RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT

         Bhairon Dan

         Vs.

         State of Rajasthan

         Civil Writ Petition No. 31 of 1956
                (Dave and Modi, JJ.)

         09.08.1957

         JUDGMENT

Dave J.

1. These are two writ applications under Art. 926 of the Constitution of India. The first
one has been presented by Bhairodan and 15 others who are residents of the Bikaner
District, while the second one has been filed by Ram Bux and 8 others who are
residents of jodhpur City. Since common questions of law are involved in both the
applications, they are being disposed of together.

2. It is stated by the petitioners in both the applications that they deal in betel leaves
and that they have been asked by the Sales-Tax Officers, Bikaner and Jodhpur to
submit and furnish returns of their turnover for the prescribed period in the prescribed
form and manner as provided under section 7 of the Rajasthan Sales Fax Act (No XIX
of 1451) so that assessment. may be made under section 10 and the tax may be
recovered from them under section 11 of the said Act. It is urged by then that they are
not liable to pay sales-tax on the sale or turnover of the betel leaves on two grounds. In
the first place it is contended that the Rajasthan Sales Tax Bill was not introduced or
moved on the recommendation of the Rajpramukh as provided in Art. 207 of the
Constitution of India and therefore it is Tatra vices of the Constitution. Secondly, it is
contended that even if the sales Tax Act is held to be valid, the petitioners are exempt
from paving any tax because 'betel leaves' come under the category either of
'vegetables' or of plants which have been specifically exempted from payment of tax
under the Schedules appended to the said Act.

3. It is admitted by the non-petitioners that the petitioners deal in betel leaves and that
they have been asked by the sales Tax officers to submit and furnish their returns of
turnover. It is, however, contended that the Sales Tax (Act No. XIX of 1954) is quite
valid and that the petitioners are not entitled to claim any exemption under the said
Act.

4. Thus, the two questions which arise for determination in these petitions are :

       (i) whether the Sales Tax Act No. XIX of 19--4 (which will hereinafter be
       referred to as the Act) is invalid, and
       (ii) (in case point No. I is decided against the petitioners) whether the
       petitioners are exempt from paying any tax under the said Act.

5. To begin with the first point, learned advocates for the petitioners have urged that
the bill relating to the Rajasthan Sales Tax was a money bill as defined in Art. 199 of
the Constitution of India and therefore it could not be introduced or moved in the
Legislature except on the recommendation of the Rajpramukh as provided in the Art.
207 of Constitution. It is urged that the said bill was not introduced or moved on the
recommendation of the Rajpramukh that the constitutional provisions were thus
infringed and so the Act was invalid This allegation was denied in the reply filed by
the State of Rajasthan. In the first reply which was filed by non-petitioners, the denial
wat no doubt made in vague terms, but the learned Government Advocate has now
presented a definite reply saying that the bales Tax Bill of 1954 was introduced on the
recommendation of the Rujpramukh. He has even produced a true copy of the
recommendation made by the Rajpramukh on 13-9-1954. Under the circumstances,
the objection raised by the petitioners does not stand. We strongly disapprove the
petitioners' action in stating a wrong fact and making such allegation without any
basis. We may further point out that this objection of the petitioners could not stand
even if the fresh reply and copy of the said recommendation were not filed by the
Government Advocate in view of the provisions of Art. 255 of the Constitution, which
runs as follows : 'No Act of Parliament or of Legislature of a State specified in PArt A
or Part B of the First schedule, and no provision in any such Act, shall be invalid by
reason only that some recommendation or previous sanction required by this
Constitution was not given, if assent to that Act was given-

       (a) Where the recommendation required was that of the Governor, either by the
       Governor by the President;
       (b) Where the recommendation required was that of the Rajoramukh, either by
       the Rajpramukh or by the president;
       (c) Where the recommendation on previous sanction required was that of the
       President by the President

6. It is clear from the provisions of the said Article that in cases where the Constitution
required that a bill cannot be moved or introduced without the recommendation or
previous sanction of the President or the Governor or the Rajpramukn the Act would
not be invalid simply because such a recommendation or a previous sanction is not
made provided subsequent assent is given by that authority whose recommendation or
previous sanction was necessary or by the higher authority, namely the President. In
the present case it is common ground between the parties that this Act received the
assent of the President of India on 22nd December 195' as published in Rajasthan
Gazette Extraordinary, dated 30.12.1954. So even if we were to find that the bill was
not introduced or moved on the recommendation of the Rajpramukh we could not hold
the Act invalid since it had received the assent of the President of India.
The first objection has, therefore, no legs to stand and is fit to be dismissed .

