RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT

                  Jagrup Singh

                  Vs.

                  State, (Rajasthan)

                  Civil Writ Petn. No. 1873 of 1990
                            (Rajesh Balia, J.)

                  18.02.1993

                  JUDGMENT

Rajesh Balia, J.

1. This petition pertains to ac-question of the petitioner's land situated at Chuck 2-e
Chhoti Tehsil and District Sri-ganganagar. This is second time that the petitioner has
come before this Court chal-lenging the notification dated 9th September, 1987, issued
under Section 4 of the Central Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as
'the Act'), annexed along with the petition as Annexure 4, and declaration under
Section 6 of the Act, dated 10-9-1987 (published in Gazette Extraordinary dated 11-9-
1987), covering the land comprised in the noti-fication Annexure 4, which has been
annexed as Annexure 5, to the writ petition. The public purpose for which the land in
question is sought to be acquired, so stated to be in these annexures, is that the land in
question is required for construction of sewerage plant and strips, within the
Municipal Council, Sriganganagar. In the first instance, after publication of
notification under Section 4 of the Act, which was published on 11-9-1987, in the
Official Gazette; the petitioner's co-licensee received a notice dated 11-9-1987 on 25-
9-1987, purported to have been issued by the Land Acquisition Officer, Sriganganagar
under Section 9 of the Act. The petitioner filed writ petition, number - - Brij Mohan
Narain v. Land Acquisition Officer1 and others; challenging the acquisition
proceedings. After filing of the writ petition, the declaration dated 10-7- 1987 under
Section 6 read with Section 17(4) of the Act, was published in the Official Gazette, on
8-10-1987. The earlier writ petition was filed on 3-10-1987. In the said writ petition, a
prayer was made that the respondents may be restrained from publishing the
declaration under Section 6 in pursuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act of
1894.
2. The aforesaid writ petition along with other writ petitions came to be decided by a
Division Bench of this Court, by a common judgment dated 2-8- 1988. It was held that
notice under Section 9 having been issued before publication of the declaration under
Section 6, was invalid. Until decision of the writ petition, declaration under Section 6
was published only in the Official Gazette dated 8-10-1987, and had not been
published in the two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land was
situated, of which at least one had to be in the regional language and the Collector had
also not caused public notice of the substance of such declaration, to be given at
convenient places in the locality in which the land was situated. On a statement
having been made on behalf of learned counsel for the respondents, that before
proceeding further in the acquisition matter, the publication of the declaration shall be
carried out in terms of Section 6(2) of the Act and it is only after compliance with the
provisions of Section 6 that the land in question will be acquired. The Court disposed
off the matter, by quashing the notice under Section 9 of the Act, issued by the
Collector, as noticed above, and directed the respondents to comply with the
provisions of Section 6(2) of the Act, concerning publication of declaration within 2
months. The publication of declaration under Section 6 was not made within 2 months'
period, as fixed by the aforesaid judgment but ultimately, the declaration was
published on 15th January, 1990, in a Hindi daily "Sima Sandesh" and in an another
local daily "Lok Sammat".

3. The petitioner has filed this writ peti-tion challenging land acquisition proceedings
once again. In the writ petition, the petitioner has raised very many grounds,
challenging the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act as well as
declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894.
The principal contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioner are as under :

       (1) That the acquisition proceedings have been resorted to for the fulfillment of
       a public purpose namely construction of a sewerage plant. Said public purpose
       does not exist inasmuch as the scheme, for the implementation of which the
       land is being sought to be acquired has not yet been framed, therefore, no
       notification under Section 4 could have been published. The issuance of
       notification is clearly colorable exercise of powers. For this proposition, learned
       counsel relied on State of Tamil Nadu v. A. Mohammed Yousef, (1991) 4 SCC
       224 and a decision of this Court rendered in S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6399
       of 1991 - Bapiya v. State of Rajasthan, dated 15-10-1992.
       (2) That the alleged scheme for which the land in question is being acquired is
       against the Master Plan approved for Sriganganagar and, therefore, the land
       could not have been acquired for the implementation of the pur-ported purpose
       disclosed in the notification. For this reason also re-course to acquisition
       proceedings in the present case is colorable exercise of power. Learned counsel
       in support of his contention relied on Doman Paswan v. State of Bihar, 2
       (3) That the publication of declaration having not been made in accordance with
       the provisions of Section 6(2) either within the time prescribed by the Court in
       its judgment dated 28-8-1988 or, within the time prescribed by Statute under
       Section 6(1) of the Act; the acquisition proceedings stand lapsed and a belated
       compliance of Section 6(2) cannot revive the already lapsed acquisition pro-
       ceedings.
       (4) That, at any rate, the public purpose for which the land is being acquired, do
       not now exist, and, therefore; the land acquisition proceedings must be quashed.

4. Learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. N. P. Gupta, raised a preliminary objection
as to the maintainability of the writ petition. He contended that the validity of
notification under Section 4 as well as declaration under Section 6 was in challenge in
the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner and all the contentions which have been
raised or ought to have been raised as to the validity of notification under Section 4
and declaration under Section 6, cannot now be permitted to be raised again, in view
of earlier decision of this Court in which only partial relief was granted to the
petitioner by quashing notice under Section 9 of the Act and by giving direction to the
respondents to comply with the provisions of Section 6(2) regarding publication of
notice within one month. He relied on decision in Brij Mohan v. State of Rajasthan 3

5. So far as the preliminary objection is concerned, it holds good as far as contentions
Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned, which to the validity of initiating land acquisition pro-
ceedings at all, by publishing notification under Section 4 of the Act. In Brij Mohan's
case (supra), it has already been held in. a writ petition arising out of these very land
acquisi-tion proceedings, that in view of decision dated 22-8-1988, the petitioner is
precluded from raising issues concerning validity of notification under Section 4 or of
declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894. However, that is only in relation to the
stage of proceedings, so far as it is preceding the stage of compliance of provisions of
Section 6 is concerned. Since, compliance of Section 6 was not made and the Court
has directed the respondents to proceed further after com- plying with the provisions
of Sub-Section (2) of Section 6 in accordance with law; it cannot be said that whether
the provisions of Section 6 have been complied with in accordance with law or not,
were subject matter of decision in earlier writ petition. Since it was common ground
that the compliance of provisions of Section 6 were not complete at the relevant time;
the question whether the provisions of Section 6 have been complied with and whether
the alleged compliance of the pro-visions of Section 6 is in accordance with law or not
could neither have been raised nor decided at that stage.

6. The contention No. 3 raised by learned counsel for the petitioner very much survive
for decision. Learned counsel for the re-spondents put reliance on Brij Mohan's case
(supra), for the purpose of persuading this Court not to entertain the contention No. 3
as well. I am afraid, this contention of learned counsel for the respondent cannot be
ac-cepted; firstly - the decision in Brij Mohan's case (supra) is not binding on the
present petitioner. It cannot also be of any assistance to the respondents as a
precedence as it appears from the judgment that the conten-tions which have been
raised presently before me, were neither raised nor decided in Brij Mohan's case
(supra). Therefore, the conten-tion No. 3 will have to be examined and decided on
merits.

