PUNJABA AND HARYANA HIGH COURT

                                            Desh Raj Parshotam Lal

                                                         Vs

                                                 State of Punjab

                                    Civil Writ Petition No. 2145 of 1978

                        (S.S. Sandhawalia, CJ. and P.C. Jain and S.S. Dewan, JJ.)

                                                   24.07.1978

                                                  JUDGMENT

S.S. Sandhawalia, C.J.

1. In this set of four Civil Writ Petition Nos. 2145, 2459 and 2191 of 1978 and No. 3316 of 1977,
the primary and indeed the only challenge laid is against the constitutional validity of Section
8(1), (2), (2A) and Section 9(2), (3) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as
the Act).

2. In view of what follows, it is wholly unnecessary to advert to the facts. It would, however,
suffice to mention that the primary consideration for placing these cases before the Full Bench
was the apparent conflict between the Single Bench decision of this Court in Malwa Sugar Mills
Co. Ltd. v. The Assessing Authority, Sangrur1 , and the subsequent Division Bench judgment
reported in Babu Ram Jagdish Kumar & Co. v. The State of Punjab and others2,.

3. Mr. R.C. Dogra and Mr. Shaukat Ali, appearing for the petitioners in all the four cases, have
frankly conceded their total inability to lay any challenge to the vires of Sections 8 and 9 of the
Act in face of the binding precedent of the Supreme Court. Both the learned counsel have very
fairly brought to our notice that in State of Tamil Nadu and another v. Sitalakshmi Mills and
others3, their Lordships of the Supreme Court repelled the twin challenge to their validity raised
on the basis of Article 301 of the Constitution of India and an argument of abdication of
legislative authority by Parliament. It has been fairly conceded that, in view of this judgment and
those referred to below, nothing now survives in the present cases.

4. All that now remains is to examine the correctness of the Single Bench judgment in Malwa
Sugar Mills' case (supra) because of the observations made on the 24th of May, 1978, by the
Motion Bench in Civil Writ Petition No. 2145 of 1978. It is evident on a reference to the said
judgment that the same was apparently decided as a matter of first impression and the binding
precedents of the earlier Supreme Court cases were not brought to the notice of the learned
Single Judge. Even otherwise, it is manifest that the issue was not adequately agitated and neither
principle nor authority has been adverted to in depth for arriving at the ultimate conclusion. The
significant thing then is that in the Division Bench judgment in Babu Ram Jagdish Kumar's case
(supra) later the issue was even considered exhaustively by the Division Bench and a wide
variety of challenges to the constitutionality of the provisions assailed therein was repelled. Mr.
Dogra further conceded that the identical argument raised earlier before the learned Single Judge
in Malwa Sugar Mills' case (supra) was raised before the Division Bench also and rejected in
terms as a contention having no substance. The significant thing is that the learned counsel for
the petitioners have not even remotely raised a single argument to assail the correctness of the
view expressed by the Division Bench in Babu Ram Jagdish Kumar's case (supra). It is wasteful
to traverse the same ground over again and agreeing with the Division Bench we overrule the
Single Bench judgment in Malwa Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The Assessing Authority, Sangrur.

5. Lastly, we may notice the recent Division Bench judgment of this Court in Civil Writ Petition
No. 6780 of 1976, decided on 21st July, 1978, wherein also an identical challenge directed
against the very provisions of Sections 8 and 9 of the Act has been repelled.

6. It calls for specific mention that not the least argument was raised to assail the validity of
Section 5 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act in Civil Writ petition Nos. 2145, 2459 and 2191
of 1978.

7. There is no merit at all in any of these writ petitions. All the four writ petitions are hereby
dismissed. However, in view of the very fair stand taken by the learned counsel for the
petitioners, we are disinclined to burden the petitioners with costs.

Petitions dismissed.

Cases Referred.

11976 R.L.R. 161
2(1976)33 S.T.C. 259
3(1974)33 S.T.C. 200