within the authority conferred on him by law.

        (2) Whether the Government under Section 20, Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal)
        Act, 1950, can pass an order for the recovery of money found due from the employers by
        the Labor Commissioner in a conciliation proceeding.
        (3) Whether Government can exercise powers under Section 20, Industrial Disputes
        (Appellate Tribunal)

Act, 1950, for the recovery of a due under an award wherein it is neither shown as a determinate
sum nor as payable to a determinate person.

        (4) Whether the proceeding started by the Certificate Officer, Gopalganj, under the Public
        Demands Recovery Act, against the petitioner is valid in law in case it is found that the
        due thereunder cannot be realised by the order of the Government in accordance with the
        procedure laid down in Section 20, Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.

13. I take up these questions one by one.

14. In the course of the argument on the first point a subsidiary point was also raised by the
petitioner that the conciliation proceeding based on the agreement dated 23-1-1952, had after the
decision given by the Assistant Labor Commissioner exhausted itself and there was no
proceeding left thereafter wherein any decision could be given by the Labor Commissioner. I
think it is not necessary to decide this point. Even if it be accepted for the sake of argument, as
contended by the learned Government Pleader, that the conciliation proceeding based on the
agreement dated 23-1-1952, remained pending before the Labor Commissioner even after the
decision given by the Assistant Labor Commissioner and even after the satisfaction of the claims
by the petitioner on the basis of that decision, this much is clear that the Labor Commissioner in
that conciliation proceeding had no authority in law to pass any final order of the nature of those
made by him on 21-2-1953, and 29-4-1953. The powers and duties of a conciliation officer are
given in Section 12, Industrial Disputes Act 1947. That section reads:

        "(1) Where any Industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the conciliation officer may, or
        where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under Section 22 has been
        given, shall, hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner.
        (2) The conciliation officer shall, for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of the
        dispute, without delay investigate the dispute and all matters affecting the merits and the
        right settlement thereof and may do all such things as he thinks fit for the purpose of
        inducing the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute.
        (3) If a settlement of the dispute or of any of the matters in dispute is arrived at in the
        course of the conciliation proceedings the conciliation officer shall send a report thereof to
        the appropriate Government together with a memorandum of the settlement signed by the
        parties to the dispute.
        (4) If no such settlement is arrived at, the conciliation officer shall, as soon as practicable
        after the close of the investigation, send to the appropriate Government a full report
        setting forth the steps taken by him for ascertaining the facts and circumstances relating to
        the dispute and for bringing about a settlement thereof, together with a full statement of
        such facts and circumstances, and the reasons on account of which, in his opinion, a
        settlement could not be arrived at.
        (5) If, on a consideration of the report referred to in Sub-section (4), the appropriate
        Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference to a Board or Tribunal, it may
        make such reference. Where the appropriate Government does not make such a reference
        it shall record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons therefor.
        (6) A report under this section shall be submitted within fourteen days of the
        commencement of the conciliation proceedings or within such shorter period as may be
        fixed by the appropriate Government."

This section obviously contemplates that what is referred to a conciliation officer to be decided in
a conciliation proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is an industrial dispute. In this
view of the matter, the very argument advanced by the learned Government Pleader presupposes
that the controversy between the parties over the interpretation of the award of 26-9-1950,
regarding its application to the different categories of workmen was taken by the parties as an
industrial dispute, and it was, therefore, agreed between them to be referred to the Labor
Commissioner to be decided by him as a conciliation officer in a conciliation proceeding. This
aspect of the question finds support also from the definition of the phrase 'industrial dispute'
given in clause (k) of Section 2, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. That reads ­

        "industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference between employers and employers,
        or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is
        connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with
        the conditions of Labor, of any person."

In this case, therefore, there was a dispute between the employers and workmen, as contemplated
by the Industrial Disputes Act, over the interpretation of the award as to whether it did or did not
apply in the case of particular categories of workmen. That being so, all that the Labor
Commissioner under Section 12, Industrial Disputes Act could do was to induce the parties to
come to a fair and amicable settlement on the matter. On his success in the attempt what he could
do under Sub-section (3) of Section 12, Industrial Disputes Act was to send a report thereof to
the Government together with a memorandum of the settlement signed by the parties to the
dispute.
It is admitted in this case that though the parties had agreed to appoint the Labor Commissioner
as the conciliation officer no settlement could be arrived at before the Labor Commissioner in the
course of the conciliation proceeding and even if there was any that was not before him but
before the Assistant Labor Commissioner which had already been acted upon by the parties and
thus it had exhausted itself. If, therefore, the contention of the learned Government Pleader is
accepted that even after the decision given by the Assistant Labor Commissioner the conciliation
proceeding still remained pending before the Labor Commissioner, this much is to be held that as
no settlement thereafter was arrived at between the parties before the Labor Commissioner in that
proceeding, he had no option under Sub-section (4) of Section 12 but to send to the Government
only a full report setting forth the steps taken by him for ascertaining the facts and circumstances
relating to the dispute and for bringing about a settlement thereof, together with a full statement
of such facts and circumstances, and the reasons on account of which, in his opinion, a settlement
could not be arrived at. And in any case in the absence of the settlement before him he had no
authority under law to pass a final order of the type said to have been given by him in the letters
issued from his office on 21-2-1953 and 29-4-1953. Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 12,
Industrial Disputes Act 1947 say that on receipt of the report submitted to the Government under
Sub-section (4) of the section, it was for the Government to decide as to whether the case should
be referred to a Board or Tribunal for a decision. It does not provide for a final decision to be
given by the conciliation officer even when a settlement is arrived at between the parties and
much less when no settlement is arrived at between them. In either case he has only to report the
matter to the Government. For these reasons, I hold that the orders passed by the Labor
Commissioner on 21-2-1953, and 29-4-1953, in a conciliation proceeding said to be based on the
agreement dated 23-1-1952, are without jurisdiction.