7. Coming to the merits of the case, learned counsel for the respondent Mr. N. P.
Gupta, urged that there is no requirement of law that publication of declaration under
Section 6 should be made within the year of the publication of notification under
Section 4 of the Act, as stipulated under Section 6(1) of the Act. He contends that the
publication of declaration under Section 6 is relevant only for the provisions
succeeding Section 6(2) and have no relevance to Section 6(1). In this context, he
further contended that what is required by Section 6(1) is that a declaration has to be
made under the signature of the Secretary to the Government within 1 year of the
publication of notification under Section 4 and it does not require that declaration
should be published within 1 year. He contends that there difference between 'mak-
ing'of a declaration and 'publication' of a declaration. According to learned counsel,
'making of declaration' is complete as soon as it is signed by the Secretary to the
Govern-ment. In the present case, the signature of the Secretary was, undoubtedly,
placed on the declaration within 1 year of the date when notification under Section 4
was published and, therefore, the proceedings cannot be held to have lapsed merely
because the 'publication' as required by Section 6(2), was made after lapse of 1 year
from the relevant date. He further contended that Section 6(2) envisages publication of
declaration by 3 different modes, namely - (i) in the official Gazette, (ii) in two daily
newspapers, one of which must be in the regional language in the locality; and (iii) by
Collector causing the public notice of the substance of such de-claration, to be given at
convenient places at the said locality. The 'publication' in any one mode is sufficient
compliance for the purpose of Section 6(1), even if it he held that making of a
declaration within its ambit includes its publication. It is apparent that the declara-tion
was published in the Official Gazette on 8-10-1987, that is to say, within the time
prescribed under Section 6(1) and merely because the 'publication' through other
modes was carried out beyond period of one year from the relevant date, will not
invalidate the land acquisition proceedings. He places reliance on Umesh Aggarwal v.
State of U.P., 4 Lt. K. Padmadas v. State of Kerala, 5 and on Shivgonda Balgonda Patil
v. The Director of Resettlement, 6 He also referred to Mangal Singh v. State of
Haryana, reported in 7

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. K. N. Joshi, joins issue with learned counsel
for the respondent about the aforesaid con-tention. He contends that 'publication of a
declaration' in accordance with provisions of Section 6(2) is integral part of 'making of
a declaration', and, it cannot be read in isola-tion and independent of provisions of
Section 6(1). He contends that unless a declaration is published in accordance with the
statutory provisions, it cannot be considered a declara-tion at all and, therefore, a
declaration can be said to have been 'made', only when it is signed by the Secretary to
the Government, as required by Section 6(1) and is made public by publication in
accordance with the provisions of Section 6(2). According to Section 6(2), date of
publication is the last of the dates of its publication and giving of public notice.
Undisputedly, the last of the dates of publication in the present case fall much beyond
the period of 1 year from the date of notification under Section 4, even after excluding
the period during which the proceedings re-mained pending in this Court and further
proceedings were stayed by the orders of this Court. In support of his proposition,
learned counsel for the petitioner relies on a decision of Supreme Court in The
Collector (Distt. Magistrate), Allahabad v. Raja Ram, Jaiswal, 8 The State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma, 9 Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 10
and Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay (now Maha-rashtra), 11

9. Since the controversy revolves round the true import of provisions of Section 6, it
would be apposite to re-produce here relevant portion of Section 6 of the Act of 1894,
as it stood when the impugned notification Annx. 4 and declaration Annx. 5 were
issued, which reads as under:

       "6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose.
       (1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the appropriate
       Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under Section
       5A, Sub-Section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or
       for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of
       a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorized to certify its
       orders, and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of
       different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under Section 4,
       Sub-Section (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or
       have been made (wherever required) under Section 5-A, Sub-Section (2) :
       Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a
       notification under Section 4, Sub-Section (1), -
       (i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment
       and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967), but before the commencement of
       Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made from the date of
       publication of notification; or
       (ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment)
       Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of
       publication of the notification :
       Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation
       to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly
       out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.
       (2) Every declaration shall be published in the Official Gazette, and in two daily
       news-papers circulating in the locality in which the land is situate of which at
       least one shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall cause public
       notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at convenient places in
       the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such
       public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of publication of the
       declaration), and such declaration shall state the district or other territorial
       division in which it is needed, its approximate area, and, where a plan shall
       have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected.
       (3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for
       a public purpose or for a Company, as the case may be; and, after making such
       declaration, the appropriate Government may acquire the land in manner
       hereinafter appearing."

10. It would be relevant and necessary to notice the scheme of the acquisition proceed-
ings, as it stood originally and, as the same have come to stand after relevant
legislative amendments from time to time; in order to understand the inter-relation of
various pro-visions of the Act, how the matter stood before the amendment, and what
was the mischief for which the earlier provision did not provide any remedy which
was provided by the amendments
.
11. The acquisition proceedings com-mences with the publication of a notification
under Section 4 of the Act whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that the
land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed, for any public purpose. Such
notification was required to be published in two modes only, before the amendment of
Section 4 by the Land Acquisition (Amend- ment) Act, 1984, came into force. The
modes provided for publication were - publication in the Official Gazette and
publication of substance of the notification in any con-venient part of the locality. The
notification under Section 4 authorizes any officer of the Government, who is
generally or specially authorized by the Government in this behalf; to carry out
preliminary investigation about the land in respect of which notification under Section
4 is issued. It also gives an opportunity to those persons who are having interest in the
land covered by such notification to raise objections, if any, to the acquisition of their
land before the appro-priate authority. The next step in the acquisi-tion proceedings is
hearing of objections of any person interested in any land which has been notified
under Section 4 by the Collector and submission of Collector's report to the
appropriate Government for its decision in terms of Section 5-A of the Act. After
decision of the appropriate Government on objections, the stage is reached where, if
the appropriate Government is satisfied after considering the report, if any, made
under Section 5-A that any particular land is needed for a public purpose or for a
Company; a declaration is to be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary
to such Govern-ment under Section 6(1) of the Act. Such declaration is required to be
published in the Official Gazette and the Collector is required to cause public notice of
the substance of such declaration to be given at the convenient places in the said
locality in which the land is situated. Such declaration is to be treated conclusive
evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as the case
may be, as per the provisions or Section 6(3) of the Act. Thereafter, the Collector,
after obtaining orders from appropriate Government to acquire the land under Section
7, and giving notice to persons interested, is to pass an award under Section 11,
determining the compensation. The Gov-ernment could proceed to acquire a land only
after declaration under Section 6(1) has been made. After the declaration under
Section 6 has been made, notice under Section 9 is required to be issued to the persons
in-terested, stating that the Government intends to take possession of the land, that
claim for compensation for all interest may be made to the Collector. Such notices are
required to be issued to the occupant of the land as well as to any person who has been
found to be a person interested in land during the land acquisition proceedings carried
out hereinbefore, and the Collector is also required to issue a public notice to that
effect. After the notices under Section 9 have been issued under Section 11 of the Act,
the Collector is required to inquire into the objections, if any, which any person
interested may have in pursuance of notice under Section 9 to the measurements made
under Section 8 and, into the value of the land, on the date of publication of
notification under Section 4; and into the respective interests of the persons claiming
compensation and, the Collector was to make an award under his hand. It may be
noticed that in terms of Section 11 read with Sections 23(1) first and Section 24
seventhly of the Act, the date of publication of notification under Section 4 is the
relevant date for the purpose of determining the market value of the land for the
purpose of making an award about the compensation to be paid to the persons
interested in the land.