7. Coming to the next objection raised by the petitioners it may be observed that the
decision thereof rests on the interpretation of two words appearing in Column 2 of the
Schedule appended to the Act which describes certain goods on which no tax-is
payable under that Act. Serial No. 2 of the Schedule under which the petitioners want
to bring their case runs as follows :-
'Fresh fruits, sugarcane, vegetables, and flower seeds, bulbous, plants excluding
onions and garlic, edible, tubers, vegetable orchids.

8. Learned Advocates for the petitioners have urged that the term 'vegetables' is very
wide in its meaning and the betel leaves are covered thereby They have referred to the
meaning of this word as given in Webster's New International Dictionary, Vol. 2, page
2823. It is as follows :

       'Vegetable-noun-a plant specifically in etc; also the edible part or parts of such
       common usage; a herbaceous plant cultivated plants, as prepared for market or
       table. for food as the cabbage, turnip, potato, bran There is no well-drawn
       distinction between vegetables and fruits in the popular sense ; but it has been
       held by the courts that all those which, like potatoes, carrots, peas, celery,
       lettuce. tomatoes etc., are eaten (whether cooked or raw) during the principal
       part of a meal are to be regarded as vegetables, while those used only for
       dessert are fruits.

9. It is true that the word 'vegetable' is used both in its vide as well as in its narrow
sense. In its wide sense it may embrace the entire vegetable kingdom and all kinds of
plants and fruits would also come under that term. But as pointed out in Webster's
Dictionary itself this word when used in Its narrower sense (in which it is generally
used in common parlance) means a herbaceous plant cultivated for food and even
fruits would fall outside its ambits. In our opinion the word vegetable has been used in
the Act in its narrower sense meaning those classes of vegetables which are grown in
kitchen gardens to supplement the food. This is clear from the language of Clause (2)
of the Schedule itself. It mentions fresh fruits, sugarcane, vegetables, onion and garlic
etc. at one place. If the word 'vegetables' were used in its comprehensive sense, every
other article mentioned in this clause could be covered by one word 'vegetables' and it
was unnecessary for the Legislature to make special mention of fresh fruits,
sugarcane, onions and garlic were also mentioned, shows that the word 'vegetable' was
used as meaning these vegetables which are grown in kitchen gardens and which are
used to supplement the food It may be pointed out that similar matter came for
discussion in Kokila Ram v. Province of Bihar, 1 and Madhya Pradesh Pan Merchants
Association v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2 Following the view expressed in the first
case, it was observed in the second case that the word 'vegetables' cannot be given the
comprehensive meaning which the term bears in natural history and has not been
given that meaning in taxing statutes before. The term 'vegetables' is to be understood
as commonly understood denoting those classes of vegetable matter which are grown
in kitchen gardens and are used for the table. There are numerous cases in which the
term vegetables' used in taxing statutes has .been expounded, and it has been held in
them that peanuts, cashewnuts, walnuts etc.. though vegetables in the botanical sense
are not vegetables in the common acceptance of the term (See Planters Nut and
Chocolate Co., Ltd. v. The King3 We respectfully agree with this observation. The
same view has been adopted in the case of Brahmanaed v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh,4 and Firm, Shri Krishna Chaudhw v. Commissioner of Sales-Tax U. P., 5 and
we see no good reason to take different view.