15. The law on the second point also, in my opinion, is equally clear. Section 20 of the Industrial
Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, reads:

        "(1) Any money due from an employer under any award or decision of an industrial
        tribunal may be recovered as arrears of land revenue or as a public demand by the
        appropriate Government on an application made to it by the person entitled to the money
        under that award or decision.
        (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit under an
        award or decision of an industrial tribunal which is capable of being computed in terms of
        money, the amount at which such benefit should be computed may subject to the rules
        made under this Act, be determined by that industrial tribunal, and the amount so
        determined may be recovered as provided for in Sub-section (1).
        (3) For the purpose of computing the money value of a benefit, the industrial tribunal
        may, if it so thinks fit, appoint a commissioner, who shall, after taking such evidence as
        may be necessary, submit a report to the industrial tribunal, and the said tribunal shall
        determine the amount after considering the report of the commissioner and other
        circumstances of the case."

Under Sub-section (1) of the section the Government can recover under the Public Demands
Recovery Act only that money which is due from an employer under any award or decision of an
industrial tribunal. This Sub-section, therefore, does not give power to the Government to realise
any money under the Public Demands Recovery Act which is due from an employer under a
decision given by a conciliation officer in a conciliation proceeding. I, therefore, think that the
learned Government Pleader was not correct in pressing that the money found due by the Labor
Commissioner under his orders dated 21-2-1953 and 29-4-1953, given in the conciliation
proceeding could be executed by the Government by procedure laid down in Section 20,
Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. The contention of the learned Government
Pleader, therefore, on this point fails.

16. The third point is also based on the interpretation of Section 20, Industrial Disputes
(Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. That section has already been quoted above in extenso. Reading
the award of 26-9-1950, as I do, it seems to me that what it decides is that the workmen of
particular categories are entitled to get retaining allowance for the off-season and has further laid
down certain principle to be worked out in the case of each worker if found to belong to those
categories for the payment of his demand on account of retaining allowance. It does not deal with
the claim of any individual workman nor does it work out any particular due to be paid to any
specific person. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that any particular person was shown
therein as entitled to any determinate amount as his due from the petitioner. That being so, no
particular person could apply to the Government on the basis of any finding in the award
specially given in his favor that he was entitled to any particular money as his due from the
petitioner. In my opinion, Sub-section (1) of Section 20 is applicable only in those cases where a
determinate sum is held to be due under the award in favor of a specified and definite person.
This is clear from the reading of Sub-section (2) of Section 20. This Sub-section deals with the
cases where the benefit under an award is not given in the form of a determinate sum but only in
a form which is capable of being computed in terms of money. It says that in such a case the
money claimed by any particular person as due to him under the award may be determined either
by the Industrial Tribunal or according to the provision provided in the rules made under the Act,
and only on determination in either of those ways it may be recovered under Sub-section (1) of
Section 20. In the present case our attention has not been drawn to any particular rules made
under the Act for this purpose and, therefore, in the absence of such rules the only machinery
available under law under this sub-section for the determination of any claim made by any
person on the basis of such an award is the industrial tribunal. And it is only when the Industrial
Tribunal has determined the amount that it can be recovered in a manner provided in Sub-section
(1) of Section 20, Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. As already stated above,
the award in the present case has laid down only a principle for the payment of retaining
allowance to workmen and therefore so far each individual worker is concerned, his due has to
be worked out on the basis of the principle laid down there. That, as is apparent from the facts of
this case, will require not only an arithmetical calculation of the figures but also a decision as to
whether a particular workman does or does not in fact belong to the categories of workmen who
under the award have been found to be entitled to receive the retaining allowance.
I, therefore, think that it was not permissible in law for the Government in such a case to act
under Sub-section (1) of Section 20, Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 and to
pass an order for the realization of any due under the Public Demands Recovery Act on the basis
of a claim made by a workman without its determination by the Industrial Tribunal. This, in
substance, if permitted, will amount to giving power to each workman or to the Government to
interpret the award and to compute the due claimed on the basis of that interpretation. That, I
think, is not contemplated by Section 20(1), Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.
That has to be done under Sub-section (2) of Section 20 either by the Tribunal or in accordance
with the procedure laid down in the rules, if any, made on the subject under the Act. In my
opinion, the contention advanced by the learned Government Pleader on this point is without any
substance. In the present case, therefore, the award not having found any determinate sum as due
from the employers to a particular person, the Government could not proceed under law to
recover any due by a proceeding under the Public Demands Recovery Act on the basis of a
calculation made by any individual workman in his application submitted to it. The order of the
Government, therefore, of 20-2-1954, said to have been passed on the basis of the application
submitted by the workman for the realization of their amount claimed to be due against the
management under the award of 26-9-1950, is without jurisdiction. Here it may be noted that the
learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner also tried to attack the validity of the order passed by
the Government under Section 20(1) of the Act on the ground that the award as a result of the
notice given under Section 19(6), Industrial Disputes Act, had long before that order terminated
and as such no order could be passed thereafter for the realization of any money said to be due
under that award. I, however, think that in view of the finding given above, this point need not be
answered in this case.