12. It may also be noticed that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act initially did
not provide any time limit for making of a declaration under Section 6, after
notification under Section 4 was published, and it also did not provide any time limit
for making of an award, after declaration under Section 6 had been published. At the
same time, once notification under Section 4 was published, in terms of provisions of
Section 11 read with Section 23 of the Act, the compensation to be determined under
the Act was pegged at the level of market price prevailing on the date of publication of
notification under Section 4; irrespective of any time-lag between the notification
under Section 4 and the actual acquisition, the determination and payment of
compensation. This anomaly leads to many judicial pro-nouncements that though
delay in making of declaration under Section 6 after publication of notification under
Section 4 and making of award after publication of declaration under Section 6 by
itself does not invalidate the land acquisition proceedings, but is by itself or coupled
with other circumstances may lead to inference that the issuance of notification under
Section 4 followed by inordinate delay in completion of land acquisition proceedings
was a colorable exercise of powers to peg down the price of the land for the purpose of
determining compensation at some future date; though no real need of acquiring the
land existed, for initiating land acquisition proceedings, which may lead to striking
down of the land acquisition proceedings. However, burden of proving that delay in
completion of acquisition proceedings was inordinate and unjustified and
responsibility rests with the Government, lay on the person who chal-lenges the
acquisition proceedings on that ground.

13. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma, 12 the issue of inordinate
delay in completing the land acquisition proceedings in pursuance of notification
under Section 4 came up before their Lordships of Supreme Court, in a matter where
for a parcel of land, which was notified for acquisition under Section 4, successive
declarations under Section 6 were made for acquiring different pieces of the parcel of
land covered by notification under Section 4, Wanchoo, J. speaking for himself and on
behalf of Mudholkar, J., observed (paras 13 and 14) :

       ".......The importance of a notification under Section 4 is that on the issue of
       such notification the land in the locality to which the notification applies is in a
       sense freezed. This freezing takes place in two ways. Firstly, the market value
       of the land to be acquired has to be determined on the date of the notification
       under Section 4(1) : (See Section 23(1) firstly). Secondly, under outlay or
       improvements on or disposal of the land acquired commenced, made or effected
       without the sanction of the Collector after the date of publication of the
       notification under Section 4(t) cannot be taken into consideration at all in
       determining compensation : (See Section 24, seventhly).
       ...........Two things are plain when we come to consider the construction of
       Sections 4, 5-A and 6. The first is that the Act provides for acquisition of land
       of persons without their consent and though compensation is paid for such
       acquisition; the fact however remains that land is acquired without the
       circumstances which must be borne in mind when we come to consider the
       question raised before us. In such a case the provisions of statute must be
       strictly constructed as it deprives a person of his land without his consent.
       Secondly, in interpreting these pro-visions the Court must keep in view on the
       one hand the public interest which compels such acquisitive and on the other
       interest of the person who is being deprived of his land without his
       consent........On the other hand, as the compensation has to be determined with
       reference to the date of the notification under Section 4(1) the person whose
       land has to be acquired may stand to lose if there is a great delay between the
       notification under Section 4(1) and the notification under Section 6 in case
       prices have risen in the meantime......."

(emphasis supplied)
Sarkar, J., in his concurring judgment repelling the contention that successive de-
clarations under Section 6 can be made so as not to put extra cost on the Government
Exchequer, observed (para 3) :

       "....If it is a justification of saying that a number of declarations can be made
       under Section 6 because otherwise the Government may have to pay more, it
       seems to me that it is at least an equal justification for saying that such
       declarations cannot have been contem-plated by the Act because that would
       mean an avoidable deprivation of the owners of their beneficial enjoyment of
       lands till such time as the Government is able to make its plan. As the Act is an
       expropriatary Act, that inter-pretation of it should be accepted which puts the
       least burden on the expropriated owner........"

In Krishna Iyyer v. State of Madras, 13 relying on the observations made in State of
M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad (supra), learned Judge of the High Court came to the conclusion
that though Statute does not prescribe any time limit for issuing declaration under
Section 6(1), after notification under Section 4(1) or far passing of an award at a
subsequent stage; it does not deprive the aggrieved party of a remedy where undue
prolongation of the proceedings has operated in an oppressive manner on the owner of
the land. Similar view was taken by the High Courts of Gujarat, and Punjab and
Haryana.
14. With the aforesaid back-drop, for the first time, through Land Acquisition
(Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967 (hereinafter, called 'the Act of 1967'), before
the existing proviso to Section 6(1), the proviso in the following terms was inserted :

               "...................

       Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a
       notification under Section 4, Sub-Section (1), published after the
       commencement of the Land Ac-quisition (Amendment and Validation) Or-
       dinance, 1967, shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of
       such publication.
       Provided further that.........."

By the above quoted proviso, the Act prohibited any declaration under Section 6 to be
made after the expire of three years from the date of publication of notification under
Section 4. The Act of 1967 did not further provide any time limit to complete the stage
subsequent to making of declaration. In that state of affairs, the relevancy of
declaration under Section 6 remained as serving con-clusive proof of the fact that the
Government is duly satisfied, after an enquiry at which parties concerned are heard,
that the land in consideration is really needed for public purpose. In that view of the
matter, the anomaly, for removing of which the amend-ment was made, remained
unaffected.

In the scheme of the Act, as it came to exist after the Act of 1967, while interpreting
the provision, of Section 6(1), as amended, it was held that no time-limit has been
prescribed for notification under Section 6 of the principal Act and what has been
prohibited is confined to declaration, 'made' been and the specified period.

15. Thereafter, the land Acquisition Act was further amended, through the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (herein-after called 'the Act of 1984'), which
brought amendments in the provisions of Sections 4, 6, and 11 and also inserted
Section 11-A, all of which have vital bearing on the question of scope of Section 6 in
the light of the Scheme of -the Act, as it exists now. For the present purpose, it would
be necessary to analyze the provisions, as they existed before the Act of 1967; as they
existed after the Amendment Act of 1967 but before the Act of 1984, and as they exist
now; after the commencement of Act of 1984 - in comparable manner.