10. We have next to see whether 'betel leaves' are covered by the word 'plant' as urged
by the petitioners' learned counsel. In this connection it may be observed that some
difficulty has arisen on account of a difference in printing clause 2 in different editions
of the Act. For instance, in the Act which has been published in the Rajasthan
Gazette, dated 12-1954, the words used are 'bulbes and plants'. In another copy of the
Act Published by the Rajasthan Law V1'eeky, we find that the words used are
'bulbous, plants'. It is obvious that there is some printing mistake. There is no such
word in the Webster's Dictionary as 'bulbes' and it appears that the letter 'e' was
wrongly printed in the schedule given in the Rajasthan Gazette Extraordinary referred
to above. Similarly it appears that the publishers of the Rajasthan Law Weekly
converted the word 'bulb' into 'bulbous of their own accord The word "bulbes" being
obviously a misprint it was thought that the real word was 'bulbous' and that it was
used as an adjective to the word fallowing i. C. 'plant'. Orchids whether epiphytic or
terrestrial are both bulbous plants and on this kinship it was thought that the
legislature intended to exempt bulbous plants excluding orchids, members of the same
genera. It was also thought that this exemption was meant for such plants as are
generally grown in home gardens and are supplied by nurseries. It being doubtful that
the legislature wanted to exempt all plants whether g own in home gardens or fruit
orchards it was assumed that the legislature wanted to exempt only the first which are
supplied by the nurseries either in the shape of seeds or in the shape of bulbs or roots
e. g. lilies, cannas, dahlias, chrysanthemums, gladioli. The correct wording as
assumed h their Lordships is evidently liberal and more in consonance with the
general rules of interpretation. `Bulbous' is an adjective and not a noun and could not
be used in the schedule unless it was meant to qualify the noun 'plant' which follows
thereafter. If the Legislature meant to insert bulbous pant, then it would mean that it
only wanted to exempt those kinds of plants which are bulbous and not others. We see
no reason why the Legislature exempted bulbous plants only and thus it is clear that
the Legislature had used two words, namely 'bulbs' and 'plants' and it wanted to
excerpt both from the payment of the Sales-tax. Assuming, therefore, that the word
'plants' was not qualified by any adjective, we have to see if betel leaves can be
covered by this woad. It may be observed that every leaf of a slant is rot a plant itself.
In our opinion, the word 'plant' was used by the Legislature in the sense of a living
organism which could be planted or grown. It was connected by the learned counsel
themselves that betel leaves which are imported from outside cannot be planted like
shrubs or trees and therefore they cannot be taken to be plants.

11. Leaned counsels have urged in the end that if two constructions of a word are
possible, the one which leans in favor of the subject should be adopted by the Court.
In support of their contention, they have referred to State of Bombay v. R. S. Phadtare6
In that case the question which came for decision was whether 'sugarcane' was a fresh
vegetable which was exempted from the provisions of the Sales Tax Act. It was held
that ''sugarcane' did come within the meaning of the term 'fresh vegetables' and it was
further observed that if two constructions are possible in the taxing statute, the Court
should lean in favour of that construction which gives relief to the subject. We
respectfully agree with the above observation in principle that if two constructions of a
certain word or term in the taxing statute are possible the court should lean in favour
of that construction which gives relief to the subject. But in the present case we think
that two constructions are not possible. Looking to the scheme of the Schedule it is not
possible to include 'betel leaves' within the terms of 'vegetables' or 'plants'. As
observed in Kokila Ram v. Province of Bihar,7 `betel leaves' are generally used as
masticatory. They may sometimes be used as an aid to digestion or as a vehicle for
administering Ayurvedic medicines. But we have not yet heard of a betel leaf i.e.'pan'
being used as vegetable or as a plant anywhere. Under the circumstances, we think
that betel leaves are not exempted in the schedule of the Act and the writ applications
must, therefore, fail.

12. Before parting with the case, we may also decide one more point which has been
raised in the application. It has been urged that 'betel leaf' is an article of an essential
character, that it is consumed of all -lasses of people, that a levy of sales-tax on such
an article is against all canons of policy of taxation and, therefore, this court must give
relief to the petitioners. In this connection it would be enough to say that this Court
cannot lay down any law. It is true that same States, as for example U. P. seen to have
exempted this article from gales-tax as it appears from the judgment in Firm Shri
Krishna Chaudhary v. Commissioner of Sues tax U.P., but this is a matter which is to
be considered by the Legislature. We cannot give any relief to the petitioners on
extraneous considerations.

13. Both the applications thus fail and they are hereby dismissed with costs.
.
Cases Referred.

1. AIR 1951 Pat 367
2. (AIR 1956 Nag. 54)
3. (1952) 1 D.L.R., 385
4. (VII Sales Tax Cases 1956, Page 206)
5. (VII Sales Tax Cases 1956, P. 742)
6. (AIR 1956 Bom. 496)
7. (AIR 1951 Pat., 367)
8. (VII Sales Tax Cases 1956, P. 742)