17. Coming to the last point, we have to proceed on the findings given above that the
Government on the facts of the present case had no power to pass an order under Section 20,
Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, for the realization of the due claimed in the
applications submitted to it by workmen. That being so, the very foundation on the basis of
which the Certificate Officer of Gopalgani started a proceeding under the Public Demands
Recovery Act for the realization of Rs.23790-1-3 against the petitioner did not exist in law and
therefore that proceeding is without any legal basis and void.

18. In this case action was taken by the Certificate Officer against the petitioner for the
realization of money under Section 4, Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914. That section reads:

        "When the Certificate Officer is satisfied that any public demand payable to the Collector
        is due, he may sign certificate in the prescribed form, stating that the demand is due and
        shall cause the certificate to be filed in his office."

It shows that the satisfaction of the Certificate Officer to the effect that some public demand
payable to the Collector is due is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power given to him
under this section. In case, therefore, where an order is passed by the Certificate Officer under
this section without any satisfaction on his part to the effect stated above or on the so-called
satisfaction which is arbitrary and not based on any material, his order so passed will be one
without jurisdiction. It is evident from the facts of this case that the proceeding against the
petitioner was started by the Certificate Officer on the basis of form No.1 filed in his office by
the Sub-divisional Officer of Gopalganj and that form was filled in in accordance with the
direction given to the Sub-divisional Officer by the Government in its letter dated 20-2-1954.
That order by the Government, as already held above, being without jurisdiction, there could not
be in law any basis for the satisfaction of the Certificate Officer that any public demand payable
to the Collector was due and, therefore, the proceeding started by him under the Public Demands
Recovery Act on the basis of that order is undoubtedly void. It has, however, been contended
both by the learned Government Pleader and Mr. Tara Kishore Prasad that a writ of certiorari or
prohibition for such a relief at least at this stage is not maintainable and it should not be allowed.
Their point is that the question of invalidity of the proceeding can be raised and decided on an
objection before the Certificate Officer or in appeal before the appellate authority or in a separate
suit as provided in the Public Demands Recovery Act itself, and unless those remedies have been
exhausted no writ under Article 226 of the Constitution should be issued to quash the proceeding.
It is true that as a general rule a writ of certiorari or prohibition will not lie in such a case but as
held in the case of - 'Nazrna Khatoon v. R.P. Sinha1',
        "there is an exception in a case where the want of jurisdiction complained of is based
        upon the violation of some fundamental principle of justice. In such an exceptional case,
        the existence of a remedy by way of appeal or revision is no answer to an application
        asking for a writ of certiorari or prohibition."

In the present case in law there is no money due under the certificate and as such is not
recoverable by the Government under Section 20(1), Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal)
Act, 1950. Therefore, if despite that fact the proceeding for the realisation of money under a void
certificate is allowed to continue, it will only result in an unnecessary harassment of the petitioner
and the attachment of some of its properties or the attachment of the personal properties of any of
its directors and all this without any legal validity.

19. For the reasons stated above, I hold this is a fit case in which a writ of certiorari should issue
quashing the orders passed by the Labor Commissioner on 21-2-1953, and 29-4-1953, and the
order passed by the Government under Section 20, Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act,
1950 on 20-2-1954, as also the proceeding started by the Certificate Officer, Gopalganj, under
the Public Demands Recovery Act against the petitioner for the realization of Rs.23,790-1-3 on
the basis of the letter issued to him by the Government on 20-2-1954. Further the Certificate
Officer, Gopalganj, is prohibited to take any further action in the proceeding started by him
against the petitioner under the Public Demands Recovery Act.
20. The application is accordingly allowed but in the circumstances of the case no order for costs
is passed.

Ramaswami, J.

21. I agree.

Petition allowed.

Cases Referred.

1 AIR 1954 Pat 43