16. The principal change in the Land Acquisition Act, which has been brought about
by the amendments, for the present purposes, is that the Land Acquisition Act before
the Amendment Act of 1967, did not provide any time- frame within which pro-
ceedings of acquiring the land and determining the compensation were to be
completed, though the compensation amount was pegged to the prices prevailing on
the date of issuance of notification under Section 4, which resulted in undue long
delays in completion of land acquisition proceedings, to harassment and oppression of
the owners, whose land was being acquired compulsorily. When the an-omalous
situation and inherent potentiality of abuse came to fore, through various decisions of
the courts, to suppress the mischief due to lack of any provision about time-limit for
completing the acquisition proceedings, which resulted in oppressive operation of
statute due to pegging down the compensation payable to the market value existing on
the date of notification under Section 4; in the first instance, the Legislative intervened
and amended Section 6, by prohibiting making of any declaration after 3 years of the
publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act. However, still no time-frame for
completing the land acquisition proceedings after a declaration under Section 6 was
made, was provided; not the relevance of prescribing a date which should be deemed
to be date of publication of declaration under Section 6 was felt necessary to be
provided. Declaration under Section had only one relevance of providing conclusive
proof of existence of need for acquiring land for public purpose. It carried no
relevance for the purpose of having a time-frame for completion of acquisition
proceedings, culminating in passing of an award in respect of land sought to be
acquired. The mischief intended to be suppressed, continued.

17. In order to suppress that mischief, comprehensive amendment was made in 1984,
by the Act of 1984, providing separate time lag for each stage of proceedings within
which land acquisition proceedings are to be completed, in culmination making of an
award. The time frame provided under the present provisions is that a declaration
under Section 6 is to be made within one year of the publication of notification under
Section 4 and, thereafter, an award has to be made within a period of 2 years from the
date of publication of the declaration. Consequence, in either case, is fatal to the land
acquisition proceedings, about which there is no dispute.

18. A comparison of the relevant pro-visions, as they govern the acquisition
proceedings from time to time would make it clear that while notification under
Section 4 continues to remain the starting point for preliminary investigation and
laying the foundation for acquisition proceedings, and the relevant date for
determining the com-pensation for the purpose of arriving at the market price of the
land under acquisition and excluding the improvement and additions to the structures
from being included in determination of compensation, remains the date of publication
of notification under Section 4; there has been change in the mode of publication of
declaration under Sections 4, and 6, there is change in the relevance of declaration
under Section 6 from being confined to the mere proof of existence of public purpose;
provision has been made as to what shall be the date of publication, as more than one
mode of publication were being prescribed and, a time limit was also pre-scribed
under Section 11-A of the Act for making an award under : Section 11, after making of
declaration under Section 6 of the Act.

19. The relevance of declaration under Section 6 which was confined to serve proof of
existence of public purpose for the ac-question of land in question was extended to
provide a starting point of limitation for making an award in a total time frame
provided for completing the land acquisition proceedings, starting from the point of
publication of notification under Section 4, until passing of an award under Section 11.
The making of a declaration under Section 6 now serves 3-fold purposes, under the
Scheme of the Act - (a) it furnishes a conclusive evidence that the land is needed for
public purpose; (b) it is only after making of such declaration that the appropriate
Government may acquire the land, in the manner provided thereafter, that is to say, in
the manner provided under the Act, succeeding Section 6 (as per Section 6(3)), and (c)
the declaration also furnishes a starting point for limitation within which an award of
compensation is to be made.

20. It is in the light of aforesaid back-drop of the changing scheme of the Act from
time to time that provisions of Section 6 as are existing today after the Amendment
Act of 1984, has to be construed and, in my opinion, any precedent which have dealt
with the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, before the Act of 1984, does not directly
cover the issue raised in this petition.
21. It is well known principle of con-struction for interpreting provisions of such
remedial provisions of Statute, that courts are to make such construction as shall
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy and also suppress subtle intervention
and evasions in continuance of the mischief.

22. In Heydon's case (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7-a, it was resolved by the Barons of the
Exchequer "that for the sure and true inter-pretation all statutes in general (be they
penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be
discerned and considered : (1st). What was the common law before the making of the
Act. (2nd). What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not
provide. (3rd). What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the
disease of the com- monwealth. And, (4th). The true reason of the remedy; and then
the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the
mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle intervention and evasions,
for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commondo, and to add force and life
to the cure and remedy, according to true intent of makers of the Act, pro bono
publico."

This dictum has since then acquired the statuts of classic on the subject.

23. The principle has been quoted with approval by the Constitution Bench of Sup-
reme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar,14 The principle has since
been reiterated in a catena of decisions of Supreme Court in succeeding reports.
Recently, in Good-year India v. State of Haryana 15 Mukerjee, J. observed (at p. 789
of AIR):

       "In my opinion, the High Court correctly noted in the said decision that the
       provisions of constitutional change have to be construed, and such problems
       should not be viewed in narrow isolationism but on a much wider spectrum and
       the principles laid down in Heydon's case (1584) 3 Co-Rep 7a) are
       instructive......, and find out what was the mischief that was sought to be
       remedied and then discover the true rationale for such a remedy. In Black-
       Clawason International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg Ag.16 Lord
       Reid observed as follows (All England Reporter p. 814) :"One must first read
       the words in the context of the Act as a whole, but one is entitled to go beyond
       that. The general rule in construing any document is that one should put one self
       'in the shoes' of the maker or makers and take into account relevant facts known
       to them when the document was made. The same must apply to Acts of
       Parliament subject to one qualification. An Act is addressed to all the lieges and
       it would seem wrong to take into account anything that was not public
       knowledge at the time. That may be common knowledge at the time or it may
       be some published information which Parliament can be presumed to have had
       in mind.
       It has always been said to be important to consider the 'mischief' which the Act
       was apparently intended to remedy. The word 'mischief' is traditional. I would
       expand it in this way. In addition to reading the Act you look at the facts
       presumed to be known to Parliament when the Bill which become Act in
       question was before it, and you consider whether there is disclosed some
       unsatisfactory state of affairs which Parliament can properly be supposed to
       have intended to remedy by the Act."
24. The principle, that reasonable con-struction should be followed and literal
construction should be avoided, if that defeats the manifest object and purpose of the
Act, was further reiterated with approval, in Hotel Balaji v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 17

25. Keeping the above well-settled prin-ciples of interpreting a statute, I may examine
the present case by considering how the matter stood immediately before the amend-
ment in various provisions of the Act, having inter-relation, came into force; what was
the mischief - for which the earlier provisions did not provide and, remedy which
should be provided by the amendment, to cure the mischief.

