RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT

                Chandra Bose

                Vs.

                State of Rajasthan

                Civil Writ Petn. No. 185 of 2000
                          (B.R. Yadav, J.)

                20.07.2000

                ORDER

B.R. Yadav, J.

1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Rajendra Prasad, at length. Perused
the suspension-order, dated 6-1-2000, Annexure-4 to the writ petition, whereby, the
petitioner was suspended from the office of Chairperson, Municipal Board,
Kishangarh, District, Ajmer; and also the amended suspension-order dated 24-2-2000,
Annexure-6 to the writ petition, whereby, the petitioner was not only suspended from
the office of Chairperson of the aforesaid Board but also as a member of the Board.

2. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Rejendra Prasad, I
have gone through the orders impugned, Annexures 4 and 6, together with the charge-
sheet. Annexure-1 and the explanation given by the petitioner, Annexure-3 to the writ
petition.

3. From a close scrutiny of the averments made in the writ petition and the averments
made in the reply filed by the respondents, it is crystal clear that the State
Government, in exercise of its power under sub-section (2) of Section 63 of the
Rajasthan Municipal Act, 1959 (Act No. 38 of 1959), appointed an enquiry officer, to
make preliminary enquiry into the facts brought to its notice. After receipt of the
preliminary enquiry report from the authority appointed by the State Government, the
petitioner was given an opportunity to submit her explanation. After taking into
account the preliminary enquiry report, together with the explanation, submitted by the
petitioner, the State Government drew up a statement, setting out distinctly the charges
against the petitioner and sent the same for enquiry and findings by a Judicial Officer
of a rank of District Judge, appointed by it, for the purpose of holding a detailed
enquiry, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, within the meaning of
sub-section (3) of Section 63 of Act No. 38 of 1959.

4. It is revealed from the materials available on record that during the pendency of the
enquiry by a Judicial Officer of a rank of District Judge, the State Government placed
the petitioner under suspension as Chairperson and also as a member of the Municipal
Board, Kishangarh, District, Ajmer, against whom, proceedings had already
commenced, as stated hereinabove.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Rajendra Prasad, meticulously urged
before me that the charges leveled against the petitioner, are superficial in nature and
the suspension-orders of the petitioner have been passed due to bias attitude of the
State Government.

6. It is observed that it is very easy to allege bias, but it is very difficult to prove it. I
have gone through the charges, leveled by the State Government, against the
petitioner. Those charges cannot be said to be superficial, if analyzed in the light of
Section 67 of Act No. 38 of Act of 1959. I restrain to make any comment on the merit
of the allegations made against the petitioner, because, it is to be enquired by a
Judicial Officer of a rank of District Judge, I do not consider it proper to deal with the
arguments, raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, because, it will adversely
affect to the petitioner, if the learned Advocate General is also called upon to reply the
same, as averred in the reply filed on behalf of the respondents.

7. At this stage, I have examined the statutory provisions of sub-sections (2), (3) and
(4) of Section 63 of Act No. 38 of 1959, which reveal that the State Legislature has
taken all precautions, to make procedure of suspension, against a member or chairman
of a Board, just, fair and reasonable. In the present case, the State Government, before
passing the impugned order dated 6-1-2000, Annexure-4 and the amended suspension
order dated 24-2-2000, Annexure-6, has followed the statutory mandate, envisaged
under sub-section (2) as well as sub-section (4) of Section 63 of the aforesaid Act.

8. I am of the view that the charges, leveled against the petitioner, raise disputed
questions of fact, which cannot be gone into under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, therefore, I decline to make the suspension- order dated 6-1-2000, Annexure-4
and the amended suspension-order dated 24-2- 2000, Annexure-6 to the writ petition,
ineffective, by issuing a writ of certiorari.
9. Lastly, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Rajendra Prasad,
that the petitioner has apprehension in her mind that since a proceeding for her
removal under Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 63 of Act No. 38 of 1959, is
pending against her, therefore, she may be debarred to contest election of member of
the Board. In reply, it is submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General, Sri
Mohammed Rafiq that the apprehension of the petitioner, is misplaced in view of the
mandatory provisions, envisaged under Section 64 of Act No. 38 of 1959, wherein, it
is provided that a member, who has been removed under Clause (d) of sub-section (1)
of Section 63, or against whom, adverse findings have been recorded under Section
63-A, shall not be eligible for re-election for a period of five years from the date of
passing the order of his removal or from the date of recording of adverse finding, as
the case may be. According to the learned Additional Advocate General, the petitioner
cannot be debarred from contesting forthcoming election of member of Municipal
Board, Kishangarh, due to pendency of removal proceedings under Clause (d) of sub-
section (1) of Section 63 of the said Act.

10. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the contentions, raised by the learned
counsel for the parties. I am of the view that in such a situation, in abundant caution, it
is held that during the pendency of removal proceeding against the petitioner, under
Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 63 of Act No. 38 of 1959, she would be
entitled to file her nomination-paper and she would be eligible for re-election in
forthcoming election of Municipal Board, Kishangarh, District, Ajmer, if she so
chooses. Her nomination-paper would not be rejected on the ground that a proceeding
of removal against her is pending under Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 63 of
the aforesaid Act.

11. With the aforesaid observations, the instant writ petition is hereby dismissed on
merit. In the circumstances of the case, both the parties are directed to bear their own
costs.

Petition dismissed.