26. It has been discussed above, that the amendments in Sections 4, 6 and 11 have
been brought and Section 11-A has been inserted, to suppress the mischief that may be
caused due to prolonged delay in completion of land acquisition proceedings, which
resulted in undue harassment of citizens, who were being deprived of their land
compulsorily by peg-ging the market value of land to the date of notification under
Section 4 for the purpose of determining compensation under the Act; by providing a
time-frame for completion of each stage. If the contention raised by the respondents is
to be accepted, it would result in that event after providing for time-frame, for making
a declaration under Section 6 after publication of notification under Section 4, and
further time-limit for making an award after publication of declaration under Section
6; the period between signing of declaration and its publication, remain unprovided by
any time limit and the resultant position would be the same, that after signing of the
declaration it may not be published at all or, is published after considerable long
period, without affecting the validity of the land acquisition proceedings.

Not only that, even in cases where publica-tion of declaration under Section 6 is made
in one or more modes, provided under Section 6(2), but not in all the modes provided
under Section 6(2) and such publication is kept in abeyance for indefinite period so as
to keep the time limit for completion of award also in abeyance, for indefinite period,
inasmuch as, Section 6(2) clearly provides that last of the dates of such publication
and giving of such public notice shall be the date of publication of declaration; and,
the limitation for making of an award is stated to be from the date of publication of
declaration under Section 6. Section 6(2) provides 3 modes of publication of
declaration, namely, publication in Official Gazette, publication in two daily papers
circulating in the locality in which the land is situated and of which at least one shall
be in the regional language; and lastly, the Col- lector shall cause public notice of the
sub-stance of such declaration to be given at the convenient places in the said locality.
All the publications are not required to be simultaneous, that is to say, publication in
different modes can be at different times. Last of the dates of such publication is to be
treated the date of publication of declaration. Accepting the contention of the
respondents would mean that it would be possible for the administration to sign a
declaration, publish in one or two modes and keep publication of one mode in
abeyance indefinitely and, thereby, making of an award be put in abeyance inasmuch
as limitation for making of an award under Section 11-A, according to the
respondents, would not commence at all until publication in all the modes have not
been made. This would be nullifying the very object for which the amendments have
been brought to suppress the mischief.

27. The only exception to the principle of Heydon's case (1584-3 Co. Rep. 7a), as
approved by their Lordships of Supreme Court, is that in applying the principle of
Mischief Rule, in interpreting the statute, it must always be borne in mind that
foremost and primary rule of construction is that the intention of Legislature must be
found in the words used in the legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one
construction only, then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other
hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with
the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provision of
the Statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when
such words are capable of two con-structions, that the question of giving effect to the
policy of or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are
capable of two constructions, one of such is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the
Act while the other construction is likely to assist the achievements of said policy, the
courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction. [see Kanai Lal Sur v. Param-nidhi
Sadhu Khan, 18

28. Can it be said that the only possible construction of the language used in Section
6(1) is one suggested by the respondents on the basis of difference in the meaning of
words "made" and "published". In this connection, it is to be noticed that a scrutiny of
Section 6(1) goes to show that first part of Section 6(1) envisages the satisfaction of
the appropriate Government after considering the report, if any, made under Section 5-
A(2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose. Once this satisfaction is
arrived at by the Government, a declaration of having reached such satisfaction is to
be made under the signatures of Secretary to such Government or of other officer duly
authorized certified orders. Now, the crucial words are - "declaration shall be made".
The words "shall be made", cannot be divorced from the word "declaration". "Shall be
made", is a verb, whose object is a "declaration", as to the satisfaction of the
Government that the land is needed for a public purpose. It is to be noticed that the
words used are not, making of an 'order' by the appropriate Government. The
interpretation of Section 6 cannot be based merely on the word "made". Therefore,
before inter-prating the word "shall be made", in contradiction to "published", it would
be necessary to see what the object "declaration", which is a 'noun' means, in its plain
grammatical form. It may also be said that "declaration" is a noun and its
corresponding verb is "to declare".

29. For meanings of words "declaration" and "to declare", in Webster's Third New
International Dictionary (Unabridged); the meaning of "declaration" has been said to
be :

       "the act of declaring, proclaiming, or publicly announcing : explicit assertion :
       formal proclamation".

The word "declare" has been stated to mean :

       "to make known publicly; announce, pro-claim or publish, especially by a
       formal statement or official pronouncement; com-municate to others".

According to Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. III, "declaration" means :
               "announcing openly, explicitly or for-mally, positive statement or
               assertion; an assertion, announcement or proclamation in emphatic,
               solemn, or legal terms."

Likewise, the verb "declare" stated to mean :

       "To make known or state publicly, for-mally, or in explicit terms; to assert,
       proclaim, announce or pronounce by formal statement or in solemn terms."

Likewise, the Random House Dictionary of the English Language (The Unabridged
Edition), also gives the similar meaning to the term "declaration" and "declare".
According to it, "declaration" means :

      "a positive, explicit, or formal statement, proclamation : something that is
      announced avowed, or proclaimed : a document em-bodying an announcement
      or proclamation."

A verb "declare" is stated to mean :

       "to make known clearly, especially in explicit or formal terms : to announce
       offi-cially; proclaim : to manifest; reveal; show : aver, asseverate, state : making
       something known emphatically, openly or formally; to make known, sometimes
       in the face of actual or potential contradiction."

The Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, at p. 368, explains the word "declare" as
under :

       "To make known, manifest, or clear. To signify, to show in any manner either by
       words or acts. To publish, to utter; to announce clearly some opinion or
       resolution.."

30. Thus, even according to literal dictionary meaning of word "declaration", as
noticed above, it includes the act of making known or proclaiming the contents of such
declaration for the purpose of making it known to others. In the context of statutory
declaration, like the one contemplated under Section 6 of the Act, it appears to be the
only appropriate meaning. The plain literal mean-ing 'proclaiming' is also to announce
or to declare, in an official or formal manner, or, to announce or declare publicly or
officially. If, keeping in view the above literal meaning of term "declaration", the
language of Section 6 is read in terms of its meaning :

       "a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signatures of Secretary to
       such Government or........"

would literally read in its synonymous terms :

       "when the appropriate Government is satisfied.....that any particular land is
       needed for a public purpose or for a Company, such satisfaction shall be made
       known or pro-claimed under the signatures of Secretary 20 such Government or
       of some other officer duly authorized to certify its orders.(Emphasis supplied)."

Thus, literal meaning of the phrase - "declaration shall be made to such effect", would,
necessarily include within its ambit, not only the act of signing the document but also
making it known officially or publicly by some form of announcing or publication.

31. If that be the literal interpretation of Section 6(1), of the phrase "declaration shall
be made", Section 6(2). merely provides the modes of "making known or proclaiming
officially to general public" about the satis- faction of the Government regarding any
particular land being needed for the public purpose. This interpretation conforms to
the rule of literal interpretation, without violating the plain language used by the
Legislature. In my opinion, this interpretation also fulfils the object of suppressing the
mischief for which the amendment brought about by the Act of 1984, inasmuch as, it
does not leave any gap unprovoked for by the time limit within which the land
acquisition proceedings have to be completed.

32. In support of his proposition that the language of Sub-Sections (1) and (2) of
Section 6 suggests two steps, to be taken - the first step, which is to be taken by the
appropriate Government, is to make a declaration to that effect that the land is needed
for a public purpose and; the second step is, to cause a declaration to be published;
and, that law does not require the stage of publication of declaration to be completed
within one year of the publication of notification under Section 4 but requires merely
signing of a declaration within the time prescribed; learn-ed counsel for the respondent
relied on Umesh Aggrawal v. State of U.P. 19 and Shivgonda Balgonda Patil v. The
Director of Resettlement, 20 No doubt these two decisions support the contention raised
by learned counsel for the respondent, However, I respectfully regret my inability to
agree with the view expressed in the two decisions, for the reasons discussed above. It
appears that it was not brought to the notice of learned Judges of the respective High
Courts that the literal meaning of 'making of a declaration' within its ambit includes
'the act of making it known with announcement or proclamation' and, nor it was
brought to the notice that the interpretation suggested on behalf of the State, would
defeat the object with which the amendment in the Land Acquisition Act was brought
about by the Act of 1984. Mangal Singh's case (1990 LACC 363), is besides the issue
raised in the present case. It dealt with a case in which a corrigendum was issued,
correcting certain discrepancies in the 1st declaration under Section 6. The question
arose, as to which should be taken to be date of publication of declaration - of the first
declaration, or, of the corrigendum. No such issue is involved in the present case.

33. The relevancy of publication of de-claration under Section 6, under the existing
scheme of the Act, prior to amendment of 1984, was considered to be only for the
purpose of providing proof of the existence of declaration for the purpose of raising
pre-sumption of conclusiveness as to the existence of public purpose for acquiring the
land. The decision of their Lordships of Supreme Court in Khadim Hussain v. State of
U.P., 21 also does not help the cause of the respondents, inasmuch as, that was the
decision rendered in the scheme of the Act, as it existed before the amending Act of
1984 came into force and, in the then existing scheme, the relevancy of publication of
declaration under Section 6 was held only to provide conclusive proof of the existence
of need to acquire the land for public purposes in terms of Section 6(3). While
considering the Act, as amended by the Act of 1967, the Apex Court held (Paras 25
and 26) :

       "It is clear from the provisions set out above that the object of the notification
       under Section 6 is to ensure that the Government is satisfied, after an enquiry at
       which parties concerned are heard, that the land under consideration is really
       needed for a public purpose and that the declaration is to operate as conclusive
       evidence to show that this is so. The conclusiveness of this declaration cannot
       be questioned anywhere if the procedure dealing with its making has been
       observed. The notification which takes place under Section 6(2), set out above,
       follows and serves only as evidence of the declaration.

(Emphasis supplied)..

       ......In fact, Section 4(2) of the Amendment Act of 1967, set out above, itself
       makes a distinction between a "declaration" under Section 6 and its
       "notification" under Section 4 of the principal Act. It does not say that no
       notification under Section 6 of the principal Act can take place beyond the time
       fixed. The prohibition is confined to declaration made beyond the specified
       period. If the case of the appellant could be that no declaration was made within
       the prescribed time, it was his duty to prove it. He has not discharged that
       onus."
It may be noticed that the Apex Court has interpreted the relevant provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act in Khadim Hussain's case (supra), with reference to the object,
with which the relevant provisions were associat-ed.
34. As I have discussed above, the sole purpose of declaration under Section 6, under
the existing scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, is not merely to serve the purpose of
furnishing conclusive evidence to show that the land under consideration is really
needed for the public purpose, but, is also essential part of the time-frame within
which the land acquisition proceedings up to making of an award of compensation,
has to be completed. It also clears the way for taking order of the Government by the
Collector concerned to acquire the land and proceed in the manner provided under
Section 7 and thereafter. The decision in Khadim Hussain's case (supra), was founded
on the finding that sole purpose of declaration under Section 6 was to furnish
conclusive evidence of the fact that land is needed for public purpose, in a case arising
out of proceedings which took place before the commencement of the Act of 1984.
Hence, that decision is clearly distinguishable and ratio thereof is not ap-plicable in
the present case.

35. The object, with which the amend-ments in Sections 4 and 6 were made and
Section 11-A was inserted, was to provide a time-frame within which the proceedings
of acquiring land up to amount of compensation payable to the person interested, is
deter-mined, and is made available to them. This time- frame is of three years period,
from the date of publication of notification under Section 4, by providing different
time limits for completing the intermediate stages.

36. If interpretation, as suggested by learned counsel for the respondents, which is
based on difference of meaning between the words "made" and "published", is
accepted; then, the phrase "declaration shall be made" would defeat the very purpose
of the Act, by leaving an interim stage, to be completed without any time limit. This
will make the Act susceptible to abuse by subtle intervention and evasion, for
continued mischief.
Since the present case is covered by the provisions of the Act, as it exists, after the
amendment came into force by the Act of 1984; the ratio of aforesaid decision cannot
be made applicable, ipso facto, in the present case.

37. Apart from what has been discussed above, my conclusion is not rested on gram-
matical meaning of word "declaration", alone. It will be noticed that in Section 6(1),
the phrase used is "declaration shall be made" and, in Sub- Section (3) of Section 6
also, the phraseology of "making such declaration" has been used. To be precise, Sub-
Section (3) provides - "after making such declaration, the appropriate Government
may acquire the land in the manner hereinafter appearing". If making of a declaration
does not partake within its ambit, making it known to others, in the manner provided
under Section 6(2); then it would result in a very anomalous situation. In that event, in
terms of Section 6(3), as soon as the declaration is made, the appropriate Government
may acquire the land in the manner hereinafter appearing; that is to say, it can put into
execution the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, commencing from Section 7
onwards, as soon as a document of satisfaction about need for acquisition was signed
by the Secretary to the Government or by any other officer autho-rised in this behalf;
without there being publication of the declaration in the manner provided under Sub-
Section (2) of Section 6. It is nobody's case, rather it is an admitted premise; that
publication of declaration in all the modes is necessary before it becomes operative
and it is the case of the respondents also that the phraseology of Sub-Section (2)
suggests that the date of publication is relevant for the purpose of the provisions of the
Act, appearing after Section 6(2). If the contention advanced on behalf of the res-
pondents is to be accepted, the date of publication referred after Section 6(2) is
relevant only for Section 11-A, as the phrase "from the date of publication of
declaration", finds place only in Section 11-A. Sub-Section (3) of Section 6 also does
not use the word "publication", but uses the word "making such declaration", that is to
say, verb "make" has been used for "declaration" in both the provisions, of Section 6,
Sub-Sections (1) and (3). If the "making of a declaration", within its ambit does not
include the "publication of such declaration ", then. it would be contradiction terms, to
say that, publication of declaration in all the modes is mandatory require-ment, before
further proceedings can be taken in terms of declaration but the statute authorizes to
take further proceedings for acquiring the land in the manner appearing after Sub-
Section (3) of Section 6, as soon as the declaration is made; as distinguished from
"declaration is published". Naturally, accept-ing the contention on its face will exclude
the provisions of Sub-Section. (2) of Section 6 for the purpose of putting into action
the ac-question proceedings after "making" such declaration. The acceptance of
interpretation suggested by the respondents would mean that even before the
publication of a declaration in the modes prescribed by the Act, the land may be
acquired in the manner appearing in the provisions of the Act succeeding Sub-Section
(3) of Section 6, rendering the provisions of Section 6(2), which are admitted to be
mandatory, wholly nugatory. If, on the other hand, it is suggested that while for the
purposes of Section 6(1), making of a declaration has a different meaning than for the
purpose of Section 6(3), inasmuch as, making of such declaration under Section 6(3)
would include its publication as well, then it strengthen conclusion that at best, the
phrase "declaration shall be made", is capable of more than one meaning. In that
event, it would be a requirement of principle enunciated in Heydon's case (1584-3 Co
Rep 7a) (supra), to accept that interpretation which effectuates the object and purport
of Law and suppress the mischief for which it has been brought into existence in
preference to that, which would leave room for subtle intervention and invasion for
continuance of the mischief. The interpretation which I have accepted leaves no period
from the date of publication of notification under Section 4 until the date of making of
an award, unprovoked for by a time-frame and would further the object of the
amendments by suppressing the mischief of prolonged delay for want of any provision
in the Act providing for a time-frame to complete the land acquisition pro- ceedings.

38. The word "declaration" used under Section 6(1), cannot be in the Scheme, as it
presently exists, be treated to be an order of acquisition by the appropriate
Government, as suggested by learned counsel for the respondent. Sub-section (3) of
Section 6 provides that after making such declaration, the appro-priate Government
may acquire the land in the manner hereinafter appearing, that is to say, in the
provisions succeeding Section 6 of the Act.

39. Section 7 of the Act envisages that whenever any, land have been so declared to be
needed for a public purpose or for a Company, the appropriate Government or some
officer authorized by the appropriate Government in this behalf, shall direct the
Collector to take order for the acquisition of the land. This clearly indicates that an
order of acquisition of the land has to be made after a declaration under Section 6 has
been made. Therefore, the requirement that the declaration shall be made when the
Government is satisfied that any particular land is needed for the public purpose is not
by itself an order of acquisition and, purposely the term "declaration" has been used in
a sense, different from the "order", in Section 6(1) of the Act.

40. In this connection, it may also be noticed that can it be said that, but for the
provisions of Section 6(2), no publication in any form is required to be made, of the
declaration made under Section 6(1) ? In my opinion, even if Sub- Sec. (2) did not
exist, a declaration in order to come into force, for any purpose of the Act, had to have
been made known or published in a reasonable manner, though such manner may not
have to be in con-formity with any particular mode. Even in the absence of Sub-
section (2), a declaration that the appropriate Government is satisfied that any
particular land is needed for the public pur-pose, or for a Company, could have been
complete and effective only if it has been made known or published in some manner
and only then it could have been a 'conclusive evidence' of the fact that the land
sought to be acquired for, is needed for a public purpose and thereafter, it could have
been brought to a situation where particular provisions, succeeding Section 6 could
have been invoked in terms of Sub-section (3) of Section 6.

41. It may be relevant, in this connection, to refer to the observations made by the
Apex Court in the Collector (District Magistrate), Allahabad v. Raja Ram Jaiswal, 22
with reference to Section 4(1) of the Act, as under :

       "It could not be urged that since the underlying purpose behind publication of a
       notice in the locality is to give an op-portunity to the person interested in the
       land to object to the acquisition, where in a case, the purpose is achieved as in
       the instant case the petitioner having filed his objections, the failure to publish
       the substance of the notification in the locality need not be treated fatal and
       cannot invalidate the proceedings. The submission as presented is very
       persuasive and but for binding precedents. The Supreme Court would not
       whittle down a mandate of legislation recognized by a long line of decisions
       solely depending upon the facts of a given case. Further the submission is pre-
       dicated upon an assumption that the sole purpose behind publication of
       substance of notification in locality is to make require-ments of Section 5-A
       functionally effective. The assumption is not well founded."

Their Lordships further went on to observe as under (Para 16) :

      "Assuming that a notification in the Of-ficial Gazette is a formal expression of
      the decision of the Government, the decision of the Government is hardly
      relevant unless it takes the concrete shape and form by publication in the Official
      Gazette. Where a decision of the Government to be effective and valid has to
      notified in the Government Gazette, the decision itself does not become effective
      unless a notification in the Official Gazette follows. Therefore, assuming that
      notification is a formal expression of a decision of the Government to acquire
      land, unless the decision is notified in the Government Gazette by an appropriate
      Government notification, the proceedings for acquisition cannot be said to have
      been initiated and the decision would remain a paper decision."

No doubt, these observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court have made in reference to
Section 4 of the Act, but the analogy is fully applicable to the provisions of Section 6,
as far as the question - when the declaration under Section 6 can be said to have been
made effective ?

42. In Raja Ram Jaiswal's case (supra), it has been stated in no uncertain terms that
the decision of the Government is hardly relevant, unless it takes concrete shape and
form by its publication, and, where a decision of the Government in order to be
effective and valid, has to be published, for, an effective decision is made, only when
it is published.

43. If the provisions of Section 6 are read in the frame-work of the Scheme of the
acquisition proceedings; under the Act, in my opinion, it leaves no room of doubt that
making of declaration under Section 6(1) as well as under Section 6(3), envisages
within its ambit, the act of making it known in the formal manner and that formal
manner of making it known, has been provided by Section 6(2).

44. It has also been argued, in this connection, that Sub-section (2) of Section 6 states
that last of the dates of such publication and giving of such public notice (hereinafter
referred to as 'the date of publication of declaration'), is suggestive of the fact that the
date of publication is relevant only, for the purpose of provisions appearing after
Section 6(2) and, is not relevant or related to provisions of Section 6(1), which
precedes Section 6(2). The use of the expres-sion "hereinafter", according, to learned
counsel, is significant and is clearly indicative that the definition of the "last of the
dates of publication", is for the purposes of sub-sequent provisions of the Act and not
for the preceding provisions, including Section 6(1) of the Act. For this submission,
learned counsel relied on Umesh Aggrawal's case (1989 LACC 675) (All) (supra) and
Lt. K. Padmadas's case (supra). In Umesh Aggarwal's case, the Court observed as
under :

       "The relevant portion of Sub-Section (2) of Section 6 is "the last of the date of
       such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred
       to as the date of publication of the declaration." The use of the word 'hereinafter'
       is significant. No such words as 'in this Section' or 'in this Act' or 'herein-
       before'. There is no provision that the publication of the declaration in the
       Official Gazette and two newspapers and the giving of public notice, all are to
       be done before the expiry of one year from the date of publication of
       notification under Section 4. In our opinion, the contention of the learned
       counsel for the petitioner has no force and it is not required by law that the
       declaration under Section 6 should have been published in the Official Gazette
       and two newspapers and public notice of the declaration should have been given
       in the locality before the expiry of one year from the date of publication of the
       notification under Section 4."

In Lt. K., Padmadas's case (supra), his Lordship of High Court of Judicature for
Kerala, observed as under (at p. 162 of AIR) :

       "It is evident from the parenthesis, which is relevant, that any reference in the
       subsequent provisions of the Act, to the date of publication of the declaration is
       to be taken as the last of the dates of publication and the giving of public notice.
       The use of the expression "hereinafter referred to" makes it clear that the
       definition of the last date of publication is for the purpose of the subsequent
       provisions of the Act. It is not possible to project it back for the purpose of Sub-
       section (1)........"

45. After giving considerable thought, I have not been able to persuade myself to fall
in line with the above decisions, Firstly; because, in my opinion, as discussed above,
making of declaration includes the act of making it known by announcement or pro-
collimation officially and, therefore, the mode of publication provided under Sub-
section (2) of Section 6, is only the mode of making known or proclaiming the
declaration officially there-fore, there cannot be different dates of making of
declaration and publication of declaration. Secondly; the fact that for brevity's sake, if
the Act has provided that 'hereinafter last of the dates of such publica-tion shall be
referred to as the dates of publication', it does not mean the date of publication for
different parts of the Act, would be different. There is no basis in confining the
meaning of 'date of publication' only for later part of the Act and not for the purpose of
whole Act. If that be so, being a necessary implication or expression; inter-pretation of
the very same provision cannot be different for the purposes of different provisions of
the same enactment. It cannot be held that for the purpose of Section 6(1), the date of
publication shall be different than for the purpose of Section 11-A. When Section 6(2)
explicitly states that last of the dates of publication of such declaration shall be the
date of publication of declaration, when a declaration is to be published in
various/different modes and, publication by all the modes is mandatory. In that view of
the matter, there can only be one date of publication for all purposes under the Article.
Therefore, merely the fact that by one of the modes, publication was effected within a
period of one year of publication of notification under Section 4, will not save the land
acquisition proceedings from being lapsed, if the publication by all the modes have
not been effected within one year. There is no dispute between the parties that,
publication by all the modes is mandatory, and the declaration under Section 6 was not
published in all the modes within one year of publication of notification under Section
4.

46. As a result of this conclusion, it necessarily follows that publication of decla-ration
under Section 6 in the manner provided under Section 6(2), only makes the declaration
effective; that is to say, a publication in all the modes prescribed under Section 6(2)
have to be made for completing the 'making of declaration' envisaged under that
Section.
47. Thus, viewing from any angle, whether applying the test of plaint literal dictionary
meaning to the language used in the Act or, applying the test of Mischief Rule of
interpreting the Statute, or looking from the point of view of legislative intention, the
conclusion is irresistible that the act of 'making declaration' by the appropriate
Government that any particular land is needed for public purpose, include the act of
making it known public, in official manner and, that act has to be performed within a
period of one year from the date of notification under Section 4(1). The act of making
declaration known in official manner has been pre-scribed under Section 6(2) of the
Act. The principle is well settled that where any statutory provision provides a
particular manner for doing particular act, then, that thing or act must be done in
accordance with the manner pre-scribed. Therefore, the act of making declaration of
Government's satisfaction in regard to the requirement of the particular land for any
public purpose is complete only when the same is made known by publishing the said
satisfaction in the manner prescribed under Section 6(2), for the purpose of further
proceedings in the matter of land acquisition, in terms of the other provisions of the
Act. It is only after the publication of the declaration in the manner prescribed under
Section 6(2) that it becomes a declaration which is conclusive proof of the fact that
land is needed for public purpose and it is only 'making of such declaration', which
furnishes conclusive proof of such satisfaction that authorizes the appropriate
Government to acquire land in the manner thereafter provided under the Act. It is only
after making such declaration that the appropriate Government can issue directions to
the Collector to take orders for acquisition of land under Section 7 of the Act. It is only
after making of such declaration which includes publication thereof also, that
provisions of Section 11-A becomes effective in sup-pressing the mischief for which it
has been enacted.

48. Summing up of aforesaid discussion, is that making of a declaration under Section
6(1) within its ambit includes the act of making the document of declaration known or
published officially. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 provides only the modes of
publication of declaration, which is a part of the act of making of a declaration and the
publication of declaration in all the modes prescribed under Section 6(2) has to be
made within the period prescribed under Section 6(1).

49. Coming to the last point urged by learned counsel for the petitioner, that the public
purpose, even if it was existing at the time of notification under Section 4, has now
ceased to exist and, therefore, the land acquisition proceedings should be quashed,
though in terms of my conclusion on contention No. 3, this contention need not be
decided, yet it would be sufficient to state that the contention of learned counsel for
the petitioner is not well founded. If the public purpose existed at the time when the
land acquisition proceedings commenced, the fact that particular public purpose for
which the land was sought to be acquired after declaration under Section 6 has been
made, as a result of subsequent cessation of that public purpose; the land which has
been acquired for one public purpose, may ultimately be used for other public
purpose, without affecting the validity of acquisition proceedings of the land.
Therefore, any land acquisition proceedings, which have been validly carried out, are
not invalidate as a result of subsequent cessation of declared public purpose.

50. As a result of above discussion, the petition succeeds. Since, admittedly,
publication of declaration under Section 6 in all the modes have not been made within
a period of one year from the date of publication of notification under Section 4, even
after excluding the period during which the proceedings remain-ed stayed by the
orders of the Court; the land acquisition proceedings could not validly have been
continued after lapse of one year from the date of publication of notification under
Section 4. Hence, the impugned land acquisition proceedings, in their entirety are
quashed.

There will be no order as to costs

Petition allowed.

Cases Referred.

1. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2420/87
2. AIR 1988 Pat 341
3. (S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1922/90), decided by this Court on 14-9-1992
4. 1989 LACC 675 (All)
5. AIR 1992 Ker 158
6. AIR 1992 Bom 72
7. 1990 LACC 363 (Punj and Har)
8. AIR 1985 SC 1622
9. AIR 1966 SC 1593
10. AIR 1963 SC 1019
11. AIR 1960 SC 1203
12. AIR 1966 SC 1593
13. (1967) 2 Mad LJ 422
14. 1955 SC 661
15. ((1990) 2 SCC 71)
16. (1975 (1) All England Reporter 810)
17. (1992) 6 JT (SC) 182
18. AIR 1957 SC 907
19. (1989 LACC (All) 675)
20. AIR 1992 Bom 72
21. (1976) 1 SCC 843
22. AIR 1985 SC 1622